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Introduction: Disasters, such as hurricanes, pandemics, and mass casualty incidents, 
have become a fixture of modern life. Requirements for hospitals to prepare for and respond 
to disasters can be challenging, given resources available and today’s healthcare 
environment. This study explored these challenges by describing hospital employees 
perceptions of the disaster response experience, and the hospital work environment during 
disaster response.  
Background: Little is known about the challenges hospital employees face during 
disaster response. Prior research has identified concerns related to inadequate supplies, space, 
and staff to conduct successful healthcare responses to disasters. The safety and 
psychological wellbeing of hospital staff who participate in disaster response are additional 
concerns. Hospital employees’ experiences of disaster response may also be affected by 
employment factors such as job role and job level within the hospital organization.  
Methods: Qualitative description was used to examine the experiences of hospital 
employees who were involved in a hospital evacuation during Hurricane Florence in 2018. 
Sixteen hospital employees, sampled from the Frontline, Middle, and Leadership 
organizational levels, participated in semi-structured interviews. Documents were reviewed 
to provide context for the interview data. Using conventional content analysis, interview data 
and document review notes were examined for themes related to hospital staff experiences of 
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working during the disaster, and participants’ perceptions of the disaster response work 
environment.  
Results: Participants described the cultures of teamwork, communication, and 
organizational learning during the disaster response experience. The disaster experience was 
shaped by participants’ job role and job level: Frontline employees described dissatisfaction 
with pay and fears about their own safety and the safety of their families; employees with 
clinical duties described patient safety concerns. Participants also described a second 
disaster: the permanent closure of the obstetrics unit after the hurricane, and the impact on 
hospital staff and the community.  
Conclusion: Effective hospital disaster response requires more than meeting hospital 
accreditation standards. Adequate supplies, space, and organizational culture are critical to 
ensure the health, safety, and psychological needs of employees who respond during a 
disaster. Hospital leaders and policymakers must devote the needed resources to hospital 
disaster preparedness to facilitate successful healthcare responses to disasters. 
v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 Thank you to all who assisted me with this endeavor. Thank you to Dr. Christine T. 
Kovner, without whom I would have never begun this degree program, and to Dr. Cheryl B. 
Jones, without whom I would have never finished it.  Thank you to my committee, who 
endured numerous revisions and updates emails. Thank you to my study participants for 
being so gracious and open. Thank you to the individuals who supported my work in critical 
ways, whether they realized it or not: Kevin, Alberta, and William.  
 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................... x 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................. xi 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1 
The Hospital Environment During Disaster Response ................................................. 5 
Purpose of This Study ................................................................................................... 5 
Research Questions ....................................................................................................... 6 
Significance of the Study .............................................................................................. 6 
Chapter Summary ......................................................................................................... 7 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................. 9 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 9 
Understanding Disasters ............................................................................................... 9 
Preparedness ............................................................................................................... 12 
Response ..................................................................................................................... 17 
Employee Experiences of Disaster Response at the Workplace ................................. 21 
Two Key Factors: Willingness and Ability to Respond ...................................... 22 
Job Characteristics ............................................................................................... 23 
Employee Needs During Disaster Response ....................................................... 24 
Psychological Effects of Disaster Response ........................................................ 26 
Resource Availability and Workarounds ............................................................. 30 
Media Coverage of Event .................................................................................... 31 
The Work Environment During Disaster Response .................................................... 33 
 vii 
Communication .................................................................................................... 33 
Staffing and Workload ......................................................................................... 35 
Organizational Justice .......................................................................................... 37 
Chapter Summary ....................................................................................................... 38 
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODS ................................................................................ 39 
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 39 
Research Design.......................................................................................................... 39 
Addressing Validity .................................................................................................... 40 
Setting ......................................................................................................................... 42 
Sample......................................................................................................................... 43 
Procedures ................................................................................................................... 47 
Site Selection ....................................................................................................... 47 
Recruitment .......................................................................................................... 48 
Data Collection .................................................................................................... 51 
Qualitative Data Analysis .................................................................................... 54 
Protection of Human Subjects .................................................................................... 57 
Special Research Considerations for Victims of Disasters .................................. 58 
Chapter Summary ....................................................................................................... 60 
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS ........................................................................................................ 61 
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 61 
Summary of Hurricane-Related Events ...................................................................... 62 
The Hurricane ...................................................................................................... 63 
The Birth Center Closure ..................................................................................... 66 
Results ......................................................................................................................... 67 
RQ1: Staff Experiences of the Hospital Evacuation ................................................... 68 
 viii 
Preparation for the Hurricane .............................................................................. 69 
The Hurricane Response ...................................................................................... 75 
The Aftermath ...................................................................................................... 87 
RQ2: The Work Environment ..................................................................................... 99 
Facilities ............................................................................................................. 100 
Organizational Culture ....................................................................................... 107 
Comparison of Findings by Job Role and Job Level ................................................ 119 
Comparison of Findings by Recruitment Method .................................................... 120 
Chapter Summary ..................................................................................................... 121 
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION ................................................................................................ 123 
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 123 
Summary of Major Findings ..................................................................................... 123 
Staff Satisfaction ................................................................................................ 124 
The Influence of Job Role and Job Level .......................................................... 126 
Duty, Obligation, and Standards of Care ........................................................... 127 
Stress, Burnout, and Psychological Debris ........................................................ 129 
The Second Disaster: Loss of the Birth Center ................................................. 132 
Building Hazards and Cascading Effects .......................................................... 134 
Hospital Culture ................................................................................................. 135 
Community Networks ........................................................................................ 138 
Implications............................................................................................................... 139 
Implications for Practice .................................................................................... 140 
Implications for Education ................................................................................ 144 
Implications for Future Research ....................................................................... 145 
Implications for Policy ...................................................................................... 146 
 ix 
Limitations and Methodological Considerations of this Dissertation....................... 149 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 151 
APPENDIX A: RECRUITMENT EMAIL ........................................................................... 153 
APPENDIX B: FOLLOW-UP RECRUITMENT EMAIL ................................................... 154 
APPENDIX C: FLYER ........................................................................................................ 155 
APPENDIX D: INTERVIEW GUIDE ................................................................................. 156 
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................... 157 
  
 x 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Anticipated Sampling Strategy ................................................................................. 45 
Table 2. Organization of Themes and Categories ................................................................... 68  
 xi 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
CMS  Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services 
CNA  Certified Nursing Assistant 
CSC  Crisis Standards of Care 
ED  Emergency Department 
EMS  Emergency Medical Services 
EOP  Emergency Operations Plan 
FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency 
HICS  Hospital Incident Command System 
HIC  Hospital Incident Command 
IC  Incident Commander 
ICU  Intensive Care Unit 
NG  Nasogastric 
OSHA  Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
RN  Registered Nurse 
SARS  Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
UC  Unit Clerk 
1 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
When two airplanes flew into the World Trade Center in downtown Manhattan, New 
York on September 11, 2001, one of the largest workplace evacuations during a disaster in 
United States history took place (Gershon, Magda, Riley, & Sherman, 2011). More than 
14,000 employees and visitors were successfully evacuated from the building within two 
hours, amid smoke, fire, noise, mass confusion, and clouds of falling ash (Gershon, Qureshi, 
Rubin, & Raveis, 2007; Groeger, Stellman, Kravitt, & Brackbill, 2013). The success of this 
disaster response is especially significant considering the flaws in building design and 
engineering, the evacuees’ lack of familiarity of the safety features and layout of the 
building, the environmental hazards that resulted from the disaster, and the relatively high 
rate of medical conditions and disabilities reported by those who experienced the disaster at 
the time (23%) (Gershon et al., 2011).  
Four years later, in September of 2005, more than 2,000 patients, staff, and visitors 
waited four days to be evacuated from Memorial Medical Center in New Orleans, Louisiana 
as Hurricane Katrina demolished the hospital and the surrounding community (Canfield, 
2011). Survivors withstood devastating conditions inside the hospital, which had lost power 
and water, and had filled with sewage, floodwater, and the stench of decay. As the storm 
withdrew from the city, at least 45 patient corpses were carried out of the building (Fink, 
2013). In the years following, as information about what took place in Memorial Medical 
Center during those four days was made public, hospitals and healthcare organizations began 
reconsidering their own disaster planning efforts.  
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These examples illustrate the wide variation in the outcomes of disaster management, 
and the impact that it has on human lives. Disaster management is generally described as a 
cycle that consists of four phases: preparedness, or planning to handle a disaster; response, or 
actions taken to save lives and prevent damage during a disaster; recovery, or actions taken to 
return to normalcy or safety after a disaster; and mitigation, or activities that prevent or 
lessen the impact of disasters (Couch, 2008). This cycle is generally used by businesses and 
governmental agencies at local state, and national levels to prevent, plan for, and reduce the 
impact of disasters.  
Disasters are extreme events that can occur suddenly or over a period of time, and 
cause damage to human beings, infrastructure, and the environment. Disasters are often 
characterized as natural or manmade. Natural disasters include events brought on by natural 
phenomena. These events are generally caused by movements of the earth (such as in 
volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, and tsunamis), climate change (such as hurricanes, 
tornadoes, extreme drought, extreme heat, famine, and landslides) (Vasilescu, Khan, & Khan, 
2008), and the spread of infectious diseases, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS), Ebola Virus Disease (EVD), and novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19). The 
number of people affected by these extreme hazards has significantly increased during the 
past decade (Guha-Sapir, Hoyois, Wallemacq, & Below, 2016).  
Manmade disasters include events brought on by human negligence or malice, such 
as terrorism, mass casualty incidents, industrial accidents, technological hazards (such as the 
widespread or sustained loss of internet connectivity, or the breach of a secure network 
containing sensitive data), and engineering failures. Political conflicts, social injustice, and 
poor gun regulations have been cited as being the causes of numerous tragedies over the past 
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decade, such as the Boko Haram (CNN, 2018a) and ISIS (CNN, 2018b) attacks, the 
Charlottesville, Virginia protests (Spencer & Gay Stolberg, 2017), the Pulse Nightclub 
massacre (Ellis, Fantz, Karimi, & McLaughlin, 2016), and the litany of school shootings that 
continue to occur in the United States (Grabow & Rose, 2018). When these events occur in 
exposed areas, with vulnerable or un-prepared people, organizations, or structures, they can 
result in humanitarian conditions that are similar in severity to natural disasters (The United 
Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction [UNISDR], 2015).  
When natural or man-made disasters occur, local hospitals often become the nexus of 
relief, providing shelter, food, water, electricity, and communication, in addition to providing 
care for the sick and injured (The Institute of Medicine [IOM], 2012). The hospital may even 
become the victim of a disaster if, for example, a hospital’s infrastructure or utility system 
become affected by flooding from a hurricane, its staff and patient safety are threatened by an 
approaching wildfire, or a suspicious package is left unattended in the hospital lobby. Under 
such conditions, hospital leaders must respond in some way, often making the critical 
decision to fully or partially evacuate hospital premises. Hospitals that are affected by 
disaster and experience an evacuation are potentially burdened with enormous financial, 
logistical, and safety challenges to the hospital and its staff, often requiring staff to quickly 
make decisions, provide care using whatever means or supplies available, and protect both 
themselves and their patients under rapidly changing conditions. Despite the high stakes of 
disasters, research concerning the logistics and experience of evacuating a hospital is sparse.   
Generally, the literature on disasters in healthcare can be sorted into four main 
categories: a) narrative or non-empirical accounts of organizational staff or patient 
experiences during a disaster (see Bernard & Mathews, 2008); b) clinical best practices for 
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managing injuries or illness during or after disaster (see Jain, Noponen, & Smith, 2003); c) 
studies of disaster response simulations in hospitals (see Pucher et al., 2014), and d) survey 
studies of hospital employee willingness and ability to report for work during or after a 
disaster (see Charney, Rebmann, & Flood, 2015). Narrative accounts of staff experiences are 
often presented in editorials, the news media, and in non-fiction books to describe personal 
experiences and observations during a disaster response. Clinical best practices, staff 
availability, and simulations are also important areas of the literature that inform disaster 
planning. Although captivating to read, these accounts are not rigorous empirical work. A 
2010 analysis of public health emergency preparedness literature published between 2000-
2008 found that nearly 68% of the literature were non-empirical articles such as narrative 
accounts and editorials (Yeager, Menachemi, McCormick, & Ginter, 2010). These efforts do 
not provide critical information about the work environment during disasters, such as 
communication, resources and supplies, facilities, teamwork, and administrative processes.  
Research designed to examine the hospital work environment during disaster 
response could help guide future disaster planning and improve the way hospitals are 
prepared to respond. The healthcare environment has direct and indirect relationships with 
the quality and safety of the healthcare delivered (Choi, Bergquist-Beringer, & Staggs, 2013; 
Djukic, Kovner, Brewer, Fatehi, & Greene, 2014), which is especially important during a 
disaster. Thus, understanding the hospital disaster response environment is essential to 
improve the quality and safety of healthcare provided during disasters, and to protect 
employee health and safety during these events. Specifically, there is a need for research 
focusing on the hospital disaster response phenomenon, and the work environment in which 
the response occurs, to inform organizational leaders as they prepare for such events.  
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The Hospital Environment During Disaster Response 
Depending on the type and context of the disaster, hospitals are vulnerable to 
numerous health and safety hazards during disaster response. The physical work 
environment, or the infrastructure, utilities, and supplies, may be affected by power loss, 
flooding, infrastructure damage, loss of plumbing or potable water, dramatic shifts in 
temperature due to loss of cooling or heating, insufficient food supply, fire, chemical spills or 
odors, or insufficient supplies required for patient care. These changes in the physical work 
environment can directly affect both patient and employee health and safety during disaster 
response. 
The non-physical work environment—such as the teamwork and communication 
between staff, management and leadership styles, organizational culture, and financial 
aspects of the organization—also may be altered by changes in communication or cohesion 
between team members, changes in job roles and responsibilities, supervisory support, or 
inequalities in pay, resources, or aid. Changes in the non-physical work environment can 
affect employee satisfaction and organizational commitment, and ultimately affect patient 
safety and the quality of care provided to patients (Aiken et al., 2012; Djukic et al., 2014).  
Purpose of This Study 
The purpose of this dissertation was to explore hospital employees’ experiences and 
perceptions of their work environment during a hospital evacuation that was triggered by a 
natural disaster, Hurricane Florence, that struck the Carolinas in September 2018. Using 
qualitative methods, the investigator identified factors in the work environment that shaped 
participants’ perceptions of the hospital disaster response experience. Qualitative description 
was the methodology used to explore the phenomenon of hospital evacuation related to 
disaster response. Sixteen semi-structured interviews were conducted with employees of a 
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hospital that evacuated due to Hurricane Florence, and Hospital Incident Command System 
(HICS) notes were examined to provide context. Interview transcripts were examined 
following the principles of conventional content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). 
Research Questions 
The following questions were used to guide this study: 
1. What were the experiences of staff working in a hospital during a disaster-related 
evacuation?  
2. How did hospital staff describe the work environment during a disaster-related 
evacuation? 
Significance of the Study 
This study is significant in several ways. First, an empirical approach was used to 
examine a topic that is both under-studied and critically important in protecting humans 
during disaster response. The researcher was able to explore the perspectives of hospital 
employees who experienced a disaster and worked during a hospital evacuation. Although 
narrative reports, media stories and articles, personal blogs, and nonfiction books have been 
published on the topic, these reports are primarily personal accounts of individuals’ 
experiences, and subject to biases and perhaps the temptation to sensationalize disaster 
events. These empirically derived findings will add to the small body of evidence on the 
topic of hospital employee experiences during disaster response, and inform hospital 
preparedness and response planning.  
Second, to our knowledge, this is the first study of hospital employee experiences 
during a natural disaster that used a sampling strategy focusing on job role (such as nurse, 
security officer, or administrator) and job level (such as frontline, middle management, and 
top-level employees), including both clinician and non-clinician participants. Empirical 
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studies of hospitals responding to disasters often do not sample staff members who are 
outside the patient care role, such as environmental services staff, security, and facilities 
engineers. Yet, these individuals play an important role during a disaster response, are able to 
contribute a unique perspective on the hospital work environment during disaster response, 
and provide a broader understanding of how individuals and groups work together during 
actual, difficult, and high-risk situations.  
Third, the hospital where data were generated is a rural hospital that, in response to a 
natural disaster, closed its birth center. Although natural disasters, like hurricanes, do not 
discriminate between rural and urban areas, rural communities are often more adversely 
affected because they lack the resources and expertise needed to prepare for and recover from 
a disaster. The impact of the natural disaster on the rural hospital in this study resulted in the 
closing of its birth center, which limited access to needed obstetrical services and potentially 
jeopardized quality of care for community residents (Kozhimannil, Casey, Hung, Prasad, & 
Moscovice, 2014). The magnitude of the impact of this closure on the hospital employees 
who participated was an unexpected and significant finding. 
Chapter Summary 
The purpose of this dissertation was to explore the experiences of employees who 
worked in a hospital affected by a disaster, and assisted with a hospital evacuation and 
disaster response, and to describe the hospital work environment as perceived by those 
employees. This chapter provided an overview of the study, including the statement of the 
problem, the research questions, and the significance of the study. The organization of 
subsequent chapters are as follows. Chapter Two presents a review of the literature related to 
the definitions of disasters and emergencies, employee experiences of workplace disaster 
response, and the workplace disaster response environment. In Chapter Three, the methods 
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used in this dissertation are described. The results are presented in Chapter Four, and these 




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
The literature reviewed focuses on three main areas. First, an overview of the 
concepts of “disasters” and “emergencies” is provided. The policies and agencies that govern 
organizational actions taken to prepare and plan for disasters are also discussed. Second, a 
review of the literature regarding employee experiences of responding to a disaster at the 
workplace (research question 1) is provided, followed by a review of the literature regarding 
the disaster response work environment (research question 2). Research related to employee 
experiences of responding to disasters at the workplace is limited. Thus, this review includes 
both academic research and non-academic (“grey”) literature. Although a cursory review of 
these topics was conducted prior to data collection, this review was largely completed during 
the data analysis phase of the study, as is appropriate with qualitative description 
methodologies. To provide a foundation for this study, relevant literature in the following 
areas was reviewed:  understanding disasters; employees’ experiences of disaster response in 
the workplace; and the disaster response work environment. Each of these areas is discussed 
in subsequent sections. 
Understanding Disasters  
Although the terms “disaster” and “emergency” are often used interchangeably by the 
media or in disaster and emergency planning manuals, these terms represent distinct events 
that necessitate the use of different approaches by hospital leaders to manage the event. Thus, 
distinguishing these terms provides context for understanding hospital staff behaviors before, 
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during, and after disasters and emergencies. Within the context of a hospital’s environment, 
these terms take on additional meaning.  
Hospitals routinely deal with clinical patient emergencies, such as respiratory distress 
or cardiac arrest. These emergencies are “expected,” and require resources that are generally 
available and anticipated on a daily basis, such as specific types of clinical staff (staff who 
provide direct clinical care to patients), medications, and medical equipment. In hospitals, 
emergencies may also include events that are not related to routine patient care, such as the 
occurrence of small fires, bomb threats, or suspicious packages left on site, temporary utility 
losses limited to a small area, or chemical spills. These emergencies may require action by 
hospital facility staff such as security personnel, engineering or facilities management staff, 
and administrators.  
In general, emergencies have certain characteristics. First, emergencies convey a 
specific sense of timing and urgency to manage the event and prevent injury or loss of life. 
Second, emergencies are typically able to be contained (Couch, 2008). For example, a fire in 
a garbage bin can be extinguished, a chemical spill can be cleaned, and an armed intruder can 
be apprehended. Third, emergencies are events that call for the immediate and temporary 
suspension of normal operating procedures and the activation of “extraordinary measures” to 
contain the event. Finally, actions taken in response to an emergency are typically managed 
by an organization using their own staff and resources, and do not usually require support 
from external resources.  
Disasters, on the other hand, are typically of a much larger scale, scope, and impact 
than emergencies. Disasters usually cannot be contained and instead require some larger 
response by an organization (Couch, 2008). Disasters occur as a result of community (i.e. 
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individuals, organizations, systems, and governments) vulnerability to a hazardous event that 
leads to injuries, fatalities, and significant economic breakdowns (Mezinska, Kakuk, 
Mijaljica, Waligóra, & O’Mathúna, 2016). Disasters require the activation of both internal 
“extraordinary” measures that require additional external supports from government 
agencies, local first responders, and law enforcement personnel to adequately respond to a 
disaster (Couch, 2008; Mezinska et al., 2016).  In other words, the response to a disaster 
typically cannot be managed using resources from within the organization alone (Couch, 
2008).  
Healthcare organizations are not required to report disaster response activities to a 
central database or agency, which makes it difficult to accurately estimate the frequency of 
hospital disaster response. Currently there are no reported estimates of the frequency of 
hospital disaster response. There are, however, there are a few estimates of hospital 
evacuations in response to a disaster. Although these estimates do not include situations in 
which a hospital experiences a disaster and but does not evacuate, these numbers may 
provide some insight on the frequency of hospital disaster response.  
 Commonly reported estimates of hospital evacuations are based on data from an 
analysis of hospital evacuations between the years of 1971-1999. In this analysis, Sternberg 
et al. (2004) examined data from newspapers, academic publications, and the U.S. Fire 
Administration to determine the occurrence of hospital evacuations. The authors reported that 
275 hospital evacuations occurred during this thirty-year period, the frequency of evacuations 
increased each decade, and the most common cause of evacuation was internal fires. Prior to 
this analysis, the only estimate of the frequency of hospital evacuations was based on a 1997 
examination of the preparedness of hospital emergency departments in Washington state to 
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respond to hazardous materials incidents (Burgess, Blackmon, Brodkin, & Robertson, 1997). 
Burgess at al. (1997) reported that 13% of the hospitals in Washington had evacuated the 
emergency department or other area of the hospital due to contamination accidents.  
The most recent study of the frequency of hospital evacuations, conducted by Bagaria 
et al. (2009), searched published academic papers, media reports, and online disaster agency 
resources to estimate the frequency of hospital evacuations worldwide. Bagaria et al. 
identified 65 hospital evacuations in the United States between 1979-2009, 16 of which took 
place after 2000. The difference in total numbers of hospital evacuations between the 
Sternberg et al. study (2004) and the Bagaria et al. study likely represents a difference in 
methodologies, but nonetheless underscores the lack of available data and, in turn, our 
limited knowledge of hospital disaster response.  
Preparedness 
Most organizations are not required to develop in-depth disaster response plans. 
Although businesses are required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) to identify processes for fire response and evacuation, management of hazardous 
materials, personal protective equipment, and general first aid, there is little motivation for 
business owners to spend the time and money to develop disaster response plans and initiate 
practice drills using them. Thus, most businesses do very little to prepare for disasters 
(Alesch, Holly, Mittler, & Nagy, 2001). For example, in a study of businesses impacted by 
the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake in Santa Cruz County, California, less than 10% of 
businesses in Santa Cruz had a disaster plan (Wasileski, Rodríguez, & Diaz, 2011). Similarly, 
in South Dade County, Florida, only 15.4% of businesses affected by Hurricane Andrew in 
1992 had a disaster plan (Wasileski et al., 2011).  
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For those businesses that do prepare for disasters, the general guidance on where to 
focus efforts is flawed (Tierney, 2007). Most preparedness plans for businesses focus on 
protecting the physical structure of the business, with the intent to reduce loss of life and 
property. Preparedness materials for businesses do not typically address the issues they will 
realistically face in the post-disaster environment, such as a decrease in the supply or demand 
for products or services, the migration of staff or available labor away from the disaster site, 
or suggestions for operating during long-term community disruption (Tierney, 2007). In a 
summary of the findings of studies examining the preparedness efforts of 5,000 private-
sector businesses across the US, Webb et al. (2000) report that most businesses place very 
little emphasis on engaging in disaster preparedness activities or planning. In a study of Des 
Moines businesses, for example, nearly half  had not carried out a single preparedness 
measure (Webb at al., 2000). In Los Angeles, pre-earthquake preparedness activities were 
similarly uncommon: only 18% of businesses surveyed had purchased earthquake insurance, 
13% had obtained a generator, 17% had conducted earthquake drills, 29% had developed an 
emergency response plan, and only 14% had developed a recovery plan (Webb et al., 2000).  
For organizations in high-risk industries, including healthcare, transportation, utilities, 
or nuclear power, constructing a comprehensive disaster preparedness and response plan 
could mean the difference between not only financial loss or viability, but large-scale loss of 
human life. As such, these organizations are typically required to develop disaster plans that 
address more topics than basic first aid or fire containment, and in some cases, are required to 
practice these response plans annually.  
Preparedness actions taken by these businesses often involve simulating disaster 
conditions to allow employees to practice their disaster response duties. For example, the 
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Southern California Gas Company regularly inspect their disaster plans, and employees are 
tested using drills, in which they activate the emergency response center, mobilize field 
workers, manage calls from customers, and write press releases (Hickman & Crandall, 1997). 
Every two years, nuclear power plants in the US are required to conduct similar drills; these 
drills often involve plant employees plus a variety of community stakeholders, such as 
hospitals, nursing homes, schools, daycares, and municipal offices (Adalja, Sell, Ravi, 
Minton, & Morhard, 2015). Disaster planning for nuclear power plants is so detailed that 
some plans include detailed provisions for sheltering nearby livestock, and creating databases 
of nearby farms to note where feed and other agricultural assets are stored (Adalja et al., 
2015).  
Healthcare organizations are also required to develop and practice disaster response 
plans. It is critical that staff and administrators engage in preparedness efforts to decrease the 
impact of disasters on both staff and patients. Hospitals are required by the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and by The Joint Commission to maintain disaster 
and emergency response plans, commonly called an Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) (The 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), 2016; The Joint Commission, 2016). It 
is important to note that despite being referred to as “Emergency Operations Plans”, these 
plans address response protocol for both emergencies (such as chemical spills or small fires) 
and disasters (mass casualty events, natural disasters).  
CMS standards include four elements for disaster preparedness: risk assessment and 
planning, policies and procedures, communication plan, and training and testing (CMS, 
2016a). Hospitals must develop and update annually an all-hazards-based EOP by using a 
documented assessment of the risks to which their facility is vulnerable (for instance, 
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hurricanes for coastal facilities, or tornadoes for midwestern locations). The EOP should 
address topics specific to disaster preparedness, to include strategies for evacuating and 
sheltering in place, collaborating with area providers, governments, and agencies, addressing 
the needs of specific patient populations, ensuring operations continuity, and succession 
planning. Hospitals must also develop policies and procedures related to the provision of 
food and water for patients and staff, waste disposal, and alternate energy sources. These 
procedures must address considerations for safe evacuation, such as care and treatment 
needs, the use of identification bands, medical documentation, and evacuation locations. 
There must be policies related to the use of volunteers, the role of state and federal agencies 
such as Medical Reserve Corps and the National Guard, and arrangements with outside 
hospitals and providers in the event of surge or evacuation (CMS, 2016c). 
The communication plan must contain the names and contact information for staff, 
outside hospitals and agencies, volunteers, and state and local emergency management 
officials. The communication plan must also address alternative means of communication, 
processes for contacting emergency management agencies, and methods of sharing patient 
health information and medical records with outside providers.  
Finally, hospitals are required to develop a training and testing program as a part of 
disaster planning. This program must include two annual testing exercises: one community-
based, full-scale exercise, and one exercise of the hospital’s choice. A full-scale exercise is 
considered to include multiple agencies and jurisdictions and should involve “boots on the 
ground” simulations, including the medical treatment or decontamination of mock victims. 
Alternatively, a hospital may conduct a “table-top” exercise, in which a facilitator leads a 
group discussion of a realistic disaster scenario (CMS, 2016c).  
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For hospital staff, preparedness activities generally involve securing and documenting 
a staffing plan, designating how patients will be relocating, securing supplies and 
medications, organizing leadership teams, and developing a communication plan. For 
example, with the imminent threat of a disaster and in anticipation of losing electricity or 
running out of medical supplies and drugs, staff may attempt to wean patients from 
ventilators and intravenous medications either prior to a disaster striking, or prior to an 
impending evacuation  (Barkemeyer, 2006; Berggren, 2005; Uppal et al., 2013).  
Leaders may also set up Hospital Incident Command Systems (HICS) or response 
headquarters prior to or at the start of the disaster in order to centralize command and provide 
more efficient communication (Bailey, Williford, Cawley, Wain, & Lehman-Huskamp, 2020; 
Nakagawa et al., 2013). HICS is an incident management system for healthcare 
organizations, based on principles of the National Incident Management System (NIMS). 
HICS provide guidance to healthcare organization regarding documentation and reporting 
requirements to meet Joint Commission Standards (Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and 
Response (ASPR), 2015).  
Before evacuations occur, patients are often discharged, transferred, or relocated 
within the hospital facility to reduce the number of patients that have to be evacuated in a 
potentially dangerous environment (Adalja et al., 2014; Barkemeyer, 2006; Downey, 
Andress, & Schultz, 2013; Ginsberg, 2006).  Leaders may also make plans for enhanced 
hospital security to protect staff, patients, and hospital resources (Adalja et al., 2014; Danna, 
Bernard, Schaubhut, & Mathews, 2010; Ginsberg, 2006; Haverkort et al., 2016). Such 
planning might include adjusting operating room schedules to postpone non-emergent 
procedures and free up staff for emergency surgeries during the disaster, assessing supplies 
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and equipment to ensure adequate levels, bringing in extra supplies if needed or relocating 
supplies to higher floors to protect them from flood waters or building damage (Adalja et al., 
2014; Bernard & Mathews, 2008; Danna et al., 2010; Ginsberg, 2006; Haverkort et al., 2016; 
Okumura et al., 1998). Leaders may also review staffing plans and make staff 
accommodations (e.g., lodging, food, travel) in advance of the disaster to ensure the 
availability of adequate personnel to care for patients following the actual disaster event 
(Adalja et al., 2014; Barkemeyer, 2006; Bernard & Mathews, 2008; Danna et al., 2010; 
Ginsberg, 2006; Haverkort et al., 2016). Additionally, staff members may be encouraged to 
bring in “overnight bags” with extra clothes, food, water, flashlights, batteries, radios, and 
personal hygiene supplies to further ensure preparedness for the disaster (Adalja et al., 2014; 
Barkemeyer, 2006; Bernard & Mathews, 2008; Danna et al., 2010; Ginsberg, 2006).  
Response 
Following a disaster, businesses and hospitals may experience tragic consequences if 
preparedness efforts are ineffective or inadequate. In addition to the loss of human life, 
disasters can financially devastate businesses and local governments, and effectively turn 
thriving cities into ghost towns as workers and residents move away from the disaster site. 
Hurricane Katrina caused the largest migration of physicians since World War II, and led to 
the closure of most businesses in the area (Edwards, 2006). Eighty percent of the New 
Orleans Police Department’s officers were made homeless by the storm, and 247 officers 
were “AWOL” (away without leave) after the storm. Fifty-four were fired for leaving their 
posts during the storm. In Saint Bernard Parish, adjacent to New Orleans, 50 percent of 
municipal employees were laid off—including road crews and damage assessors; by 
November 2005, only twelve people were employed by the school district, which had 
previously staffed 1,200 (Edwards, 2006).  
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Businesses that build employee support into their disaster response plans may fare 
better after an event. Advanced planning—beyond the development of required standard 
disaster preparedness materials—could mean the difference between failure and viability 
after a disaster. In a study of 50 small businesses that had been affected by the 1994 
Northridge, California earthquake, these “management mitigations”—such as making plans 
for staffing and payroll—predicted whether the business would stay open or close 
permanently after the disaster (Alesch et al., 2001).  
After Hurricane Katrina, Northrop Grumman, a defense contractor employing over 
20,000 people at shipyards in New Orleans and Pascagoula, Missouri, flew finance 
department staff to its location in Texas, where they sent out paychecks and Western Union 
deposits to workers who could not get to their workplace. This action allowed employees to 
pay their bills and afford repairs to their homes. The labor contracts for these employees also 
allowed employees to automatically switch to vacation status rather than unemployment 
when the shipyard closed after the hurricane, ensuring the employees would receive full 
paychecks instead of meager unemployment payments (Edwards, 2006). Before Hurricane 
Katrina hit, Hibernian Bank rented office space and apartments seven hours from New 
Orleans, and allowed employees, their families, and their pets to occupy the apartments and 
office spaces after the disaster. Because of these actions, the bank was able to reopen 47 
branches of the bank within one week of the hurricane, and 39 more branches within a month 
(Edwards, 2006).  
Hospital responses to emergencies vary by the type and scale of the emergency. Small 
fires that can be contained and extinguished often require vertical or horizontal evacuation—
the evacuation of staff and patients to another floor, or to another unit on the floor. Bomb 
 19 
threats, suspicious packages, armed intruders, and chemical spills may result in “shelter in 
place” orders or staff and patient evacuations.  
Hospital responses to disasters are typically quite different.  Such conditions may 
require taking in victims of a disaster unexpectedly, such as a mass casualty or exposure to 
an infectious disease, or providing shelter, food, electrical power, and internet access if a 
natural disaster or large-scale terrorist act occurs.  If a hospital’s infrastructure is 
compromised, the disaster response may require partially or fully evacuating patients and 
staff to safety. Conditions under which hospitals respond to emergencies and disasters vary 
depending on the nature of the event, but vulnerabilities may include the loss of vital utilities 
(e.g., electricity, lighting, air conditioning, plumbing), the lack of clear roles and 
responsibilities of staff, broken communication pathways among the care team, insufficient 
preparation or training of staff on specific evacuation procedures, and inadequate supplies 
and equipment. During such conditions, staff must find ways to interact with each other and 
with organizational leaders to address immediate patient care and staff concerns, adapt to 
changing conditions, and access needed resources to safely provide care and to protect 
themselves and patients. 
When hospitals activate their EOP, organizational processes shift into a state of 
“planned” chaos, in which alternative standards of patient care and operations are adopted. 
Typically, standards of care, or “conventional” standards, refer to the staff, supplies, and 
spaces that are consistent with daily facility practices and needs. During an actual disaster 
and emergency response, standards of care shift along a continuum from conventional to 
“contingency” or “crisis” standards. Contingency standards guide hospital staff to operate in 
a way that is different from daily practices, but all staff continue providing care that is 
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“functionally equivalent” to normal patient care (IOM, 2012). Contingency standards are 
more likely to be used during emergencies, when staff and resources are unaffected or only 
moderately affected by the emergency.  An example of a contingency standard would be the 
processes activated if a small, contained fire occurred on a hospital unit that required 
evacuating patients from the area.  
Crisis standards of care (CSC) guide staff to provide the best possible care under the 
specific circumstances of an event, acknowledging that workarounds and substitutions may 
be necessary. CSC are more likely to be used when hospital staff, resources, or the 
infrastructure is severely affected by a disaster. A hospital’s shift to CSC reflects a 
significantly altered capacity to provide care following a disaster event. Indicators that an 
organization may be forced to shift to crisis care following a disaster include the decreased 
availability of essential hospital resources, such as oxygen, ventilators, hospital staff, 
intensive care beds, essential medicines, and medical transportation (Gostin & Hanfling, 
2009). Because EOPs may not accommodate a particular incident’s demand on staffing or 
resources, CSC often require hospitals to make difficult decisions regarding the allocation of 
scarce resources and the manner in which staff perform their duties (IOM, 2009). Extreme 
examples of these difficult decisions are detailed in Sheri Fink’s (2013) investigation of the 
events that occurred within Memorial Medical Center during Hurricane Katrina. Because 
hospitals are rarely required to use CSC, these plans are often overlooked and 
underdeveloped (IOM, 2012). 
Hospitals responding to disasters must rely on teamwork within and among 
professional groups, and also with outside agencies, to maintain safe and efficient processes. 
After the 1989 Sioux City airline crash, the city of Sioux City activated its EOP; fire rescue 
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teams, ambulances, police, medical staff from local hospitals, and the National Guard worked 
together to save the lives of 184 passengers and crew members (Jacobs, Quevillon, & 
Stricherz, 1990). Hospital staff may work alongside Emergency Medical Services (EMS) 
personnel, military personnel, FEMA, Wildlife and Fisheries Departments, special weapons 
and tactics (SWAT) teams, Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT), Fire Departments, 
State Troopers, the National Guard, civil defense volunteers, and independent helicopter 
pilots to safely evacuate and transport patients and employees to and from facilities (Adalja 
et al., 2014; Bernard & Mathews, 2008; Chavez & Binder, 1996; Daigle, 2004; Downey et 
al., 2013; Ginsberg, 2006; Spedale, 2006; Taylor, 2007; Uppal et al., 2013; VanDevanter, 
Kovner, Raveis, McCollum, & Keller, 2014b; Verni, 2012). Hospital staff may coordinate 
patient evacuation and relief efforts with staff from other area hospitals (Barkemeyer, 2006; 
Bernard & Mathews, 2008; Ginsberg, 2006; Spedale, 2006; Taylor, 2007; Uppal et al., 2013; 
VanDevanter et al., 2014b; Verni, 2012; Wilson, 1964), and hold interdisciplinary leadership 
and council meetings to review emergency response plans prior to and during disasters 
(Bernard & Mathews, 2008; Ginsberg, 2006; Maunder et al., 2003; Spedale, 2006; Uppal et 
al., 2013; Wilson, 1964; Zhuravsky, 2015).  
Employee Experiences of Disaster Response at the Workplace  
 To gain context for the findings from research question 1, the literature was examined 
for information regarding how employees experience disaster response at their workplace. 
Major topics identified in the review of the literature were: willingness and ability to 
respond, job role and job level, employee needs during disaster response, psychological 
effects of disaster response, resource availability and workarounds, and media coverage of 
disasters. These topics are discussed further below.  
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Two Key Factors: Willingness and Ability to Respond  
Employees’ decision to report to work during a disaster has been shown to be 
influenced by two concepts, as identified by Qureshi et al. (2005): willingness to respond, 
and ability to respond. Willingness to respond refers to employees’ personal motivations to 
report to work or to stay home, and ability to report to work refers to employees’ capacity to 
report to work—or their availability and means of getting to work. Hospital staff willingness 
to respond during a disaster that affects their work has been associated with factors such as 
the type of event, employees’ personal obligations and priorities, the work environment and 
organizational culture, and employees’ knowledge and perceptions of personal efficacy (Al-
Hunaishi, Hoe, & Chinna, 2019).  
Healthcare workers tend to be less willing to report to work during radiological 
events, and pandemics or infectious disease outbreaks, and more willing to report to work 
during natural disasters and mass casualty incidents (Al-Hunaishi et al., 2019). For example, 
in hurricanes, flooding, and other environmental or natural disasters, percentages of 
healthcare staff willing to respond during the disaster has been reported to be as high as 
77.3% (Al-Hunaishi et al., 2019), 80.4% (Adams & Berry, 2012), and 84.2% (Qureshi et al., 
2005). By contrast, their willingness to report to work during radiological events has been 
reported to be lower, at 57.3% (Qureshi et al., 2005), 63% (Mercer, Ancock, Levis, & Reyes, 
2014), and 69.1% (Adams & Berry, 2012).  
Healthcare workers’ job roles, personal characteristics, and past experiences may also 
influence their decision to report to work during disasters. Investigators have reported that 
healthcare workers are less likely to report for duty if they are female, have dependents at 
home, have a spouse or domestic partner, or have past disaster relief experience (Mercer, 
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Ancock, Levis, & Reyes, 2014; Shapira, Friger, Bar-Dayan, & Aharonson-Daniel, 2019). 
Nurses, as compared to physicians, may also be less willing to respond, and age has also 
been found to be positively correlated with willingness to respond (Shapira et al., 2019).  
Job Characteristics 
When employees experience a disaster in the workplace, their reactions and responses 
to the event may vary based on the characteristics of their position, and the placement of their 
position within the organizational hierarchy. The two characteristics that are most commonly 
reported are job level and job role.  For example, in a study of workers who had been 
affected by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, 
managers expressed difficulty managing both their own emotions, their feelings 
responsibility for the wellbeing of their employees, and a lack of preparation for managing 
the safety of both themselves and their employees (North et al., 2013). Some employees 
evacuating the World Trade Center delayed evacuation out of fear that their supervisors 
would not approve of them leaving without permission (Gershon et al., 2011, 2007). After 
the 2011 bombing of government headquarters in Oslo, Norway, employees without 
leadership responsibilities were less likely to feel safe at work following the attack, and had 
higher expectations of another terrorist attack at their workplace (Nissen, Nielsen, Solberg, 
Hansen, & Heir, 2015). Sources of information about a natural disaster sought by employees 
also varied by job level, according to Drabek (2020, 2001):  higher-level employees tended to 
seek information from a government agency, while lower-level employees sought 
information from relatives.  
Differences in employee experiences of disasters at the workplace could be associated 
with the rewards and benefits that vary by job role and job level. A positive relationship 
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exists between job level and job satisfaction (Cranny, Smith, & Stone, 1992; Robie, Ryan, 
Schmieder, Parra, & Smith, 1998). Higher level positions tend to include better working 
conditions, promotion opportunities, pay, autonomy, supervision, and responsibility (Robie et 
al., 1998). In a disaster scenario, factors such as pay, autonomy, job satisfaction, working 
conditions, and responsibility may amplify an employee’s negative or positive experience of 
the event.  
 In hospitals, those who are on the “front line” providing care to patients report 
experiencing higher levels of job-related stress during disasters. In studies of hospital 
employee experiences during disasters such as hurricanes and infectious disease outbreaks, 
nurses, technicians, facility staff, and support staff experienced higher levels of stress, felt 
they were more likely to suffer adverse physical effects from the disaster (Chong et al., 2004; 
Koh et al., 2005; Maunder et al., 2004; Nickell et al., 2004), reported decreased levels of job 
satisfaction (Bai et al., 2004; Tam et al. 2004) and increases in workload (Koh et al., 2005), 
compared to employees in administrative positions. Employees in positions of power, 
control, or those privy to communications among hospital management reported 
experiencing less stress and more satisfaction with their jobs than those who worked in direct 
patient care roles (Nickell et al. 2004).  
Employee Needs During Disaster Response 
Personal Safety. Situations in which employees lack the needed resources to safely 
carry out their work creates distress for employees who feel unprotected (Ammar, Stock, 
Holland, Gelfand, & Altschul, 2020; Binkley & Kemp, 2020; Hewlett & Hewlett, 2005; 
Jennings, Yeager, Feistritzer, Gullatte, & Martyn, 2018; Quinn, Thomas, & McAllister, 
2005; Tam, Pang, Lam, & Chiu, 2004). This is especially salient during disasters such as 
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pandemics, where employees may be exposed to dangerous pathogens if they lack personal 
protective equipment (PPE). One nurse working with Ebola patients during the 2003 Ebola 
outbreak in central Africa noted, “The greatest worry at work was that I had no protective 
gear in place. At the beginning of the isolation, there were only gloves, no masks” (Hewlett 
& Hewlett 2005, p.293). In another investigation, when staff had adequate supplies to safely 
complete their tasks, such as PPE, employee morale was greater (Lee et al., 2005).  
Basic Needs. Services, supplies, or assistance that leadership offer or neglect to offer 
related to basic physical needs—such as housing, food, water, rest, and hygiene—are of 
particular importance to employees. In studies of hospital disaster response, some staff have 
complained of a lack of adequate food, water, rest, toilets, sleeping areas, and debriefing after 
the disasters (French, Sole, & Byers, 2002; King et al., 2016; Nakagawa et al., 2013). This 
reflection of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is not surprising. It is possible, however, that the 
basic needs of employees are not included in standard disaster response planning. Other 
studies have identified incidences of basic needs unfulfilled: in a study hospital disaster 
response during Hurricane Katrina, one nurse addressed staff complaints about a lack of 
working toilets by building a toileting system out of biohazard bags, a bedpan, and a chair, 
and taught the rest of the staff how to use it (Berggren, 2005). At other facilities, it was 
reported that bathrooms were created by tying privacy blankets around bushes (Chavez & 
Binder, 1996) or placing plastic bags into garbage cans (Wilson, 1964).  
Rest and comfort are also important for employees during disaster response. During 
Hurricane Katrina, administrators at one hospital shortened nursing shifts from 12 and 8 
hours to 2 hours to allow time for staff rest and hydration (Danna et al., 2010). In a study of 
staff caring for patients affected by Ebola, time spent wearing PPE—including overalls, a 
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surgical gown, a respirator, a face shield, double layer gloves, and double layer foot 
protection over surgical scrubs and clogs—was limited to 45 minutes followed by a 20 
minute recovery period to minimize staff discomfort, and employees who experienced 
claustrophobia were not required to care for Ebola patients (Haverkort et al., 2016).  
Moral Support. Employees affected by disasters have needs beyond food and 
shelter. Interventions to boost morale and support employees’ emotional and spiritual needs 
may ultimately improve employee’s experiences of disaster response, especially during times 
of extended response, such as in a hurricane or pandemic. Organizations have found various 
means of doing so, for example, one hospital provided a movie and snacks to staff who had 
been asked to sleep at the hospital the night of Hurricane Sandy (Uppal et al., 2013). Other 
studies reported that hospital administrators held group prayer services for patients and staff 
(Barkemeyer, 2006; Berggren, 2005). Staff of a hospital flooded by Hurricane Katrina hung 
inspirational banners on the walls of the units and hosted a talent show for employees and 
patients, illuminated by flashlight (Berggren, 2005). During the COVID-19 pandemic, staff 
of a medical intensive care unit (MICU) at a Texas hospital promoted wellness and relaxation 
by creating a makeshift breakroom for staff to eat, drink, and relax (Newby, Mabry, Carlisle, 
Olson, & Lane, 2020). These efforts to improve the comfort, happiness, and morale of staff 
working during disasters, although typically not planned for in EOPs, are an important factor 
in ensuring an adequate workforce to respond to disasters.  
Psychological Effects of Disaster Response 
Workers who are regularly exposed to trauma, such as police, firefighters, healthcare 
workers, and rescue workers are at a higher risk for psychological problems such as 
depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and other mental health problems 
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(Brooks, Dunn, Amlôt, Rubin, & Greenberg, 2019). Workers who are not routinely exposed 
to trauma as a result of their occupation can also suffer psychological symptoms after 
experiencing a disaster at the workplace.  For example, mental health issues were reported in 
Capital Hill staff who were exposed to the 2001 anthrax attacks (North et al., 2009), 
Pentagon employees who were working the day of the September 11th terrorist attacks 
(Grieger, Fullerton, & Ursano, 2003), and factory workers who experienced an earthquake 
(Bland et al., 2005).  
In one study, it was estimated that 24% of employees directly exposed to a disaster at 
the workplace suffered from PTSD at 10 months after the traumatic event (Hansen, Nissen, 
& Heir, 2013), and 17% still showed symptoms of PTSD after 22 months (Hansen et al., 
2017). The psychological impact of experiencing trauma in the workplace can vary based on 
factors such as training, social support, extent of the exposure, and prior history of 
psychological symptoms (Brooks, Dunn, Amlôt, Greenberg, & James Rubin, 2016; Brooks et 
al., 2015). Alcohol dependence, anxiety, prior psychiatric symptoms, and higher perceived 
stress are also associated with increased risk for employee PTSD at the workplace (Song, 
Jeong, Choi, Kim, & Ahn, 2018), and symptoms of trauma may be worsened with poor 
workplace support (Biggs, 2014), identification with trauma survivors or victims 
(Hodgkinson & Shepherd, 1994; Ursano & McCarroll, 1990), repeated exposure to trauma 
(Fullerton, Ursano, & Wang, 2004; Marshall, 2006) or media coverage of trauma (Jenkins, 
1997; Nishi et al., 2012), and avoidance of thinking of the event (or “deliberate detachment”) 
(Brown, Mulhern, & Joseph, 2002; Linley & Joseph, 2006).  
The ways in which managers and leadership teams respond to and manage their 
employees’ emotional and physical needs may significantly affect how workers evaluate 
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their overall disaster experience. Employees who felt unsupported by their organizations in 
past disasters may be reluctant to report to work during future disasters (French et al., 2002; 
Moore, Gilbert, Saunders, Bryce, & Yassi, 2005; Powell-Young, Baker, & Hogan, 2006). To 
support the wellbeing of hospital staff after an earthquake, nurses were given time off after 
the disaster to rest, recover emotionally, attend to damaged homes or move into new homes, 
and stave off burnout (Johal, Mounsey, Brannelly, & Johnston, 2016). When the staff of a 
hospital treating SARS patients exhibited stress and anxiety about their close contact with the 
infectious disease, psychiatric and occupational therapy staff opened a drop-in support center 
for fellow employees to talk candidly about their fears and learn about further employee 
support resources (Maunder et al., 2003). These interventions and efforts by hospital leaders 
and managers may help employees recover emotionally and hasten their productive return to 
the workplace.  
Although in-depth disaster preparation and planning, good organizational leadership, 
and a supportive organizational culture may have a positive effect on the mental health and 
wellbeing of employees during and after the disaster (Biggs, 2014; Hsu et al., 2004), 
interventions implemented to address the psychological effects of employees exposed to 
trauma is limited, and findings are inconsistent (Brooks, Dunn, Amlôt, Greenberg, & Rubin, 
2018). For example, critical incident stress debriefing (CISD), often just referred to as 
“debriefing”, has long been encouraged for occupational groups exposed to a trauma at the 
workplace, and is considered an essential element of workplace stress management (Mitchell, 
1983; Vaithilingam, Jain, & Davies, 2008). However, other research contends that these 
debriefing sessions can actually be harmful to employees (Rose, Bisson, & Wessely, 2003; 
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Rose, Bisson, Churchill, & Wessely, 2009); these conclusions by Rose et al. are also 
contested (Hawker & Hawker, 2014).  
Psychological symptoms experienced by traumatized employees may ultimately 
affect work outcomes. Employees who are traumatized by disasters at the workplace may 
experience reduced productivity and concentration (Miller-Burke, Attridge, & Fass, 1999; 
Paterson, Leadbetter, & Bowie, 1999), and have difficulty returning to the workplace, as 
PTSD is characterized by difficulty returning to the scene of the trauma (Stergiopoulos, 
Cimo, Cheng, Bonato, & Dewa, 2011). Employees who report high levels of stress after a 
traumatic event may be more likely to be call in sick to work (Byron & Peterson, 2002), and 
employers may suffer financially due to decreased productivity and absenteeism (El-Guebaly 
et al., 2007; Kessler & Frank, 1997). 
Stigma is an additional concern for the mental health of workers exposed to disasters. 
In the case of a public health disaster, employees exposed to the contagion within the context 
of their work may experience negative reactions from the community. Several studies report 
hospital workers’ frustration with the stigma and social isolation produced by working with 
SARS and Ebola patients. This perceived stigma provoked stress in participants (Maunder et 
al., 2004). For example, individuals in one study expressed anxiety when using public 
transportation because they feared the negative reactions of others (Koh et al., 2005). In other 
studies, employees have reported isolating themselves from coworkers, friends, and family 
out of fear of spreading infection (Nickell et al., 2004; Robertson et al., 2004; Styra et al., 
2008; Tam et al. 2004), being isolated by communities that feared exposure to infection by 
staff caring for infected patients ( Chong et al. 2004; Hewlett & Hewlett 2005), or being 
quarantined by their own organizations to prevent the spread of infection (Robertson et al., 
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2004). Some employees who cared for infected patients even reported being instructed by 
supervisors to limit their contact with colleagues to prevent the spread of infection (Bai et al., 
2004; Styra et al., 2008).  
Social avoidance and isolation have been reported to have significant effects on 
employee stress (Maunder et al., 2004) and turnover intent (Shiao, Koh, Lo, Lim, & Guo, 
2007). To prevent the spread of infectious disease, staff members of one facility were 
discouraged from holding meetings or interacting with colleagues outside the hospital, which 
prevented staff from gaining emotional support from each other (Maunder et al., 2003). 
Emotional support from coworkers is important to employees after disasters strike; being 
able to talk to and commiserate with people who understand the experience provides a source 
of stress relief for employees (Brooks et al., 2019; Robertson et al., 2004; VanDevanter et al., 
2014b). 
Employees may feel shame or embarrassment about their psychological symptoms, 
and thus may avoid or delay help until problems are too severe to ignore (Brooks et al., 2019; 
Henderson et al., 2012; Iversen et al., 2011). Members of leadership speaking openly about 
their own mental health struggles may help to reduce the stigma of psychological suffering, 
and encourage employees to make use of counseling or other services (Brooks et al., 2019). 
Training for managers regarding the psychological effects of experiencing a disaster may 
also help foster a supportive atmosphere at the workplace (Brooks et al., 2019).  
Resource Availability and Workarounds 
In the absence of adequate supplies, studies also report the use of “workarounds” by 
hospital staff to overcome the lack of available resources needed to ensure continuity of care 
and/or maintain the safety of patients and staff. Workarounds are temporary fixes to 
 31 
perceived disturbances to workflow; workaround behaviors may include problem solving, 
improvisation, violations, deviations, or shortcuts (Debono et al., 2013). In two studies of 
Hurricane Sandy, investigators reported that pharmacists created a courier system to deliver 
medications to patients when electrical power and communications were lost, and that 
operating room staff used flashlights to provide lighting for surgical operations (Daigle, 
2004; Uppal et al., 2013). One study also reported the formation of a “bucket brigade” to 
deliver drums of fuel from basements to generators, by manually using ropes and a pulley 
system to raise drums to successively higher floors (VanDevanter, Kovner, Raveis, 
McCollum, & Keller, 2014); a similar “human chain” system was reported as being used to 
manually lift and transport patients out of flooded areas and onto to higher floors of another 
hospital (Bernard & Mathews, 2008).  Lacking air conditioning, one study reported that staff 
used damp towels to cool themselves and their patients, or fanned patients manually, 
enlisting the help of family members and staff who were not caring for patients to fan staff 
who were providing care (Barkemeyer, 2006; Bernard & Mathews, 2008; Daigle, 2004; 
Giarratano, Orlando, & Savage, 2008; Orlando, Bernard, & Mathews, 2008). These examples 
highlight the importance of securing adequate and appropriate supplies and resources before 
disasters strike.  
Media Coverage of Event  
The media plays an important role in how employees learn about their organization 
during a disaster event, and how employees and their organizations are perceived by the 
public. One study reported that employees felt targeted by negative media reports that 
undermined their professionalism (Speroni et al., 2015b), and that even positive media 
reports placed unnecessary pressure on them and garnered too much attention from the public 
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(Lee et al., 2005). Media reports have also been shown to overwhelm SARS-affected 
communities with information and misinformation, and contributed to the stigma of 
healthcare workers (Chong et al., 2004). In one study, media reports about the SARS 
outbreak resulted in a public outpouring of support for healthcare workers, and employees 
reacted positively to this attention (Koh et al., 2005). Conversely, the psychological impact 
of experiencing a disaster at the workplace may be intensified by repeated viewing of media 
coverage of the event (Brooks et al., 2019). 
Hospital staff have also reported using television and internet sources to monitor the 
status of disasters.  Some hospitals reported having limited or no access at all to news sources 
due to damage from the disaster (Bernard & Mathews, 2008; Danna et al., 2010; Ginsberg, 
2006; Nakagawa et al., 2013; Orlando et al., 2008). Staff in one hospital responding to the 
subway gas attack in Tokyo learned that sarin had been confirmed as the chemical used from 
watching television reports—the police failed to contact the hospital to communicate this 
information (Okumura et al., 1998).  Staff who worked during a hurricane and an earthquake 
were subsequently unaware of the severity of the disasters or the damage they caused to local 
areas and homes until seeing images of affected cities and victims (Barkemeyer, 2006; 
Ginsberg, 2006; Nakagawa et al., 2013). Seeing news of disasters on the television or internet 
may provoke anxiety in some hospital staff, causing them to worry about their personal 
safety, and their homes, families, and friends (Barkemeyer, 2006; Maunder et al., 2003).  
After Hurricane Katrina, one study reported that hospital staff felt that the media 
focused on what staff did wrong during the disaster rather than what they did right 
(Barkemeyer, 2006). In another study of Hurricane Katrina, a physician reported using her 
personal contacts to relay her hospital’s need for rescue efforts to a Cable News Network 
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(CNN) medical correspondent; hospital officials approved of this communication, saying 
“…the media is our rescue plan now” (Berggren, 2005, p.2). Several days after Hurricane 
Katrina made landfall, one hospital was so inundated with press requests from the media that 
they designated one physician as a spokesman, and instituted regular press conferences twice 
a day (Spedale, 2006).  
The Work Environment During Disaster Response  
 To better understanding findings from research question 2, the literature was 
examined for information regarding the disaster response work environment. Major topics 
identified in the review included communication, staffing and workload, and organizational 
justice. These topics are discussed further below.  
Communication 
Compassionate communication, in the form of emails, phone calls, text messages, and 
services and assistance offered to employees, shape employees’ stress reactions and positive 
or negative regard of their organization during and after disasters (Davidson et al., 2009). 
When managers or leadership do not reach out to employees after disasters to “check in” on 
their physical and mental health, employees may interpret this as a lack of concern (Brooks et 
al., 2019). In one study, it was reported that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief 
Information Officer (CIO), and Vice President of Nursing sent daily joint emails to all staff 
of a hospital responding to a Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak to 
provide information, express gratitude, and praise staff for their efforts (Maunder et al., 
2003). Employees of organizations that organized blood drives or fundraisers for disaster 
victims, sent emails to employees inquiring about their mental health and safety, offered 
financial assistance or psychiatric services, or encouraged rest and time off from work 
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reported reduced stress (Lee et al., 2005). These actions by leadership and management 
communicate to staff that they are valued, cared for, and worried about. Staff members who 
do not feel their role or position is perceived as important by leadership may also be less 
inclined to report to work during future disasters (Davidson et al., 2009). It is important for 
hospital leaders to use compassionate communication to make all staff feel they are a crucial 
part of the team.  
Employees also have informational needs. Staff trust in leadership is eroded by 
incorrect, insufficient, or untimely information regarding disaster details, safety information, 
and situation updates. For example, hospital employees responding to SARS who learned of 
news about their organization from the media instead of their management, and complained 
that information given to them by their employer conflicted with this information released by 
public health authorities and the media, felt frustrated and distrustful of their employers 
(Robertson et al. 2004).  In another study the SARS response, hospital staff reported that the 
infectious disease policies offered by their organization were ambiguous, and the 
dissemination of those policies was ineffective (Tam et al. 2004). Hospital employees 
responding to infectious disease outbreaks were also uncomfortable with the frequent 
changes to infection control procedures made by their organizations during the disasters (Bai 
et al., 2004; Lee et al., 2005; Speroni et al., 2015b).  
Hospital employees responding to disasters at their workplace have also reported 
lacking means of communication with coworkers and supervisors (Chong et al., 2004; 
VanDevanter et al., 2014b). To better disseminate pertinent information and situation updates 
to staff during disasters, some hospitals have implemented daily check-ins during disaster 
response, or DCIs. These typically are carried out as phone calls that can be called into by all 
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members of the staff during disaster response. During severe flooding and winter storm 
events in 2015 and 2018 respectively, the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) 
Health System used DCIs to relay information regarding resources, staffing, and 
transportation to staff members (Bailey et al., 2020). While relying on telephone and cellular 
capability presents challenges in the disaster environment, providing such a service to staff 
members may improve organizational operations during disaster response.  
It is possible that because high-risk industry staff in particular may feel like they are 
working on the frontline of the response to disasters, they feel they are entitled to earlier or 
more in-depth information regarding the disaster at hand than the general public. Having to 
obtain this information themselves, or be informed up updates from the media rather than 
from leadership, may make staff feel that they are not valued or trusted by their employer. 
Therefore, it is incumbent upon leaders of high-risk organizations to provide clear and direct 
communication regarding news of the disaster, and situation updates within the organization. 
Doing so will build trust among leaders and employees, and help staff feel they are a valued 
component of the disaster response.  
Staffing and Workload  
Studies of hospital responses to disasters have reported that employees express 
concern about having adequate staff during disasters (Lee et al., 2005; Speroni et al., 2015b) 
and subsequent increases in workload (Koh et al. 2005). In disaster scenarios involving an 
infectious disease, employees stationed on units involved with direct care to infected 
patients—such as the ICU and the ED— reported problems with staffing because large 
numbers of coworkers were quarantined or chose to stay home with their families (Chong et 
al., 2004). An employee in a management position expounded on staffing concerns related to 
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quarantined healthcare workers: “Once you provide care, you are quarantined… so what 
happens when you run through your nurses that quickly? Where are all of the other nurses 
going to come from to provide care for the other patients?” (Speroni et al. 2015b, pp.548-49).  
Several studies have reported that hospitals responding to disasters suffered staffing 
shortages resulting in higher workloads (Downey et al., 2013; Johal et al., 2016; Maunder et 
al., 2003; Spedale, 2006). One study noted that a particular hospital struggled to meet staffing 
needs, but was reluctant to bring in nurses from an evacuated hospital for fear of being 
perceived as poaching staff (Adalja et al., 2014). While hospitals are required to provide 
adequate staffing to safely and effectively respond to disasters (McHugh, 2010), some studies 
reported enlisting only “key” or “essential” staff to respond to a particular disaster 
(Barkemeyer, 2006; Ginsberg, 2006; Taylor, 2007). While designating essential vs. non-
essential staff is a common practice in organizational emergency response planning (United 
States Code, 1986), this practice could potentially have a negative impact on staff members 
who are resent being labeled “non-essential”, and could result in staffing shortages during the 
disaster and in the days following, as non-essential staff may have evacuated the city.  
Ensuring adequate staffing is an important aspect of hospital disaster response 
planning. Hospitals that have some degree of advanced notice of disasters (as in the case of 
hurricanes) may call in supplemental clinical and administrative staff (Adalja et al., 2014; 
Giarratano et al., 2008; Spedale, 2006), or allow any and all employees to report to the 
hospital if they are able (Bernard & Mathews, 2008; Nakagawa et al., 2013; Okumura et al., 
1998; Uppal et al., 2013). Several studies have also noted that hospitals sometimes have a 
specific staffing plan for disasters; for example, Team A will report to the hospital before the 
storm and work for as long as needed, and Team B will relieve Team A as soon as they are 
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able to get to the hospital (Bernard & Mathews, 2008; Danna et al., 2010; French et al., 2002; 
Ginsberg, 2006). When staff are displaced from their workplaces by the disaster, they may be 
deployed or “absorbed” by other local hospitals to meet demand (Adalja et al., 2014; 
Ginsberg, 2006; Uppal et al., 2013; VanDevanter et al., 2014b).  
Certain types of disasters, such as pandemics and extended infectious disease 
outbreaks, may require significant increases in staffing. In the case of a hospital that had 
admitted a patient infected with Ebola, additional staff were needed for security, 
administration, and direct care of the patient, including a “buddy” for the bedside nurse, who 
watched for errors in infection control and assisted with the donning and doffing of PPE 
(Haverkort et al., 2016; Jennings et al., 2018). During the COVID-19 pandemic, shortages of 
ED and ICU staff resulted in many states, particularly New York, calling on retired and 
inactive clinicians to volunteer to supplement the workforce (New York State Department of 
Health, 2020). The need for increases in overall staffing, or increases in staff with a specific 
skill set or specialization, is an important consideration in the development of EOP staffing 
plans.  
Organizational Justice  
Employees have reported being dissatisfied with what they perceived as a lack of 
fairness in how their hospitals delegated resources, time, training, pay, praise, and workload 
during disaster response. Employees have reported feeling resentment towards coworkers 
who were away from work longer after the disaster, or who were not part of the disaster 
response, or were not required to work after the disaster but were being compensated 
nonetheless (Robertson et al. 2004; VanDevanter et al. 2014). Employees have also reported 
being frustrated by the perceived preferential treatment of management or “critical 
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operations” employees, or those employees who were given resources such as shelter and 
food (French et al., 2002). These injustices made employees feel that their employers did not 
value them equally.  
One study described participants’ frustrations with preferential treatment: physicians 
and their families were given private hospitals rooms to stay in during Hurricane Floyd, 
while nurses and their families were directed to local shelters (French et al., 2002). Nurses 
were also concerned with the level of visible leadership and direction from their managers, 
who were not “in the trenches” during the evacuation (French et al., 2002). In another study, 
nurses on units not caring for SARS patients felt their needs became secondary to the needs 
of staff who worked with SARS patients (Maunder et al., 2003). It is important for hospital 
staff to feel that they are valued equally by leaders, for resources to be distributed as 
equitably as possible among hospital staff.  
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the literature pertaining to disasters and emergencies, the policies and 
procedures that govern the response to disasters, and employee experiences of disasters at the 
workplace was reviewed. In accordance with qualitative descriptive methods, the literature 
was briefly examined prior to data collection, and a more in-depth investigation of the 
literature was engaged in after data collection and concurrent with data analysis. In the next 
chapter, research methods for this study will be discussed.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODS 
Introduction 
 The aims of this dissertation were to: 1) explore the experiences of staff who work in 
a hospital during a natural disaster; and 2) describe their perceptions of the work environment 
during the disaster. In this chapter, the methodological approaches used will be described, to 
include the study design, sample, and analysis. A holistic approach to validity, guided by Cho 
and Trent (2006) was integrated throughout the study, and is discussed in this chapter.  
Research Design 
 This study was carried out using the qualitative description approach, with 
conventional content analysis for data analysis. Qualitative description is a methodology that 
is used to conduct an in-depth depiction and analysis of an event or experience. This 
approach utilizes a “low-inference” form of interpretation, wherein multiple researchers 
would more readily agree on the facts of a case, as the conclusions stay close to the data, or 
“data-near” (Sandelowski, 2010, p.78), instead of moving to a level of more complex 
interpretation. Unlike, for example, grounded theory, the aim of qualitative description is not 
to generate theory. In addition, the researcher refrains from committing to a specific theory a 
priori (Sandelowski, 2000, 2010). This lack of theoretical underpinning does not mean that 
the research is approached with an empty mind, but rather that findings are interpreted 
inductively. Thus, while no specific theory or framework was used in this study to guide the 
study or data collection, theory was examined during data analysis, interpretation, and the 
contextualization of findings. Likewise, the literature review was re-visited, examined, and 
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augmented after data collection was complete and concurrent with data analysis, to ensure 
that relevant literature was intentionally integrated into the discussion section.  
Addressing Validity 
 As with any study, an important aspect of qualitative research is to maintain and 
ensure the legitimacy and soundness of the study.  The realist approach to validity described 
by Maxwell (1992) rejects the positivist view that a single reality exists, which can be 
accurately measured and described to ensure validity through the use of study designs, 
methods, and approaches typically associated with quantitative research. Instead, the realist 
approach acknowledges that a participant’s perception of reality, as well as the researcher’s 
own perceptions of reality and personal biases, affect the interpretation of data. Validity in 
qualitative research, then, “…pertains to the kind of understanding that accounts can 
embody” (Maxwell, 1992, p.284). Validity in qualitative research is not tested during data 
analysis or near the end of a study using specific tools and statistics, but is built into every 
step of the research process (Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson, & Spiers, 2002). In other words, 
simply employing common qualitative approaches such as member checking, bracketing, and 
reflectivity analyses do not guarantee validity in a study; instead, the researcher must 
intentionally select the appropriate tools to be used, clearly understanding when and why 
certain tools should be used in specific cases (Cho & Trent, 2006). The use of these 
purposeful approaches can result in a more “holistically valid”  (Cho & Trent, 2006, p.335) 
approach than simply applying specific measures and assuming a “valid” study will be born 
from them.  
 Qualitative methods are typically vulnerable to two types of validity threats: 
researcher bias and reactivity (Maxwell, 2013; Paterson, 1994). Researcher bias refers to the 
potential influence of a researcher’s values, background, preconceptions, or theoretical 
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perspective on the design, analysis, and conclusions of the study. Reactivity is the effect the 
researcher may have on participants or the setting of study, and conversely, the effect of the 
participant and the data on the researcher (Maxwell, 2013; Paterson, 1994). Because neither 
researcher bias nor reactivity can be completely eliminated in any research, it is critical for 
researchers to be aware of these concerns and take steps to minimize, understand, and 
address these issues effectively within the design of the study.  
 Threats to validity in this project included researcher bias, sampling bias, reactivity, 
generalizability, and the truth value of multiple individual perspectives (Whittemore, Chase, 
& Mandle, 2001). These threats were addressed using a combination of strategies, namely  
triangulation, maintaining reactivity and reflexivity memos and analyses, holding in-depth 
discussions of the findings with a second coder, and the construction of an audit trail. These 
strategies helped to protect validity, and are meant to produce an account of participants’ 
experiences that is truthful, trustworthy, and non-judgmental (Cho & Trent, 2006). 
 Triangulation, or the use of multiple methods or data sources, was used in this study 
by conducting semi-structured interviews with study participants and reviewing 
organizational documents. These actions reduced the risk of researcher-introduced systematic 
biases and chance associations due to study design decisions (Maxwell, 2013), and helped 
understand how perspectives converged. Reactivity analysis, or the researcher’s use of 
methods to identify, document, and reflect on potential sources of reactivity in qualitative 
research, was used to address such concerns as emotional valence, distribution of power, goal 
of the interaction, importance of the interaction, and sensitivity to normative or cultural 
criteria (Paterson, 1994). Using Paterson’s reactivity framework, the researcher engaged in 
memo-writing (i.e., “memoing”) to identify personal sources of reactivity. Reflexivity, or the 
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potential for the researcher’s own “situatedness within the research” (Berger, 2015, p.220) to 
affect participants, was also addressed in this study. In particular, before, during, and 
following the field experience, the researcher reflected on how factors such as her race, 
gender, age, personal experiences, beliefs, biases, and political stances may have affected the 
research processes and outcomes (Berger, 2015), and wrote memos of those reflections. 
Other members of the dissertation committee, in particular the chair and qualitative experts, 
were available to discuss any issues raised during the field experience so that the researcher 
remained as open and unbiased as possible. 
 An audit trail consists of a series of notes and documents recorded and organized by 
the researcher to track and document the evolution of the project. These notes may include 
memos, fieldnotes, and reactivity analyses, and serve to provide context for data collected, 
the rationale for decisions made related to methods and design, the interpretation of findings, 
and the researcher’s orientation or relationship to the data (Rodgers & Cowles, 1993). 
Memos and reactivity analyses were included in the audit trail to preserve the data and 
document the context for methodological and analytical decisions.  
Setting  
 The setting for this study was a 25-bed hospital in rural, southeastern North Carolina 
that was evacuated in September 2018 due to problems associated with Hurricane Florence. 
This hospital is part of a larger health system that operates multiple acute care and outpatient 
facilities in North Carolina, and offers emergency services, inpatient and outpatient surgery, 
a medical and telemetry unit, an Intensive Care Unit (ICU), and a swing bed program. The 
swing bed program, authorized by The Social Security Act, permits rural hospitals to use 
their beds for either acute care or skilled nursing facility (SNF) patients. These beds are often 
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used for patients who require intravenous medication therapy, skilled physical therapy, or 
other skilled care services before they are able to return home (CMS, 2019).  
Prior to Hurricane Florence, this hospital setting operated a birth center, which was 
comprised of four labor, delivery, recovery, and postpartum (LDRP) beds, a well-baby 
nursery, and gynecological services. The birth center was officially closed in January of 
2019. This closure is discussed in further detail in Chapters 4 and 5.   
Sample 
The goal throughout sample recruitment and data collection in qualitative research is 
to obtain an adequate and appropriate sample (Morse, 1986, 1995). An adequate sample is 
one that consists of enough participants so that no new information is obtained by adding 
additional participants (Morse, 1995). An appropriate sample is one that supplies a sufficient 
amount of quality data to answer research questions (Morse, 1986). Adequacy and 
appropriateness of the sample in this project were achieved through the guidance of 
dissertation committee members, thoughtful planning of the sampling strategy and interview 
guide construction, and the researcher’s interview skills and experience. Recruitment for this 
project was ongoing to ensure that an adequate sample was obtained. The adequacy of the 
sample was assessed on an ongoing basis, as data were reviewed and analyzed. The 
appropriateness of the sample was ensured by recruiting participants who were a part of the 
hospital disaster event and relevant to help address the study purpose and research questions. 
 The anticipated sample size for this project was 22 participants, each selected for 
specific purposes (Patton, 2002). Purposeful sampling allows the researcher to gather cases 
that reflect a variety of employee experiences (Sandelowski, 2000) and to make intra- and 
inter- group comparisons (i.e., among individuals within the same group, and between 
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groups) (Maxwell, 2013). Participants were to be included if they participated in the hospital 
evacuation. Those who did not participate in the evacuation were to be excluded.  
The sample and sampling strategy used in this study were based on the criteria of 
staff roles and job levels. The rationale for using these particular criteria was to ensure that 
data were gathered from hospital employees with varied and diverse perspectives that 
reflected organizational roles, responsibilities, and relationships. Staff roles were defined by 
the type of formal position held by a participant (e.g., Registered Nurse, physician), while job 
level was based on the common employee reporting relationships of frontline, middle, and 
leadership employees, as described by Daft (2012).  
The desired sample for this study is shown in Table 1, based on both the specific staff 
roles and levels that were targeted to participate in the study. The sampling of employees in 
such a manner was consistent with prior disaster research examining non-healthcare 
employee reactions to terrorist events at their workplace and how these events affected 
employee job satisfaction (Gershon et al., 2011, 2007; North et al., 2013). A strength of this 
approach is that it provided diverse perspectives of how the disaster event affected 
employees within each level. Although the approach potentially provides a limited view 









  Clerical   Providers   Executive Level 
    Unit Clerk (UC) (1)     Medical Doctor (MD) (1)    Chief Nursing Officer  
   (CNO)(1) 
     Nurse Practitioner (NP)   
    (1)     
     
  Maintenance        Administration 
    Housekeeping (1)   Nursing     Director of Emergency 
    Preparedness (1)     
    Handy person (1)     Nurse Manager (NM) (1)  
    Engineer (1)     Assistant Nurse Manager  
    (ANM) (1) 
     
       
  Security   Facilities and Operations  
    Security officer (1)      Supplies Manager (1)     
      Information Technology  
     (IT) Manager (1) 
 
  Nursing   
    Registered Nurse (RN) 
    (2) 
  Pharmacy      
    Licensed Practical Nurse  
    (LPN) (1) 
     Clinical Pharmacist (1)      
    Certified Nursing  
    Assistant (CNA) (1) 
          
   
  Allied Health   
     Respiratory Therapist 
    (RT) (1) 
  
Total Frontline = 10 Total Middle= 7 Total Leadership (n=2) 
 
 Frontline employees, or those employees who held a direct service position and did 
not hold a management or leadership position in the organization, were included because 
they work to ensure the safety of patients, other staff, and themselves. This level of employee 
was identified because they offer a unique perspective and important insights about the work 
environment during a disaster and evacuation. Clerical, maintenance and security employees 
were included in this category as they possess valuable information about the context of the 
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clinical work environment and they are familiar with the structure, functioning, and 
mechanics of the organization where patient care is delivered. The information from this 
group provided context for the challenges faced by hospital employees during this event. 
Nursing and Allied Health staff were included to provide specific information about the 
provision of direct patient care during the evacuation and disaster response, and the clinical 
work environment.  
 Employees in the “middle” job level—providers (physicians, nurse practitioners, and 
physician assistants), mid-level managers, and facilities and operations personnel—were 
included in the sampling strategy to explore perspectives on the coordination and supervision 
of teams and facility operations immediately before, during, and after the disaster. During a 
hospital disaster response, employees in this category often play dual roles of both team 
leader and frontline responder. Therefore, employees at this level were expected to offer 
unique perspectives on adapting to the situational needs of the disaster while providing 
leadership and patient care during and after the event. Employees from facilities and 
operations were included because they possess knowledge of the adequacy and availability of 
supplies and technologies, and these factors have been reported to impact staff experiences 
during a hospital disaster response (Hochwarter, Laird, & Brouer, 2007; Lee et al., 2005; 
Speroni et al., 2015; Tam et al., 2004).  
 Finally, two employees at the leadership level of the organization were included. The 
Chief Nursing Officer (CNO) was included to better understand the administrative challenges 
of overseeing nursing personnel—typically  the largest group of clinicians in a hospital’s 
workforce—during a disaster. The director of emergency preparedness was also identified for 
inclusion to offer information regarding the planning and preparedness activities of the 
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organization, and various logistical features of the hospital disaster response and recovery. 
Additional participants were to be contacted using the snowball method of recruitment (i.e., 
recruiting new participants through previously recruited participants) if they were named by 
participants as key individuals taking part in the evacuation.   
At the outset of this project, sample recruitment was planned to occur through the 
distribution of a recruitment email that would be sent to prospective participants so that 
information could be spread throughout the organization, and to employees at different job 
levels. Three emails, including an initial message and two follow-up emails, were planned for 
distribution to employees at each of the top-, middle-, and front-line levels to invite 
employees who had worked in the hospital at the time of the disaster to participate in the in-
person interviews. In case of insufficient participant recruitment, a fourth email targeting 
specific individuals or groups recommended by organizational leaders would have been sent. 
A final attempt using the snowball method of recruitment would have been utilized if 
participant recruitment had been insufficient using these strategies. 
Procedures 
Site Selection 
 On March 11, 2019, an email was sent by the investigator to the hospital leader who 
was the researcher’s point of contact. The email described the dissertation proposal and 
inquired about the hospital serving as the study site. The leader responded 18 days later in the 
affirmative and suggested that another contact be made with the Research Coordinator for the 
hospital system to help with the preparation of the institutional study approval process. On 
April 4th, 2019, the required institutional study approval documents were sent to the 
appropriate department at the hospital system by the Research Coordinator, and three months 
later, on July 19th, approval to conduct the study was received. At this time, the Research 
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Coordinator also stated that the leader who had been the initial point of contact had left the 
organization, and the new leader, who would facilitate the study’s execution, was introduced. 
Recruitment 
On July 26, 2019 the new leader sent out the study recruitment email to the hospital 
listserv. One month later, no responses had been received from this email. The leader sent out 
a second email to hospital staff. In late August, after still no replies were received, the leader 
suggested that the investigator make a visit to the study hospital and remain for several days 
to carry out interviews. After consulting with the dissertation chair and a qualitative expert 
on the committee, it was agreed that this approach was the most effective way to recruit 
participants. This information was communicated to the leader and she agreed to identify 
dates for the researcher to make a site visit for data collection, 
 In late October, the leader specified early November as the time for data collection. 
The researcher’s visit to the hospital occurred on November 1-8, 2019, and included a tour of 
the hospital campus, introductions to hospital staff members, the scheduling of interviews, 
and touring the local area. Being at the study site for a week allowed the researcher to 
observe normal work operations and the culture within the hospital during “normal” 
operations, or non-disaster conditions.  
 Upon arriving on the hospital campus, actual participant recruitment took place in 
several ways. The hospital leader approached and recruited six participants into the study. 
The Research Coordinator had contacted two participants and informed them of the study; 
one of these participants called the primary investigator directly to schedule a telephone 
interview, and the other visited the hospital campus to speak in person. Seven participants 
were recruited on site, during the hospital tour and while exploring the hospital. Finally, one 
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participant was recruited via a direct email. A total of 16 participants were successfully 
recruited into the study.  
 Although the initial inclusion criteria for this study focused on only recruiting staff 
members who assisted with the evacuation, it became clear during data collection that the 
evacuation itself was only a small part of the overall disaster response experience. As such, it 
was necessary to include staff members who did not assist with the actual evacuation of 
inpatients from the hospital, but worked after the evacuation and during the response, 
assisting with the care of outpatients and/or hospital operations immediately following the 
evacuation and during the hurricane. 
 A few notable differences exist between the anticipated and actual sampling strategy. 
First, in the Frontline category, no LPNs, handy persons, engineers, or security officers were 
successfully recruited. These employees were either not available for recruitment in the 
organization, had not worked during or after the hurricane, or declined to participate in the 
interviews. Additionally, all of the nurses recruited into this study were Registered Nurses 
(RNs). The actual sample for the Frontline category included five employees from the 
Nursing field, two employees from the Allied Health field, one employee from Dietary, and 
one employee from Facilities Management.  
 From the Middle category, no providers (MD, DO, NP, or PA) or pharmacists were 
recruited. One physician scheduled an interview but did not attend. Only one pharmacist was 
present during the hospital evacuation and response, and the researcher was unable to reach 
this individual. Thus, this category was comprised entirely of staff filling roles in the Middle 
category. The actual sample for the Middle category included two employees from Facilities 
Management, and two employees from Nursing.  
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 From the Leadership category, the CNO initially agreed to participate, but was never 
able to schedule an interview. The President of the hospital during the evacuation, who later 
left the position and transferred to another campus in the same health system, agreed to be 
interviewed. An additional role in this category, the Director of Finance, was recruited to the 
sample by the hospital leader point of contact. Noteworthy was the absence of a designated 
person filling the role of Director of Emergency Preparedness at the time of the hurricane. 
Rather, this role was filled by the RN Clinical Educator, who assumed the role of Incident 
Commander (IC) during the hurricane. Thus, this role was retained in the Leadership 
category, as the person filling the role occupied a leadership role during the evacuation. The 
actual sample for the Leadership category included two employees from Administration, and 
one employee from Emergency Response.  
The different recruitment approaches used in this study—hospital leader point of 
contact recruitment, researcher recruitment, and Research Coordinator recruitment—are  
further addressed in the analysis and will be discussion of findings in this study. That is, the 
recruitment of participants by the CNO could present serious concerns related to voluntary 
consent, participation, and the validity of this study. Rather than exclude these participants, 
the researcher spent extra time with these individuals during the consent process to ensure 
that their participation was voluntary and not coerced by the hospital leader point of contact. 
Additionally, based on consultation with members of the dissertation committee, it was 
decided that data from these interviews would be examined relative to data from participants 
who were recruited through other approaches, including the snowball method or through 
personal contact by the researcher. Recruitment of participants by the Research Coordinator 
was deemed not to be a concern because the employees recruited did not report directly to or 
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have any formal professional relationship with the Research Coordinator); thus, coercion was 
not viewed as a concern for these participants. Thus, participants recruited by all sources – 
the point of contact leader, the Research Coordinator, the researcher, and the snowball 
technique—were included in the analysis.  
Data Collection   
 Triangulation (Denzin, 1970), or the gathering and combining of diverse types of 
data, such as interviews, observations, and organizational documents, provides the best 
strategy to infer relationships in studies of disasters (Couch, 2008). This study used 
document review and semi-structured interviews to gain a deep understanding of the hospital 
work environment during disaster response.   
Because prolonged engagement with participants was not logistically possible in this 
study, an immersive week was spent by the researcher to engage with participants, the 
organization, and the community. Through this intense engagement, the researcher gained a 
close understanding of the daily lives of participants, both in the organization and in their 
community (Cho & Trent, 2006). Although the researcher’s presence at the hospital was 
originally meant to be used as a time to meet and engage with staff and schedule interviews 
for a later visit, all participants instead asked to schedule their interview during this visit. 
Thus, sixteen interviews were carried out over a period of eight days.  
 The individual, semi-structured, audio-recorded interviews were conducted with 
hospital staff to gather data about their perceptions of the hospital work environment, and 
their experiences before, during, and after disaster response. The interviews followed a semi-
structured interview guide (shown in Appendix D). This guide was developed based on 
prompts used in interviews conducted with patients, nurses, and physicians who survived the 
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2010 Christchurch earthquakes in New Zealand (Johal, Mounsey, Tuohy, & Johnston, 2014; 
Johal et al., 2016; Johal, Mounsey, Tuohy, & Johnston, 2014). The interview guide for this 
study was written broadly to allow changes to be made based on discoveries made during 
document review, and to allow participants to emphasize what they thought were important 
aspects of the evacuation experience. Interview guide prompts were adjusted based on 
participant role and information revealed during the interview. Interview questions sought 
information about the participants’ background, how and when they first learned that the 
hospital was to be evacuated, the work environment during the hurricane, the participant’s 
perception of the organization’s level of preparedness, and how the participant managed their 
stress, if applicable.  
Prior to beginning each interview, each participant was provided an overview of the 
study, given time to ask questions, and then invited to sign two copies of the consent form. 
One copy remained with the participant; the second copy was stored in a secure file folder 
that remained in the possession of the researcher while in the field. The folder was then 
placed in a locked file drawer in the researcher’s office after returning to the UNC campus.  
The office space remains locked except when researchers are present.  
Participants were ensured that their participation was voluntary and that their consent 
to participate in the study could be withdrawn at any time. Because all interviews were 
conducted with individuals employed at the study site, extra time was spent by the researcher 
explaining to participants that the interview and their participation was in no way connected 
to their employment. The primary investigator explained rationale for the use of two audio 
recorders and demonstrated to participants how to turn them both off if they desired to end 
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the interview. The primary investigator also described how the participant’s data could be 
erased from both recorders if the participant wished.  
Thirteen interviews lasted between 45-70 minutes; three were between 17 and 30 
minutes. Eleven of the sixteen interviews were conducted in a staff education room that was 
provided to the researcher during the site visit. The remaining interviews were conducted 
elsewhere, as agreed upon by the participant and researcher: one was conducted in a vacant 
office, one was conducted in an administrative conference room, one was conducted in a 
vacant patient room, one was conducted in an empty waiting room, and one was conducted 
by phone. In all cases, great care was taken to ensure participant privacy. Despite these 
measures, there were several occasions when interviews were interrupted by other staff 
members or patients contacting participants, or by phone calls, texts, and pages made to 
participants.  
 After each interview, the researcher wrote reactivity statements, or personal thoughts 
and reactions to the interview (Paterson, 1994). These reflections or “memos” served as a 
thoughtful reflection on the sources of reactivity that could later influence data analysis 
(Paterson, 1994). These reflections were written either immediately after the interview, or 
later that evening.  
Document review was carried out on the final day onsite. Only one document was 
available for review. It was anticipated that access to the facility preparedness documents 
(e.g. the EOP) would be available for review; however, read-only access to a different 
document, the post-disaster report, was provided by a staff member who logged into the 
hospital Intranet, and opened the report for the researcher to review. Several hours were spent 
examining the document and taking extensive notes. Per the instructions accompanying the 
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document, no contents were reproduced. Instead, the 117-page document was read several 
times and notes were taken about relevant content. Prior to data analysis, these notes were 
uploaded to the qualitative data analysis software Atlas.ti. (2018).  
Qualitative Data Analysis 
 Audio files from the interviews were uploaded to a secure transcription service 
(Rev.com). The transcribed interviews were then edited by the researcher to remove all 
personally identifying information revealed during interviews. Proper nouns or other 
identifying information were either removed or replaced with pseudonyms. These edited 
transcriptions, and the raw audio files, were stored on the secure, password-protected storage 
system (OneDrive in Office 365) provided by UNC.  
 Transcription files and notes from the HICS document review were uploaded to and 
coded using the software program, Atlas.ti (2018), via a password-protected account. The 
researcher had previously completed online training in the use of Atlas.ti, used the program 
several times for content analysis during other projects over the past five years, and was thus 
proficient in the use of the program. 
 Prior to beginning data analysis, considerable time was spent reading and rereading 
each transcript, writing additional reflections and memos on the content of each interview, 
and rereading personal reactivity statements. This allowed the researcher to identify sources 
of personal bias and reflect on any personal emotional reactions to participants, their words, 
and their experiences. Time was spent reviewing notes taken during the site visit and 
document review, and making connections between these notes, statements made by 
participants, and memos written following each interview.  
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 Conventional content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) was used to examine data. 
This approach involves coding and examining data to discover patterns and relationships in 
the data (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Maxwell, 2013). Simply putting data into a list of 
categories and themes, however, does not provide a close analysis of data, and is not an end 
result in itself (Ayres, Kavanaugh, & Knafl, 2003). The end goal of this analysis was to use 
the “Rashomon effect” or to describe the same event by multiple study participants 
(Sandelowski, 2000, p.339) to produce an idiographic generalization composed of the 
experiences as told by hospital employees (Ayres et al., 2003). An idiographic generalization 
is one that can be applied to a case or individual, rather than to a larger population 
(Sandelowski, 1996). While quantitative research and other methods of qualitative research 
search for concepts or experiences that can be generalized to a larger population or across 
many situations, qualitative description attempts to generalize at the case or individual level, 
so that a person’s experience can be understood by the researcher.  
 After rereading the transcripts, reflections, and document review notes, each 
transcript was coded using an “open coding” strategy, where words or phrases were used to 
describe “chunks” representing an idea, a thought, or concept. The codes were developed 
inductively using participants’ words, and not created based on any a priori framework or 
theory. After this initial pass at coding, the transcripts were coded once again; during this 
process, open codes were refined further. At this stage, document review notes were 
integrated into the coding system, along with coded “chunks” or sentences that brought to 
mind statements made by participants. Next, these codes and code phrases were grouped into 
larger concepts, or categories. These concepts represented positive, negative, or neutral 
sentiments expressed by participants (i.e., “Communication with leadership” could be 
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applied to quotes indicating insufficient communication, helpful communication, or simply a 
statement of actions taken). Finally, concepts were sorted into themes. Where concepts are 
simply collections of data sorted into a common bucket, themes are a “meaningful essence” 
that run throughout the data (Morse, 2008).  
 Two matrices were then created: one matrix organized concepts across job roles and 
job levels; the other organized categories based on recruitment method. The purpose of 
creating these matrices were twofold.  First, creating the matrices provided the researcher 
with a “bird’s eye view” of the findings, a view that was not possible by simply identifying 
discrete codes and themes that do not show how the codes and themes “fit” together. The 
matrices also allowed the researcher to examine findings from the whole experience 
recounted by participants, rather than by viewing single categories or themes. Second, the 
matrices allowed for the analysis of the findings based on the context of the participants: 
whether they worked as a frontline, middle, or leadership employee, and their specific job 
role within each level. It was also necessary to examine findings relative to the method used 
to recruit participants. Arranging findings in a matrix based on the various recruitment 
methods described earlier enabled a close assessment of the potential influence of each 
recruitment method on study findings.  
Four interview transcripts were chosen that represented both “wide” and “deep” 
discussions of the event. These transcripts were given to a second coder (PhD student trained 
in qualitative analysis), who also read, reflected on, and coded the transcripts. The second 
coder was aware of the study purpose and research questions, but was not advised of any 
coding completed by the first coder. When the second coder finished coding the four 
transcripts, the primary researcher, the second coder, and the dissertation chair discussed 
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their thoughts and reactions to the data, the differences and similarities between the codes, 
categories, and themes derived from the interviews, and the context provided by the 
document review. The addition of the second coder allowed for a more in-depth examination 
of the data, and broadened analysis to include more than the singular perspective of the 
primary researcher.  
Protection of Human Subjects 
Approval to conduct the study was first obtained from the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill prior to initiating the study. 
Approval was received on March 29, 2019. Institutional approval at the study site was 
granted by the hospital system on July 19th, 2019. All details related to institutional approval 
were communicated to the researcher by the Research Coordinator for the hospital system.  
The protection of the identity of study participants, and also of the hospital itself, was 
of high importance during the conduct of this study.  Several participants expressed anxiety 
about the risk of potential loss of confidentiality, and two staff members even declined to 
participate for this reason. To protect the identities of study participants, the following 
measures were taken.  
First, audio files were uploaded to UNC’s secure OneDrive, and were not uploaded 
on a computer hard drive. From there, the files were uploaded to a secure transcription 
service. After all files were transcribed, the audio files containing unedited data were deleted. 
The transcriptions were examined for any information that could identify participants or any 
individuals named during an interview. Pseudonyms were used to replace proper nouns that 
could be personally identifying. Proper nouns that would not identify the town, the 
organization, or an individual were selected. For example, the name of a grocery store chain, 
Publix, was not changed, as these stores are located in a variety of cities, towns, and states, 
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and not only the one where data were gathered. The name of the hospital, the hospital 
system, and the town were all changed to protect the study site. All edited transcripts were 
saved to the OneDrive, and uploaded to Atlas.ti, a password-protected qualitative analysis 
software. 
Special Research Considerations for Victims of Disasters 
 There are a number of issues that had to be considered in this study involving victims 
of disasters. Although there are benefits to individuals participating in disaster research, such 
as the feeling of empowerment, learning and gaining insights into a particular type of 
disaster, developing kinship with others who might have shared common experiences, feeling 
satisfaction or value after reflecting on experiences during participation, or feeling a sense of 
altruism (Collogan, Tuma, Dolan-Sewell, Borja, & Fleischman, 2017), there are also risks. In 
this study, the participants were both employees of the hospital where community members 
were brought for care following the disaster, and victims of the disaster themselves. This dual 
impact of the disaster on the study sample meant that participants were subject to the risks of 
participating in the study as an employee, and also as a victim of the disaster. As employees, 
participants faced the risks of loss of confidentiality, being exposed as a participant, and 
being stigmatized by coworkers. As disaster victims, the subjects also faced the risks of 
physical harm from the storm, re-traumatization, manipulation, exploitation, unrealistic 
expectations, and stigmatization (Mezinska et al., 2016). Disaster researchers are encouraged 
to structure their studies to minimize potential risks to participants, and to balance risks with 
measures meant to alleviate distress and burden (Fleischman & Wood, 2002; Knack, Chen, 
Williams, & Jensen-Campbell, 2006; Lavin, Schemmel-Rettenmeier, & Frommelt-Kuhle, 
2012; Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), 2016).  
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To mitigate the potential risk of participating in the study for individuals as 
employees and as disaster victims, several precautions were taken.  First, the researcher did 
not enter the field until over three months after the disaster occurred. Immediately following 
any disaster, including a hurricane, participants may be displaced and dealing with the 
personal challenges of loss of housing, damage to personal property, health concerns, or 
financial difficulties. Allowing a span of at least a three-months to pass following the disaster 
prevented participants from experiencing the stress of study recruitment and participation 
while dealing with immediate recovery challenges.  
 Second, it is recommended that researchers not compensate individuals for their 
participation in studies following a disaster to prevent real or perceived exploitation and 
manipulation of participants (Knack et al., 2006). Instead, researchers should direct 
participants to potential sources of aid or information at the participant’s request (Lavin et al., 
2012). Participants in this study, therefore, were not compensated for their time, and no 
participants requested compensation or resources from the researcher.  
 Stigmatization, or the collective negative attitude towards a group of people, is a 
serious concern for participants of disaster research. Participants may experience stigma from 
their coworkers as “whistleblowers”, or stigma from their communities for participating in 
research that might expose vulnerabilities in the community. For example, nurses identified 
through research participation as individuals who cared for people with Ebola Virus Disease 
could be stigmatized from others in their community who view them as potential transmitters 
of the disease (Hewlett & Hewlett, 2005). Hospital employees participating in disaster 
response and recovery may face ethical dilemmas when providing care for patients 
(McMahon et al., 2016; Ozge Karadag & Kerim Hakan, 2012); these dilemmas may present 
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opportunities for retaliation or punitive measures by employers if identified through their 
participation in research. To prevent retaliation from management and stigmatization from 
coworkers for their participation in this study, the primary investigator was sensitive to 
protect the confidentiality and anonymity of all participants.  
Re-traumatization, or the trauma of experiencing an event a second time, was an 
additional concern in this study because researchers conducting research with victims of 
disasters may inadvertently probe topics that dredge up bad memories or experiences for 
participants, and make them uncomfortable responding to questions (Goodhand, 2000). To 
address this concern, the interview guide and the probes used were written to allow 
participants to respond based on their level of comfort. A list of free and low-cost counseling 
and therapy resources local to the data collection site was also compiled prior to going into 
the field so that these resources could be offered to any participants who appeared to be in 
distress during the interview. Emotional distress, however, is not viewed as a reason to stop 
or cancel an interview unless a participant desires to do so; most participants who become 
emotionally upset during qualitative interviews do not regret participation or negatively 
evaluate participation in research (Collogan et al., 2017).  
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter described the methods used to carry out this study, including the study 
design, data collection, data analysis and validity. The methods used in this study were 
qualitative description with conventional content analysis. A holistic approach to validity, 
based on Cho and Trent (2006) and Maxwell (1992) was used from the beginning to end of 
the research process. The measures taken to protect participant confidentiality, and minimize 
risks to participants as victims of disaster were particularly important in this study. In the 
next chapter, the results from the qualitative analysis of the data are presented. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
Introduction 
This study explored hospital employees’ experiences and perceptions of their work 
environment during a natural disaster, Hurricane Florence in 2018. The research questions 
that guided this study were: 1) what are hospital employees’ experiences working in a 
hospital during an evacuation? And 2) how do hospital employees describe the work 
environment during an evacuation? These questions were addressed by conducting semi-
structured interviews with 16 individuals who were employees of a hospital that was affected 
by and evacuated following a hurricane, and examining HICS notes from the disaster. 
Participants represented frontline employees (n=9), middle level clinicians and managers 
(n=4), and hospital leadership (n=3) in the organization, who were recruited to participate 
the study and interviewed individually in person (n=15) or over the phone (n=1). To 
preserve the anonymity of participants, who may be identified by their job role or title, 
participants are described throughout the remainder of this dissertation by their job level, 
e.g., frontline staff, middle management, and leadership staff. In some cases, the pronoun 
“they” will be used instead of the more identifying pronouns of “she” or “he.”  
Going into the field, it was expected that much of the participants’ recollections 
would concern the patient evacuation activities. Thus, research question one explicitly 
identified “evacuation” as the activity under study. During interviews with hospital 
employees, however, it became clear that the actual evacuation of patients was only a small 
part of the larger story. The evacuation took less than thirty minutes. The totality of the 
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disaster response, however, was the focus of participants’ comments. Regardless of the 
hospital evacuation, the emergency department remained open during and after the storm, 
and staff worked, slept, and, in essence, lived at the hospital for days at a time to care for 
patients who presented to the ED. In prior studies of hospital disasters, and particularly 
disaster response, evacuation activities played a much larger role. For example, during 
Hurricane Sandy, nurses described carrying infants in their arms through flooding, dark 
hospitals in New York as the wind howled across the city (VanDevanter et al., 2014b). In the 
current study, the evacuation itself was almost secondary because the experience of living 
and providing patient care in unusual and uncomfortable conditions was most prominent in 
the minds and memories of study participants.  
A second unexpected finding of this study was the significance of the closure of the 
hospital’s birth center following the storm. Although this event was known to the researcher 
before beginning the study, it was not anticipated that the closure would have such a 
powerful and long-term impact on staff. Participants discussed the closure as if it were a 
second disaster, almost as large and damaging as the hurricane itself. 
In this chapter, a summary of the hurricane and the birth center closure is presented to 
orient the reader to the timeline and the manner in which events unfolded. Following the 
summary, the results from the qualitative analysis are presented by research question, as well 
as the results of data analysis by job role, job level, and recruitment method.  
Summary of Hurricane-Related Events 
 There are two primary areas that provide important context for the conduct of this 
study.  The first is a discussion of the events of the hurricane, followed by a discussion of 
hospital leaders’ decision to close the hospital’s birth center. These two areas were 
mentioned frequently during study participant interviews, and no doubt shaped their 
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experiences of working in the hospital, and their perceptions of the work environment during 
the storm.    
The Hurricane 
Participants in this study spoke about the hurricane in terms of their preparation, the 
experience of working through the storm and the subsequent days in the hospital, what 
happened after they left the hospital, and their thoughts about future hurricanes. In keeping 
with the disaster management cycle framework, or Preparedness-Response-Recovery-
Mitigation, the summary of the hurricane is organized according to these phases. 
 Preparedness. On September 10th, the governor of North Carolina requested a 
declaration of emergency from President Trump. On this same day, hospital leaders met with 
local emergency management officials to hold their first situational briefing, and the HICS 
was formed. At this point, Hurricane Florence was a category 2 hurricane, with 105 mph 
winds. The disaster preparedness and response plans were reviewed. Leaders discussed the 
specifics of sheltering hospital employees, including sleeping accommodations and food and 
water supply. Additional supplies were ordered, including a backup generator, that was 
scheduled to arrive on Wednesday, September 13, the day before the storm was predicted to 
arrive. An email was sent to all staff members to update them on the hurricane status, and 
inform them of expectations for staff during the storm. As noted by one frontline staff 
member, this email could only be accessed by using a computer on the hospital campus. Staff 
who were not at work before the storm could not access or read the email.  
Over the next three days, hospital leaders continued to meet to discuss storm updates 
and the EOP. Hospital leader discussed community sheltering options with local EM 
officials, and made preparations for special needs shelters, where patients could receive 
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oxygen therapy. The decision was made to evacuate all inpatients before the arrival of the 
storm, so that staff and resources could be directed to the ED. Hospital staff readied their 
homes, families, and properties for the storm, and communicated with unit managers to 
discuss responsibilities and expectations for the disaster.  
Response. The night before the storm was predicted to arrive, staff members who 
were scheduled to work the following day were asked to come in and stay the night. Hospital 
leadership anticipated that roadways would quickly become impassible as the rain began, and 
wanted to ensure that adequate staff would be able to report to work. Staff members brought 
bags of clothing, toiletries, snacks, medication, battery chargers, sheets, pillows, and even air 
mattresses to the hospital to prepare for their stay.  
As rain began to fall on September 13th,  participants mostly described work as 
“business as usual.” Although all inpatients had been discharged or transferred to another 
hospital before the storm, there was still work to be done in the ED. Staff cared for patients 
presenting to the ED and kept their eyes on the news for information about the storm.  
On September 14th, Florence made landfall near Wrightsville Beach, North Carolina, 
and heavy rain began to fall on the hospital. At 8:00am, the hospital lost commercial power. 
The generator powered on, but two hours later, the generator malfunctioned and no longer 
provided a back-up source of electrical power. Staff worked in the intense heat and humidity, 
caring for patients in the dark without the use of tools or services requiring power, such as 
imaging or suction. Participants described their shock at having to care for patients under 
these conditions, and their fear for patients’ safety. They also expressed anxiety about the 
professional or legal consequences of providing what they perceived as “substandard” care, 
or care that was inconsistent with the usual and expected standards of care. The physical 
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discomfort of working in the extreme heat and humidity was described by all participants, 
but especially by the staff working in the ED. These participants described wringing out 
clothing drenched in sweat, and running out into the storm just to cool off.  
Staff also spoke about the perceived comforts of the employees working in the HIC 
compared to the discomforts of those working in the ED. They believed staff members in the 
HIC were laughing, joking, playing games, and watching television in the air conditioning, 
while ED staff worked through heat, humidity, and chaos while tending to patients. Staff had 
other complaints as well; as hospital temperatures crept towards 90 degrees Fahrenheit, they 
continued to be served hot foods to eat.  Also, they were not permitted to change from their 
wet scrubs into dry clothes that would accommodate the heat, such as shorts and t-shirts, 
while working in the ED. Finally, they generally felt that their needs were not being heard or 
adequately addressed by management. The constellation of physical discomfort, fear for their 
own lives and the lives of their patients and families, and frustration with the actions of 
hospital leaders led some participants to describe the disaster response experience as 
“traumatizing.”  
 Recovery. In addition to the evacuation of patients and changes made “in the 
moment” regarding staffing and hospital operations, the hurricane left the hospital steeped in 
floodwater, with damage to the roof, windows, walls, floor, and lighting. The operating room 
suffered the most severe damage, which required the suspension of all surgical services, 
including obstetric services. Renovation crews worked in the hospital for weeks after the 
storm. Some of the windows were covered with black tarps and boards during the renovation, 
leading some community members to believe the entire hospital was closed. Billboards and 
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social media posts were set up by hospital leaders to inform the community that the hospital 
was still open.  
 Mitigation. Participants discussed the lessons learned personally and professionally 
from the experience of living and working through the storm. Staff members suggested that 
evacuating the inpatients before the storm was wise, as it would have been unsafe to care for 
patients after electrical power was lost. Participants spoke about what should be done “next 
time”, indicating that they believed another storm would indeed strike the hospital in the 
future. Although some participants suggested that the ED should close during the next 
hurricane, others stated that they believed keeping the ED open was the right thing to do, 
because their community members still needed care during the disaster. Several participants 
indicated that they did not believe the hospital could physically withstand another hurricane 
of similar intensity.  
 Although participants described the renovations to the hospital and the upgrades to 
the operating suite as positive, there was no mention of efforts to improve the resiliency of 
the hospital or staff in anticipation of future storms or other disasters. Rather, they described 
their reluctance to work during future disasters and subsequent response, because of the 
difficult and traumatic experiences from Hurricane Florence.  
The Birth Center Closure 
 The hospital OR sustained severe damage during the storm, and all surgical services 
were suspended for several months after the storm and while renovations and repairs were 
completed. This suspension also forced the hospital to suspend obstetrical services, because 
no surgical birth services could be offered by the hospital. At first, the obstetrical unit 
remained open so that patients presenting to the ED could be assessed by the obstetrical unit 
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staff, and transferred to another hospital as needed. As weeks went by, however, staffing for 
the unit was slowly reduced, until finally, no staff were scheduled to work on the unit at all. 
In early January of 2019, birth center staff were called to a meeting with hospital leaders in 
which they were told that the birth center was closing permanently. Staff were given a few 
days to decide if they would transfer to another unit within the hospital (and “re-tool” to 
work on the unit), transfer to another hospital with openings in obstetrical services in the 
overall healthcare system, or take a severance package and leave the hospital and system 
altogether. 
Results 
Three themes were identified regarding staff experiences of evacuating during the 
hurricane (RQ1): Preparation for the Hurricane; The Hurricane Response, and The 
Aftermath. Two themes were discovered related to staff perceptions of the work environment 
(RQ2): Facilities, and Organizational Culture. The organization of each theme and 
corresponding categories are shown in Table 2. Finally, results are presented based on data 
analysis by job role and job level, as well as by recruitment method.  
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Table 2. Organization of Themes and Categories 
RQ1: Staff experiences of working during the disaster 
Theme Category 
Preparation for the Hurricane Prior Disaster Experience 
 Preparedness Actions 
 Prioritizing 
  
The Hurricane Response Living Conditions 
 Assistance from the Community 
 Altered Standards of Care 
 Duty & Obligation 
 Fear & Safety 
  
Aftermath Birth Center Closure 
 Community Impact 
 Job Changes 
 Personal Property 
 Silver Linings 
 Psychological Debris 
 The Future 
  
RQ2: Staff perceptions of the work environment during the disaster 
Theme Category 
Facilities Power Out 
 Building Hazards 
 The Heat 
 Infrastructure Damage 
  
Organizational Culture Teamwork 
 Communication 
 Justice 
 Work & Rest 
 
RQ1: Staff Experiences of the Hospital Evacuation  
 Three themes were identified in response to Research Question 1. These themes were 
Preparation for the Hurricane, The Hurricane Response, and Aftermath. These themes, and 
the corresponding categories within them, are discussed below.  
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Preparation for the Hurricane 
The prior experiences of hospital staff and leaders shaped their experiences during 
Hurricane Florence. In particular, their prior experiences with disaster-related preparation 
reflected their prior experiences with disasters, in general, and the lessons they may have 
learned from those experiences (Prior Disaster Experience), the steps taken by staff and 
leadership to prepare for Hurricane Florence (Preparedness Actions), and the conflicts and 
tensions employees may have felt when deciding where to turn their attention as they lived 
and worked through the disaster (Prioritizing). Each of these concepts are discussed in the 
sections that follow. 
Prior Disaster Experience. Several participants spoke about their experiences with 
prior disasters, most notably Hurricane Matthew in 2016. Specifically, they spoke about how 
these experiences informed their personal preparation for Hurricane Florence, and how they 
felt about participating during and after the hurricane. Although some staff described 
Hurricane Florence as more severe than Hurricane Matthew in terms of wind and rain, they 
evaluated the Hurricane Matthew experience as “worse” because of the decision made then 
by hospital leaders not to evacuate patients, which some staff believed was a mistake. During 
Hurricane Matthew, clinical staff had to care for inpatients when the hospital lost power; in 
preparation for Florence, all inpatients were discharged, and patient care was limited to 
individuals presenting to the emergency department (ED) during the storm: 
Compared to the hurricane before, the big hurricane that hit us before which was 
[Hurricane] Matthew, we had every bed full and some with double beds in them, and 
we were taking care of patients with no power and no computers and having to do 
paper charting. It was insane then. [Hurricane Florence] was much, much better. 
Much better evacuating the [hospital], and I think they did the right thing. (Frontline) 
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They learned stuff in Matthew because Matthew was such a disaster here, with 
everybody packed in here…So Hurricane Florence came around, we were much, 
much better prepared to handle it. Definitely. (Frontline) 
 
These comments highlight the importance of actions and decisions of hospital leaders, as 
they may moderate staff experiences of the disaster response, regardless of the severity of the 
disaster itself.  
A member of the hospital leadership staff noted that during Matthew, he learned how 
to manage and appropriately complete documentation for support by FEMA, which helped 
with the completion of paperwork for Hurricane Florence, which enabled the hospital to 
obtain funding for repairs and renovations. When considering the decision of whether to 
remain open during the hurricane or to evacuate all patients and close the hospital, a hospital 
leader considered past hurricane experiences, and how the hurricane affected the community: 
… I knew from [Hurricane] Matthew had we left and [the hospital] experienced 
flooding, we wouldn't be able to get back in. And that would mean a lot of people 
without access to care. (Leadership) 
 
Preparedness Actions. Participants also spoke about the ways they prepared for the 
disaster in their personal lives, and as professionals working in the hospital. Participants 
readied their homes, made plans for children and relatives, and packed overnight bags for 
their stay at the hospital: 
But to prepare, [I] did just the normal things you do, make sure all the documents and 
stuff were on the second floor, and safe deposit boxes, outside furniture is brought 
inside. We own a generator now but we didn't during [Hurricane Matthew], so got the 
refrigerator and the freezer cleaned out. (Leadership) 
 
Participants reported that employees also brought overnight bags with them to work in 
anticipation of staying a few days. Supplies brought by employees included clothing, air 
mattresses, batteries, chargers, food, books, and other helpful items: 
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Clothes, yeah, blow-up mattress, sleeping bag, I just slept in my office, toiletries, 
towels, things like that. Snacks, went and bought a bunch of food. A flashlight, and 
made sure I had my truck filled up with gas, and that was it. Phone chargers, stuff like 
that, yeah. (Leadership) 
 
Participants indicated that employees who were aware of the evacuation and sheltering plans 
checked online and printed sources of information for suggestions on preparing for the 
hurricane, such as ordering extra supplies, and making staffing plans. A nurse spoke about 
preparing by brushing up on recommendations for disaster response, and educating the staff 
on proper hygiene in the event of power or water loss: 
I had already pulled the CDC recommendations for predominantly-hurricane 
preparations and water, and preparing the facility, and preparing the staff, and 
hygiene, in the event that we had to go to two-person hand-hygiene and we didn't 
have water to use. (Middle) 
 
Participants also reported that as many patients as possible were discharged from the 
hospital to reduce the amount of direct patient care that would be needed during the 
hurricane, and to increase staff capacity to care for outpatients:  
We held meetings, and going into prayer at work, making sure that we had our 
emergency equipment ready, and that kind of thing. A lot of that was going back to 
the staff and working with them and making sure they knew. And then 
communicating with them [about] what the expectations were, or just kind of, ‘ be 
prepared for this,’ or, ‘Be prepared for that. Bring these things in with you.’ (Middle) 
 
We evacuated…what few patients we had off of Med-Surg. So basically, we become 
a free-standing ED, with the ability to perform surgeries in an emergency if we had 
to…We set up cots and stuff here for the nursing [staff] to make sure we had three 
shifts of nursing covered. We ramped up our supplies and dietary. We got a food 
truck in here that brought pallets of water and food to sustain the staff. (Middle) 
Participants also had differing views about whether the hospital’s disaster 
preparations had been adequate. For example, one frontline staff member stated that they 
were well-supplied with “everything we needed”: 
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But they made sure we had everything we need. We didn't run out of food, we didn't 
run out of water. People had soap. We had everything we needed. People brought 
extra snacks, like food with them, they would share with other people. (Frontline) 
 
Another participant, however, stated the opposite, looking at adequacy of the preparation 
from a different perspective: 
We didn't have the stuff that we needed. We did not have the supplies. I mean, even 
standard lighting, we didn't even have that. There should have been backup. They 
should have already been in place, we didn't have it. (Frontline) 
 
A member of the facilities team explained that, because the hospital had lost power 
during Hurricane Matthew in 2016, he took steps to prepare the hospital for another such 
occurrence during Hurricane Florence. Although the hospital’s backup generator was old, he 
noted that it had rarely been used and had never given them any problems. Still, he decided 
that it would be wise to bring in a second backup generator, just in case.  
 …we paid the money to rent it, to go ahead and unwire our plant generator, and 
wired the rental generator. We were certain we were gonna lose power. How bad it 
was gonna be and how long it was gonna last was uncertain. (Middle) 
 
The day before the facility felt the effects of the hurricane, the facilities staff tested the new, 
rented generator they had wired into the facility. It immediately blew the main hospital 
breaker.  
…it was a mess from that day forward. Basically, when we wired the generator in, 
and we throw the main breaker to test it, the breaker basically exploded, it broke. And 
that's not a breaker that you can just run up town and get. That's a 400-amp service 
breaker the day before the hurricane…. And again, this is older stuff, so it's not on a 
shelf somewhere…(Middle) 
 
The facilities staff spent the rest of that day, and the morning of the hurricane, calling 
companies around the state who still manufactured the breaker, until they were able to 
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replace the breaker and re-test the generator. Testing went smoothly, the facilities manager 
declared the building ready for the hurricane.  
Prioritizing. Participants also discussed the need to prioritize their decisions about 
their work and personal lives, especially when confronted with the decision to go to work or 
stay at home during the disaster. Several participants commented that if the hurricane had 
been worse, they would have chosen to remain at home with their families, even if it meant 
losing their jobs: 
I don't think you should expect your staff to stay here because you're going to have a 
lot of people quit then, if we have a category four hurricane because my family's not 
going to stay here, and I'm going to go with them. I'm sorry…I think a lot of people 
feel the same way, they're not going to leave their families. (Leadership) 
 
…you have that thought of, ‘I need to protect my family. And if it comes in at five, 
then, which one's going to take priority?’ All those thoughts kind of run through your 
head, of what's going to be the priority. (Middle) 
 
One staff member noted that she was prepared to come into work in a crisis, and had made 
her family aware of her decision: 
I've heard some of my peers say, ‘The next one, I'm gone. They can just fire me.’ And 
some of those were in some pretty key positions. And you may have talked to those 
folks, but, ‘I will take my family and leave.’ When it really comes down to it, would 
they? I'm not sure. But my family knows, and they've known since they were 
children, that in a crisis, that's where I would be. (Middle) 
 
Some staff members were frightened for their family’s safety, but felt they had no choice but 
to report to work: 
I was scared, but you know, we had to come to work. We had to come. We had to be 
here. Scared, you know, about your family. You had to leave your family at home and 




Employees’ ability to report to work was also an important consideration. Some 
participants discussed the difficulties they had in traveling to and from work on closed or 
flooded roads. During the hurricane itself, local authorities had implemented an order stating 
that community members were not to be out on the roads due to the flooding and high winds. 
This order meant that staff who were at home during the hurricane could not travel to the 
hospital to assist with the disaster response.   
Some participants noted that their spouses were first responders or mandated 
employees, such as healthcare providers and law enforcement officers. These participants 
discussed making prior plans with their partners in case they were both required to work 
during the disaster, such as sending children to grandparents’ homes or bringing children to 
their workplaces. For these participants, responding to disasters at the workplace was a 
given; they had accepted that it was part of the career they had chosen, and aligned their 
priorities to be a part of the disaster response.  
During several interviews, conflicting statements were made regarding the hospital 
leadership policy about bringing family members to the hospital during a disaster, and in this 
case Hurricane Florence. The President of the hospital, who had made the official decision 
regarding this issue, stated that during Hurricane Matthew, employees had been invited to 
bring their families to the hospital, which had overwhelmed the hospital resources. For 
Hurricane Florence, a decision was made that staff members could only bring their children 
to the hospital if they did not have a spouse.  
And so, we ended up with really maybe two kids in the whole [hospital]. But I really 
do feel like they were mad as fire with me…So, I took it on the chin for that but I, in 
hind sight, think it's the absolutely right thing to do. Because we lost power, we had 
no air [conditioning]. What would we have done with a hospital full of people that 
weren't patients? (Leadership) 
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Despite the hospital president’s decision that staff could not bring in family members, a 
member of middle management described bringing their spouse and child to the hospital 
during Hurricane Florence, where they all slept in a patient room. Likewise, two frontline 
staff members described a makeshift daycare during the disaster, where their children played 
games and were supervised by another employee. In contrast, another member of the 
leadership team stated that no one had been allowed to bring family, and that no family 
members were at the hospital during the disaster. Thus, there were inconsistencies in the 
behaviors of staff across all levels, and differing participant views about whether hospital 
staff were allowed to bring in family members, and whether they actually did. 
The Hurricane Response 
The Hurricane Response theme reflects participants’ views on: the day-to-day 
conditions for employees living and working within the hospital (Living Conditions); the 
ways in which local and state organizations gave assistance to the hospital staff (Assistance 
From the Community); the circumstances under which staff provided clinical care during the 
disaster and the care actually given (Altered Standards of Care); the responsibility hospital 
employees felt towards their communities (Duty and Obligation); and participants’ concerns 
about safety and fear during the disaster, and how they coped with these concerns (Fear and 
Safety).  
Living Conditions. Participants discussed the food, sleeping arrangements, and 
downtime activities that were part of the disaster response experience at the hospital. Staff 
who were off-shift passed the time by reading, socializing with coworkers, watching movies 
on mobile devices, and playing games. For example, a makeshift frisbee golf course was set 
up as a diversion and game for staff on the empty second floor. These morale-boosting 
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activities are important during extended disaster response; during Hurricane Katrina, staff 
inside Charity Hospital organized talent shows, hung motivational banners on their units, and 
organized prayer services (Berggren, 2005). Providing these activities for staff may relieve 
tension, create bonds between staff, and provide a needed break from the stress of the 
disaster.  
Some participants described the experience in a more negative light, as living in a 
“camp” or a “shelter”, receiving poor quality food, and insensitive treatment while they lived 
at the hospital:  
It was kind of like being at a homeless shelter. The cafeteria, it was like no options. 
‘You're getting soup today, and here's a sandwich. Oh, you're lactose intolerant. 
That's too bad. This is the food you get.’ (Frontline) 
 
It felt like a camp, like you were in a little concentration camp. This is it and you eat 
it this time because after this time we're not having any more food. That's it. But you 
do get free drinks, 24-hour free drinks. We're not going to cut that off, but after this 
time there's no food. I mean it felt like a concentration camp. (Frontline) 
 
The context of the disaster response is important when considering these reactions 
from staff. Employees working in the chaotic ED were drenched in sweat due to the high 
heat and humidity; these same employees were served hot clam chowder. To these 
employees, the perceived choice of leadership to serve them hot food while they worked in 
high temperatures was seen as insensitive or ignorant to their working conditions. Other 
employees commented on the lack of accommodation for their dietary needs, such as lactose 
intolerance or special diets. During the stress and chaos of disaster response within a 
hospital—especially during times without power—it may be impossible to provide the small 
comforts that could mean a lot to staff, such as planning for appealing food choices. In the 
absence of these comforts, however, employees’ overall evaluation of the disaster response 
experience may be negatively affected.  
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Other participants reported feeling quite satisfied with the meals and activities 
provided by the hospital: 
They made sure we had food and plenty to drink. They kept up with snacks when 
meals wasn't being served. We had snacks. They had entertainment, for games. 
(Frontline) 
 
We were well taken care of. I have to say that's the best I ate since I've been 
employed here because we were fed very well. In a miserable situation, the one thing 
that we had to look forward to was…you would not be hungry here. (Middle) 
 
Members of the leadership staff spoke about how they tried to be sensitive to staff by 
keeping them happy and creating a pleasant environment: 
I made sure that we provided all the meals. They got tired of hospital meals and 
they're great cooks I mean, they were down there making up stuff. But we did pizza 
one day and yeah, just tried to make it fun. (Leadership) 
 
…we watched movies, we played board games, we turned the upstairs into kind of a 
Frisbee golf course and used beach balls as like golf balls…It's crazy, the things you 
come up with when there's nothing to do during the day. (Leadership) 
 
Because the water supply to the hospital remained intact, employees were able to shower, use 
the toilets, and take care of basic hygiene needs, although under less than ideal 
circumstances: 
…we had town water, but it was a cold shower. It just depends on whether or not you 
feel comfortable showering around other people. Some of the showers, it's just kind 
of like a little curtain, and then there's people coming in and out and changing clothes 
right there beside you. (Frontline) 
 
Assistance from the Community. The study hospital used community and state 
resources and organizational and personal connections to prepare for and execute their 
disaster response.  This approach was assessed with varying degrees of success. Local 
emergency management staff, the National Guard, ambulance services from neighboring 
counties, and retailers as far away as Florida pitched in to help with the evacuation of 
patients and the sheltering of employees at the hospital.  
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Personal connections were important during this event.  For example, when both the 
main hospital generator and the backup generator failed, the third generator was identified 
through a personal contact at a local grocery store who was known to the Facilities Manager. 
A high-level hospital leader was able to use this employee’s connection to open 
communications with the regional leaders of the grocery store chain, who approved the 
transport of the generator to the hospital: 
The lady with Publix...she was like a godsend. She was the easiest person I've ever 
dealt with in this situation…I couldn't even get any question out of my mouth, she 
answered and said, ‘It's yours. We're trying to save groceries, if we lose power. 
You're trying to save people, and you're already out.’ (Middle) 
 
Also, a nearby food distributor had lost power and donated their stock of fast food to the 
hospital to feed the employees: 
…I think it was some kind of college or somebody that was connected with Chick-fil-
A…and they gave us their food because they didn't want [it] to go bad. I guess they 
didn't want to throw it away and they gave it to us. Outside places helped. They really 
helped. (Frontline) 
 
Other participants spoke about challenges working with or gaining assistance from 
community organizations. A member of the leadership team described a difficult situation 
that arose when the hospital lost power. At this time, there was a body in the morgue that 
needed to be transferred to a facility that had power so that the deceased could be stored in an 
appropriate temperature. Before the hurricane, the hospital had attempted to transfer the body 
to a local funeral home in anticipation of the hospital losing power. The funeral home, 
however, was unable to receive the body. Fortunately, an EMS team stepped in, and located a 
different funeral home with backup generator power, and transferred the body: 
We had tried to get that body out of here before the storm ever came, and we couldn't 
get cooperation from the funeral home. I don't know what the problem was with the 




A frontline staff member noted that although they were grateful for the National Guard’s 
assistance with evacuating and transporting patients, the arrival of the National Guard created 
a strain on the hospital’s food resources: 
But then they invited the National Guard to come, and it was like 20…military people 
came in to eat. So it's kind of like...when we saw that we were running out of food... 
Not that it was not nice that they did get something to eat, because that was very nice 
of them…but your staff that is working did not get to eat. (Frontline) 
 
Another staff member recalled a “hurdle” with EMS staff regarding differences in the 
practice of triaging patients that needed to be transported to the hospital: 
EMS, they see things from a different perspective sometimes than what we do…and 
vice-versa. So, there was a lot of EMS [personnel who] felt the patient needed to 
come to the hospital. But because we were trying to run so streamlined, we didn't feel 
like that that patient had really met that threshold. So there was some back and forth 
with the patient being put on the truck and brought to the hospital…That was a hurdle 
we dealt with. (Middle) 
 
Altered Standards of Care. Participants discussed the challenges of providing 
patient care during Hurricane Florence. Staff cared for patients in the hot, humid hospital, 
which, for a time, had no power at all. “We did what we had to do” was a common refrain 
when staff spoke about making patient care decisions under extreme circumstances: 
I mean like we had to put Foley catheters in, like I said, with a lantern. Somebody 
holding the lantern. Others doing the catheter. Other people holding the patient down. 
I mean, it was tough, but we'd do what we had to do to take care of the patient, 
obviously. I mean you have to do what you have to do. (Frontline) 
 
One of our most critical patients we took care of when there was no electricity at all, 
literally flashlights and electric lanterns. We still transferred patients probably when it 
was too dangerous to transfer, and that patient was one of them. I think that’s when 
your fight and flight takes over, and you know that you got to do what you got to do. 
(Middle) 
 
One staff member recalled a specific patient who arrived at the ED with their partner 
after being awakened with chest pain. The staff member recalls laughing and joking with the 
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patient about the flickering power. A short time later, the patient died. The participant was 
unsure if this outcome could have been avoided if hospital circumstances were different: 
We had one that just stuck with me, because it was a young guy…Woke up from a 
dead sleep with chest pain. Because we didn’t have power, we couldn’t do a 
[computed tomography scan]…Because the wind was a certain speed, we were 
delayed on transport…at that point, we didn’t have a lot of tests that we could do 
other than the [electrocardiogram], which didn’t look bad. I don’t know if it would 
have made a difference if we had power…I went back to my department, and then 
like an hour later or so, they called a code. We ran in and it was him. He suddenly just 
died (Frontline)  
 
Another frontline staff member described feeling that the hospital should not have remained 
open without power due to the danger of caring for patients in this environment: 
The ambulances were still calling in…and I was like, ‘But the door does not open and 
we do not have power. We should not be open at this point.’ …I mean, it was a 
problem, I had a patient with esophageal varices that had some spitting up blood in 
bed number seven. Then the [patient with a] high ammonia level was in bed number 
eight. Then had a lady who would get out of the bed twice and she had a fall in bed 
number nine. And this is all when we had no power. (Frontline) 
 
For hospital employees who are accustomed to providing care in accordance with 
strict accreditation standards, the experience of “doing what we have to do” was jarring. Two 
non-clinical staff members (Middle and Leadership levels) described this transition from 
usual care to disaster care: 
So when the Joint Commission comes into the hospital, there's a lot of rules and 
regulations that govern what we do and how we do it…When we lost that emergency 
generator, all of that stuff doesn't matter anymore. You just do what you have to do to 
make sure you can get the lights back on to these patients. (Middle) 
 
…being in healthcare, it's a very strict and highly regulated environment that we work 
in everyday…But what we're here to do is be a last resort and keep people safe, and 
treat, and do the best of our ability and I think that's what happened. Just not under 
the most ideal circumstances, yeah. (Leadership) 
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For some frontline clinical staff, the stress of working in the heat and the dark was 
exacerbated by both concern for patient safety, and anxiety about the legal or professional 
consequences of providing disaster care: 
…we were in the complete dark trying to take care of people. It's like, ‘Oh my god, 
am I going to be able to take care of this person or am I going to be able to save this 
person's life. Are we going to get in trouble for this,’ or whatever. Like, ‘Oh my god, 
I hope somebody sees that I'm doing the best that I can for this patient in the 
circumstances and the fact that we're right in the middle of a hurricane.’ It's like, ‘I 
hope we don't get in trouble for this,’ you know? (Frontline) 
 
Several staff members mentioned the loss of wall suction when the power went out. A 
few participants talked about a delirious, vomiting patient who was in restraints for her 
safety. The patient had a nasogastric (NG) tube placed, but staff were unable to suction this 
patient—there was no power for the wall suction, and portable suction was not available.  
They expressed concern for the patient’s safety, and felt liable for the safety hazards of being 
unable to suction this patient. As expressed by a member of the frontline staff: “…that’s a 
lawsuit waiting to happen.”  
 Although one member of the leadership team described the quality and safety of the 
patient care given during the hurricane as “substandard”, the President of the hospital stated 
that usual care was provided, and the only factor that was different was that it was very hot:  
I think the team did an exceptional job. I mean, the ED docs, I could not have asked 
for a better team. They did everything that they would normally do, the only thing 
was it was hot. (Leadership) 
 
Still, concerns were voiced regarding the care staff were able to provide, and potential 
liabilities associated with compromises in patient care and safety. Staff anxiety about altered 
standards of patient care is not surprising. Hospital disaster preparedness and response plans 
may assume full provision of every necessary intervention to patients during a disaster, but in 
reality, this is not always possible; in some cases, providing full interventions to patients 
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during disasters may not be ethical or utilitarian (Bernstein, 2010). Also, if disaster planning 
does not involve input from front line staff in discussions about the provision of care when 
confronted with a lack of resources, staff may feel unprepared to care for patients when the 
usual standard of care is altered under extreme conditions.  
During a hospital leadership discussion of whether to offer surgical services despite 
the high levels of moisture and humidity in the operating suite during the disaster, an 
infection control leader voiced concern about doing so to the hospital president, a physician. 
A middle level staff member stated they were uncomfortable having patients undergo surgery 
in this environment due to the heightened risk of infection. A higher-level leader, in 
response, asked the middle level staff member if they thought healthcare staff were worried 
about infection control in undeveloped areas of Africa. The middle level staff member 
agreed; saving lives was the immediate priority, and infections could be managed later. 
However, the comment from higher level leadership reflects a lack of sensitivity about the 
struggles of staff to provide quality care, even in a disaster situation, and highlights the 
incongruence, at times, of values between hospital leaders and frontline clinical staff.  This 
exchange demonstrates the complicated dilemma faced by healthcare staff during disaster 
situations.  
Duty and Obligation. Participants spoke about their feelings of duty to their patients 
and the community, and what they perceived as their obligation to provide care for patients 
during the disaster. A duty reflects what an individual believes is morally or ethically just, or 
a sense of responsibility to others, while an obligation is generally imposed by workplaces as 
a means of preserving order (Misselbrook, 2013). Participants seemed to feel both a 
professional obligation and moral duty to work during the storm: 
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I think if anything, that was the greatest concern going into it, is what is this thing 
really going to do, because I feel the obligation to stay because I need to, it's my 
community, and patients need to be taken care of, the community still needs to be 
taken care of. (Middle) 
 
I mean there's still going to be sick people during a hurricane. My husband's a police 
officer so we just made arrangements for our children because he had to go into work 
as well. We kind of expect that. When there's something, some kind of natural 
disaster could happen, we know we're going to…we'll both have to go probably stay 
at our place of work. We made arrangements for our children. I packed my stuff and I 
come in. (Frontline) 
 
These feelings of duty and obligation among healthcare providers have been 
described elsewhere as a “deep commitment and compelling need to respond” (Riba & 
Reches, 2002, p.2). The problem of duty for healthcare providers and staff is complex; they 
must weigh their own safety needs and the needs of their families, their employment 
obligations to the organization, the needs of patients, and their obligations and 
responsibilities as healthcare providers. As one healthcare philosopher argues, expert 
knowledge assumes professional acceptance of known risks, and it is dishonorable to accept 
the privilege of professional status but not fulfill its obligations (Daniels, 1991).  
Professional obligation has been proposed to be determined by four factors: the 
patient’s degree of need, the provider’s proximity to the patient, the provider’s capabilities, 
and the absence of other sources of aid (Morin et al., 2006). During Hurricane Florence, 
study participants described weighing competing factors in the provision of care to patients. 
First, they had to weigh their decision to report to work for their scheduled shifts, and 
whether they would remain at the hospital for the entirety of the storm or leave the facility to 
check on their families and property. Second, they had to balance their own health and safety 
needs with the needs of the patients, and the needs of the organization. Third, they had to 
weigh the medical risks and benefits of keeping and treating a patient within a facility that 
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lacked critical resources, versus transporting the patient to another facility, which would 
mean relinquishing patient responsibilities and relying on EMS staffing, resources, and 
knowledge. This type of “atypical triage”  or clinical decision-making has been described in 
prior studies of hospital disaster response (Barkemeyer, 2006), as situations change when 
resources are limited and usual standards of care are not possible. Finally, frontline clinical 
staff grappled with the issue of liability because they were unsure if providing care under 
altered working conditions of limited resources would place them in danger of legal 
consequences.  
Although they recognized their obligation to care for patients inside the hospital, 
participants were unsure of their duty to the entire community. Staff were aware that in the 
context of a disaster, a triage process must be in place to allocate time and resources. 
Participants discussed the experience of having to turn community members away from the 
hospital or turn their attention to those patients most in need. One participant spoke about 
turning away community members who were searching for food or electricity: 
Once [the storm] eased up…and the community still had no power, and the hospital 
had a generator, you could see the lights on. You could see people looking at the big 
screen televisions through the windows. So they're thinking, ‘Well, the hospitals the 
only place in the city that has power’, which wasn't true, but one of a few places. 
And, people…they have [an] assumption that, ‘We can just go to the hospital’ ‘We 
can charge our phones at the hospital’ ‘We can get something to eat at the hospital.’ 
Well, if we let everybody from the community in here, there will be no room. 
(Middle) 
 
Participants spoke about community members coming to the hospital not to receive care, but 
to ask for medication refills or extra medical supplies such as diabetes test strips or oxygen 
tanks. Participants explained that they did what they could, but felt uncomfortable and 
conflicted because they could not provide the service for everyone in the community who 
needed it:  
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You don't want to not help somebody, but at the same time, we couldn't help 
everybody. We referred them to as many places as we could though for those that we 
couldn't help…because really if we did for one, you got to do it for all, and that wasn't 
logical. We couldn't do that. And it hurt, I mean, because some of these people were 
really, really desperate at that time. (Middle) 
 
One leadership team member summarized the duty and obligation of the hospital toward the 
community this way:  
I think a lot of it just rests on how we prepare. And unfortunately when you work and 
operate and have a hospital in a poor county, your residents, the community doesn't 
prepare because a lot of times they can't, and we have to be that much better to be 
there for them when we need to be. (Leadership) 
 
Fear and Safety. Some participants described feeling safe in the building during the 
storm. One staff member recalled seeing a member of the leadership staff out in the storm, 
working with the facilities staff to reconnect the generator. Seeing this made her feel that the 
leadership would do what they could to keep the employees “safe and secure”: 
[Leadership team member], she kept us safe and secure. She stayed out there in the 
rain trying to help engineering with the generator. I appreciate that because she's a 
woman and most women... To me, that's something a man would have to do, but she 
stayed out there and worked in that rain with the men to make sure that we could get 
power in here. And it was raining. And I remember one time she came back in, only 
thing she had on her was a trash bag, so she wouldn't get wet. (Frontline) 
 
Although some employees admitted feeling uncomfortable in the hospital due to the heat and 
the moisture, they nonetheless described feeling safe overall: 
I consider myself still relatively young, so…I was fine. Being uncomfortable was 
certainly an inconvenience, but at least that's all it was. (Leadership) 
 
Other employees, on the other hand, did not feel safe during the disaster. One employee 
likened the experience to being on the Titanic: 
…I won't ever forget, when the lights went out and we had no backup, I felt like this 
is how the people on the Titanic felt. That was when I knew that my faith in God 
was... that I better be ready because it was the most humbling moment of my life; 
really, when I realized I may never see my family again, and that we would possibly 
be blown away. (Middle) 
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A member of the frontline staff described feeling trapped in the hospital due to the dangerous 
conditions outside: 
…it's very hard to know that you cannot go somewhere and you don't feel safe where 
you're at and knowing that you can't get out. (Frontline) 
 
Another frontline employee described feeling unsafe during the storm because of her 
diabetes. She had her medications with her, and stored them in a refrigerator in her work unit, 
but she was concerned about the safety of her medications when the hospital lost power. 
Other employees had described the hospital’s policy of not sheltering community members; 
yet, some community members found their way into the hospital:  
You just walk by the little waiting rooms, and you just see eyes. [People from the 
community] are just in there, sleeping, watching TV. Their cell phones plugged in. 
…they don't ask. They just show up. It's weird, though. You need to know where 
people are in case something does happen, and you don't want to be walking around 
and there just be some random person hanging out in the dark…It's kind of 
creepy…(Frontline) 
 
Some participants talked about feeling afraid for the safety of their family and friends. 
Staff who were able to watch the news and weather channels while the power was on in the 
hospital saw reports of tornados and flooding near their loved ones’ homes: 
I actually watched on radar, the tornado going over my mother's house. It didn't touch 
down, but I thought, ‘I'm sitting here, watching my mother get blown away.’ (Middle) 
 
One of the nights that we were here we had tornadoes and the tornado went right over 
my house, literally my husband saw it. It went right over my house. So that was really 
scary and very emotional because I was here, they were there. So it was very 
stressful. (Leadership) 
 
Four participants in this study also mentioned the important role of prayer and their 
religion in coping with the fear and stress of the disaster experience:  
I don't know what's in store in the future, but all I know is if it [such a storm/disaster] 
does [happen again], we'll be ready and we'll be prepared. We'll make it through, just 
pray and we'll make it, because we did a lot of praying. We did a lot of praying. 
Prayer works. It works. (Frontline) 
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One participant noted that they believed God had spared them from worse outcomes: 
And that's one thing about our organization is there were a lot of folks there at the 
time that were faith-based folks. I am one of those that believe that God spared us 
many, many times because he knew we needed to be there. (Middle) 
 
Prayer and spiritual beliefs have also been discussed elsewhere as playing an important role 
during hospital disaster response (Barkemeyer, 2006; Berggren, 2005). During hospital 
disaster response, employees may meet for group prayer sessions, or sing gospel songs to 
build community and increase morale.  
The Aftermath 
Aftermath concerns the experiences of participants and the community as the hospital 
permanently closed the birth center (Birth Center Closure), the hospital’s relationship with 
the community after the hurricane and the birth center closure (Community Impact), the job 
losses, transitions, and changes in job roles of employees after the hurricane and birth center 
closure (Job Changes), the status of participants’ homes, land, and belongings after the 
disaster (Personal Property), the positive outcomes and benefits identified by participants 
after the disaster (Silver Linings), the short- and long-term psychological effects of 
experiencing the hurricane (Psychological Debris), and participants’ beliefs about the 
possibility of future disasters, and how they could better prepare (The Future).  
 Birth Center Closure. To the participants in this study, the permanent closure of the 
hospital’s birth center was an event described to be as “big” and destructive as the hurricane 
itself. After the hurricane, surgeries were suspended as the operating suite had been 
profoundly damaged. For three months, the operating room (OR) was renovated, and all 
surgeries were sent to area hospitals. The temporary closure of the OR meant that the hospital 
could not operate the birth center because the availability of surgical birth services was 
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required. Thus, obstetrical patients presenting to the hospital were triaged, treated on an 
outpatient basis as needed, and transferred to area hospitals if labor and delivery services 
were required. During this time, rumors and conjecture circled the hospital regarding when 
and if the birth center would reopen: 
…everybody was on edge. Everybody, as far as the staff from the OB department. 
And then we were told that they were cutting back. They would allow us to have two 
RNs…Everybody was on edge. They let us [the labor and delivery unit] have up to 
two nurses, no assistant, and then they cut us back to one nurse in the facility, each 
shift, and tempers really flared…we kind of felt like the upper management was 
keeping us in the dark, and didn't want to be forthcoming and honest with us…And 
we were hearing rumors…that they were closing our department. (Frontline) 
 
Participants spoke about the decision to close the birth center, communication about 
the decision, and the organizational changes that followed. Organizational change, such as 
the closure of all or part of a business, often engenders negative attitudes in employees who 
evaluate the change as futile, disingenuous, or damaging to their own needs and desires 
(Dean, Brandes, & Dharwadkar, 1998). Communication during times of organizational 
change is also critical to employees who are concerned about their own livelihood and who 
are trying to make sense of the impact on their lives and career. During the three-month 
period following the storm, rumors and misinformation circled the hospital about the status 
of the birth center and the staff members who worked there. Employees were unsure of their 
standing within the organization, even at the management level.  
Finally, in early January 2019, a meeting was called for staff members who worked in 
the birth center. Participants described meeting in an upstairs education room, a small room 
lined with long tables and chairs, with a row of computers and stacks of educational material 
towards the back. Frontline participants described the news of the birth center closure being 
delivered by hospital leaders in a frank, but dispassionate manner; one participant stated that 
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they felt no empathy from those who delivered the bad news. Another participant noted that 
they saw their manager tearing up during the meeting, and felt this was an appropriate 
reaction. A middle manager who was in the room described the reactions of the frontline 
staff: 
You could kind of see all of it written all over their face. You had some that were a 
little bit more outspoken than others. There was a lot of tears. (Middle) 
 
The method of delivering news regarding negative events such as closures and layoffs 
is critical to shaping how employees perceive and evaluate the information received, and 
their ensuing behaviors and attitudes towards the organization. Deliverers of bad news send 
signals through their facial expressions and self-presentation activities, such as speaking in 
calm and empathetic tones (Michel, Bowen, & Johnston, 2009). Employees who have been 
laid off evaluate their treatment as more fair when the news of the layoff is delivered with 
respect and sensitivity (Bies, Martin, & Brockner, 1993). In this study, the news of the 
closure was not simply an announcement of job loss or transition; it was an announcement of 
changes to the hospital, the community, the professional lives of staff, and in the case of staff 
who utilized the birth center for their own deliveries, changes to their own medical care. 
Delivery of the information by leaders in a way that staff perceived as empathetic or 
compassionate might have helped participants express a more positive evaluation of their 
organization and its future.  
During the meeting, labor and delivery staff were informed that they had a few 
options for employment: they could remain employed at the hospital, and transfer to another 
unit in the hospital; they could transfer to another hospital in the system and work in another 
labor and delivery unit; or they could receive a severance package. The meeting happened 
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midweek, and staff were initially told that they needed to make a decision in two days. One 
staff member described the suddenness as follows: 
It made me nauseous. It's scary to think you've been somewhere for, at that point, 10 
years, and then realize that you had come to work one day and they tell us that our 
department's closing. That's pretty much what happened. (Frontline) 
 
Advance warning is also an important component of delivering bad news (Bies, 
2013). Providing some information regarding the bad news in advance creates a sense of 
predictability, which helps people avoid the shock in the moment and more easily adapt to 
stressful events (Seligman & Binik, 1977). At Proctor & Gamble, plant closings were noted 
to have gone more smoothly when key closing events and dates were announced well in 
advance of their occurrence (Sutton, 2009). In this study, the suddenness of the 
announcement, and the pressure to make important career decisions in a matter of days likely 
contributed to the shock created by the closure of the birth center.  
The permanent closure of the birth center left many employees unsure of the exact 
reason for the closure, as it was never formally explained to the entire staff. Some employees 
believed the birth center had closed because the OR had been damaged, but they were later 
unsure why it had not reopened when the OR was renovated: 
The ORs got ruined during the storm and it was like you can't have a running OB 
without the means or capability to perform an emergency C-section if necessary. So I 
think that was one of the reasons, too. But after the OR was up and running, I'm not 
sure what the issue is. (Frontline) 
 
Account giving, or giving an explanation or justification of bad news, can increase 
the perceived fairness and legitimacy of bad news in organizations (Daly, 1995; Wanberg, 
Bunce, & Gavin, 1999). Participants in this study indicated that no “official” reason for the 
closure was communicated to them. Instead, they made their own interpretations of what 
happened, which created rumors and chatter that circled both the hospital and the 
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community. Some participants believed that the closure was financial, others that it was 
related to low volume or high numbers of Medicaid patients, and still others thought it was 
related to the hurricane in some way.  
It was portrayed that it was connected to the storm, but I don't think it was. I think it 
was a financial decision because a lot of the patients that we get here are Medicaid 
patients, Medicaid reimbursement's not very good. (Middle) 
 
The confusion and varying information regarding the reasons for the birth center 
closure indicates that a formal explanation, or “account”, may not have been provided to the 
staff. A senior leader described the reason as both financial and storm-related: 
I think it was related to the storm… I had no plans before the storm of closing OB 
because we were delivering 200 babies. And I do feel like people need care in their 
community. But then after the storm came and we were able to successfully get those 
moms to the care that…And so when you weigh essential services versus what you 
may not have to have. And then you look at an aging population in that community, 
what do you do with that. And it just, at the time, made sense because we hadn't done 
OB in four or five months. And the community had now been used to us not doing it. 
It just seemed like the next thing. (Leadership) 
 
Job Changes. After the hurricane, many changes were made to the staffing structure 
of the hospital. Along with the birth center, a decision was made to close the human 
resources (HR) department, and subsequently these and other departments lost full-time staff 
members. The CNO and the President of the hospital also transitioned to other roles during 
the summer after the hurricane.  
But we lost, and I don't know the exact number, but it was 40 or 50 FTEs after the 
storm. We had a large layoff. So even all the administration, all the way down, it 
affected the entire...[hospital]. I don't think there was one department that did not lose 
somebody. Myself, I lost an employee that had been here 13 years. And that doesn't 
seem like a lot but I only have three guys to begin with…But administration, all the 
way up to the president of the hospital, all of that changed. (Middle) 
 
One labor and delivery nurse who chose to stay and move to another unit spoke about 
the difficulty of transitioning from labor and delivery to working in the ICU: 
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I'm like, ‘I have to do what? I used to be able to talk to my patients, now I can't 
communicate with them.’ It's different, because your brain was trained for 10 and a 
half years how to take care of laboring moms and babies, and now you have to [take 
care of entirely different types of patients]…There were no other ICU staff members 
here that had really worked in ICU before to help us in there. Or if they did, they were 
just kind of floated to the ICU area once in a while, so it was kind of a struggle, 
because we felt like we didn't really have any peer support, if that makes sense. 
(Frontline) 
 
 Community Impact. After the disaster, hospital staff and leadership had to manage the 
beliefs, reactions, and expectations of the community regarding the reconstruction of the 
hospital, and the closure of the birth center. Immediately after the storm, large pieces of 
plastic had been placed on windows that were broken or leaking, and remained there as 
construction crews began repairing damage. The exterior work on the hospital building, and 
miscommunication about the operating schedule, led some community members to believe 
the entire hospital was closed, not just surgery: 
I think they heard surgery was closed. I don't think they heard the part that surgery is 
closed due to renovations. I think when they just heard surgery is closed, and then 
there were some changes to the staffing schedule and the surgeon schedule. Then 
people would ride by, and the windows on med-surg were taped up, and had big 
pieces of plastic coming out of them from when they were working in those rooms, 
and people were like, ‘Is the hospital closed?’ (Frontline) 
 
Realizing this, the hospital put up billboards and media advertisements to inform the 
community that the hospital was still, in fact, open for business: 
We've had problems with the community, all the construction. They'd thought we're 
going to close down, and we had rumors in the community, ‘Y'all closing down? I 
heard you're closing down,’ ‘No, we're not closing down. We're getting fixed.’ And 
so, we had to put things in the paper, we had to do billboard, ‘Please, excuse our mess 
while we clean up,’ and stuff like this here. People thought, oh, yeah, we're closing. 
(Frontline) 
 
 Although the hospital remained open for patients after the storm, the severe damage 
to the operating suite meant that obstetrical surgeries could no longer be performed at the 
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hospital. One staff member described the need to communicate this to the community and to 
local EMS crews for patient safety reasons: 
So now we become a free-standing ED without the ability to do surgeries, unless it's 
life or death. In a life or death situation, we do surgery in here if we have to…we've 
got to get that out to the community. We got to get it out to the county liaisons, we 
gotta let them know, ‘We don't have the ability to do surgeries no more. Don't send us 
a pregnant mom up here. Do your best to get them somewhere else. We don't have 
that [capability].’ Now, if they just come up in a car, we do what we have to do, but 
we lost that ability. (Middle) 
 
 Participants also discussed the impact of the closure of the birth center on the 
community, calling it “heartbreaking” and “devastat[ing].” Participants described the birth 
center as being beloved by the community, and how the hospital had been utilized by many 
community residents specifically for the labor and delivery services. Several staff members 
mentioned the distance from the town to the closest area labor and delivery unit, at least a 40-
minute drive away. One participant expressed concerns about infant mortality and morbidity 
related to challenges from getting to the hospital on time. Additionally, a staff member talked 
about her own prenatal and postnatal visits at an area hospital, noting that it was “a long way 
to drive” if you were in labor. She went on to note this could be “nerve wracking” or even 
“dangerous.”  
Local EMS crews were also displeased both with the prospect of having to transfer 
laboring mothers to facilities, and with the loss of a local facility to deliver their own 
children. One participant described the response from EMS: 
EMS people were really upset. And I think it's because it puts them in a bad spot, 
because they got to ride a truck with somebody delivering a baby an hour away…I 
think they have a little bit more training in precipitous delivery, but it's still not 
something you do every day, so it's always scary when it's not something that you do 
every day. (Leadership) 
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In addition to longer travel times for obstetrical care, community members would also 
have to rely on the hospital’s emergency department for emergency obstetrical care. 
Participants described their worries for the safety of patients who presented to the emergency 
department for obstetrical services; they felt untrained and unprepared to provide this sort of 
care in the ED environment. Providing emergency obstetrical services are within the scope of 
practice for emergency medicine; however, the training requirements of emergency 
physicians include only ten low-risk, normal spontaneous deliveries (Accreditation Council 
for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME), 2019), and the assumption that as providers, 
they are expected to seek out obstetrical knowledge as a core principle of emergency 
medicine (Robinson et al., 2018). Similarly, although nursing education programs typically 
include maternal and neonatal care subject matter, care of obstetric patients requires 
knowledge and skills not normally acquired by emergency department nurses (Bush, 2016; 
Janicki, MacKuen, Hauspurg, & Cohn, 2016; Schorn & Wilbeck, 2009).  
 In contrast, a non-clinical member of the leadership team commented that most births 
are “anticipated”, community members have access to five hospitals within a 40-minute 
drive, and if needed, the emergency department nurses are trained and an obstetrician is still 
employed by the hospital. Although obstetrical emergencies are rare, the incidence of 
maternal mortality and severe morbidity is increasing, especially among women of color. 
Pregnancy-related deaths increased from 7.2 per 100,000 live births in 1987, to 18.0 in 2014, 
and severe maternal morbidity increased by almost 200% between 1993 and 2014 (American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), 2019). Such complications necessitate 
emergency transport to area hospitals for labor and delivery services. 
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In response to staff concerns about their competency in providing emergency 
obstetric care, leadership and management provided extra obstetric-focused training for 
emergency department staff. A nurse manager encouraged ED staff to think of this as part of 
their usual responsibilities as emergency care providers: 
Now it was after they closed the OB unit that they started being concerned about, 
‘What if these precipitous deliveries start coming in.’ Looking at that mindset and 
saying, ‘Look, you're an emergency room [nurse], so you're always prepared for 
precipitous deliveries. So you have to think about, you're not doing this as a birthing 
unit, you're doing this as emergency care.’ (Middle) 
 
 Participants also described community members’ displeasure in hearing about the 
closure of the birth center. The community’s social media response to news of the birth 
center closure was recounted by participants. They noted that members of the community 
described how much they appreciated having a friendly, intimate environment in which they 
could deliver their babies. Some participants described community members traveling from 
nearby cities just to give birth at the hospital.   
…It was awesome to see the people you had made friends with, or been in with their 
delivery, say ‘You guys are the best, that's the only reason we come to the hospital.’ 
So directed towards us, it was touching and heartwarming. Directed towards the 
system, not so much sometimes. Like, ‘I don't understand why you're doing this.’ 
(Frontline) 
 
Before the birth center closure had been officially announced, a local television station got 
wind of the news and showed up at the hospital to interview staff: 
I think the day that we found out they were closing, and I don't know how it got 
outside of the hospital or what, but somebody called [local tv station]…and they 
showed up. No one would talk to them. We were forbidden, we were told we couldn't 
talk. (Frontline) 
 
 Personal Property. Participants talked about the damage or lack of damage to their 
homes, land, and belongings. Although some employees were forced to leave their homes 
due to massive wind and water damage, others escaped with only minor damage to their 
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houses or property. After losing her home in Hurricane Matthew, one nurse faced significant 
damage to the new home she had moved into before Hurricane Florence. Another nurse 
described having over $100,000 worth of damage to her home during Hurricane Florence. 
After living and working at the hospital for days, another staff member noted he had 
“[nothing] to go home to.”  
 Following the storm, employees with damaged homes were eligible for financial 
assistance from the hospital or affiliated organizations. A leadership staff member described 
writing checks directly to employees for repairs: 
…we're able to stir up a check same day from an old checkbook, it's nice. And that's 
something that's really enabled our employees, a lot of that happened from hurricane 
stuff. Some of these folks have second jobs that they've got to make it to, we put a 
roof on one of our employee's houses. We have folks got flooded and we've moved 
them out, and helped with expenses related to that. (Leadership) 
 
Several employees also mentioned how much better their homes and properties had fared 
compared to other staff members, and they were quick to minimize their own property loss or 
damage when discussing those employees who had lost their homes. One employee stated 
that they did not utilize any financial assistance from the hospital, as they believed the money 
should go to employees who had suffered more severe property damage: 
Like we had a couple of ladies [employed at the hospital] that's homes were 
underwater, yeah. Some people trees fell on their house. I felt like that money 
probably should have been for those…That lost everything, like really did not have a 
house to go home to. Like we can fix our roof if it leaked, things like that. I did not 
[accept financial assistance] because I just felt like some people had it much worse. 
(Frontline) 
 
Silver Linings. After stressful events such as disasters, looking for potentially 
positive outcomes—or “benefit-finding”—may help promote resiliency in survivors (Stanko 
et al., 2015). Several participants described positive outcomes from the disaster. The lack of 
property loss or damage was sometimes mentioned as an example of how “lucky” 
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participants had been during the storm. Other participants noted that the storm had functioned 
to build camaraderie among the staff and the community: 
You don't really realize how much people do care about you until you've gone 
through something like this, and how much the community is really concerned. 
(Frontline) 
 
Another benefit identified from the disaster was the improved operating room. 
Through disaster relief funding, the hospital had been able to update the operating suite with 
new equipment, flooring, and lighting: 
So the silver lining in all that is now we have the facility…Luckily our insurance 
company did what insurance companies should do, and replaced it with modern 
replacements. A lot of the rooms have been renovated, new flooring, new walls, new 
paint, things like that that we have been trying to do with our normal operating 
budget. But I'd say silver lining because that's really what it is… (Leadership) 
 
Another employee spoke about being grateful for the “average” days after experiencing the 
disaster: 
It also made me grateful for just the average days, the regular days because going 
through something like that where you don't know what to do. You feel like you're 
kind of backed into a corner. When it's just regular, peaceful, it makes me a little bit 
more grateful for those times. (Middle) 
 
Psychological Debris. Participants spoke about the immediate and lasting 
psychological effects of responding to the disaster at their workplace. Although two 
employees described the experience as not stressful, others described anxiety, depression, 
and trauma resulting from the experience. One participant described her struggle with anxiety 
after the storm: 
I had a talk to my doctor about it, but then I couldn't get on anything. She wanted to 
get me on like an antianxiety thing, but then I was pregnant at the time and I 
couldn't…But I mean it was hard…when I got home, I mean I cried for, I know it was 
probably about two hours, just sit out in my garage and I cried. (Frontline) 
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This same participant discussed her reaction to hearing about Hurricane Dorian, a hurricane 
that swept by the town in September 2019: 
It was a very, very traumatizing experience, to say the least. When people say they 
have PTSD…I don't have things like anxiety attacks, but I could feel myself having 
an anxiety attack, knowing that I might have to come here [during Hurricane Dorian]. 
I didn't even chance it. I said, "They'll have to fire me, but I'm not spending a night in 
this hospital." I mean it was horrible. (Frontline) 
 
Participants’ perceptions of the psychological services available to them after the 
disaster were varied; some employees stated that no services were offered, and others listed 
several options for counseling that were made available to them. A member of the leadership 
team noted that after the disaster, employees were encouraged to make use of the Employee 
Assistance Program (EAP). These programs typically offer short-term counseling, 
community referrals, and follow-up for employees who have personal or work-related 
problems, and are not considered to be psychological services (United States Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM), 2019). Several employees noted, however, that if mental 
health services had been offered to them after the disaster, they would have benefited from 
them: 
I think I could've used it. Looking back now, I really wish I would have…But at the 
time you think, ‘I'm okay, I don't need that.’ Then looking back two months later, 
well there's your torrential downpour, and you find yourself in panic mode, because 
you don't know what to do and you're scared it's going to happen all over again. 
(Frontline) 
 
Some participants mentioned that they were not aware that counseling or psychiatric 
services were available to them. Others thought that the hospital had offered services, but 
only at the main hospital in the system, which was a 40-minute drive away. One member of 
middle management commented that they found the leadership’s management of mental 
health after the storm to be irresponsible: 
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And the mental stress that it causes, not only to staff and the leaders in the 
organization, but the community, and not to address it... I don't think it's been 
addressed. I know it wasn't in the hospital setting. There was not any talk of, "Well, 
we need some counselors to come and we need to address some mental health.” There 
was never any of that. And folks are going to struggle with that. We had people that 
were being evacuated from their home that left work to go home and evacuate and 
come back to work. And it's not responsible not to address it. (Middle) 
 
The Future. Several participants mentioned the possibility of another hurricane 
striking the hospital, and the ways they might react or prepare differently. Most participants 
expressed feeling certain that another hurricane would hit the town and the hospital, and 
spoke of the possibility in terms of when, not if: 
And you know, people don't believe in climate change but I do. And I think we're 
going to see a lot of stuff, I really do…I think right now we've been pretty fortunate 
because it been kind of quiet, this hurricane season has been kind of quiet but man it's 
going to be a monster season next year…but yeah, I think we'll have another one. 
(Leadership) 
 
One nurse spoke frankly about the reality of living near the coast: 
It's not if it could, it will happen again. You got global warming, you got more 
moisture in the atmosphere, you got hot temperatures and as long as that ocean gets 
[warmer]…This is part of living in the catcher's net of hurricane alley…If you don't 
want hurricanes, this is part of living in this area. You just learn how to deal with it. 
(Frontline) 
 
 Participants also expressed uncertainty that the hospital infrastructure would be able to 
withstand another hurricane: 
I can promise you that this building can't sustain…a direct impact from a category 
four hurricane, we can't sustain. The facility is just not designed for that amount of 
water and wind…it's just we're not designed to stand a category four hurricane. 
(Middle) 
 
RQ2: The Work Environment 
 Two themes were identified in response to Research Question 2. These themes 
included Facilities and Organizational Culture. These themes, and the categories discovered 
within them, are discussed in this section.  
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Facilities 
The theme of “Facilities” reflects participants’ views about changes that occurred 
during the storm that affected their views of the work environment.  The categories in this 
theme include the loss of electrical power and the ways this affected hospital operations and 
staff morale (Power Out), the design of the building that created dangerous situations during 
the storm (Building Hazards), the overwhelming discomfort of the temperature in the 
hospital during and after the storm (The Heat), and the damage to the building caused by the 
storm (Infrastructure Damage). Each of these concepts will be discussed in subsequent 
sections. 
Power Out. Electrical power and water are essential resources in the operation of any 
hospital. Hospitals use more power and water than most other building uses; interruptions in 
these services can have significant consequences to the occupants (Seltenrich, 2018). The 
failure of the two hospital generators, and the resulting power loss was a significant event for 
the staff members working inside the hospital. Without power, staff could not adequately 
provide clinical care, communicate with outside organizations, access the internet for news of 
the storm or use social media, charge devices, or watch television. According to HIC notes, 
commercial power was lost around 8:00am on September 14th, at which time the hospital 
began running on backup generator power. About four hours later, the generator 
malfunctioned and power was again lost. Facilities staff described their efforts to connect the 
second backup generator to hospital power while standing outside in the hurricane: 
I'll tell you how bad it was…[leadership staff member] was holding a trash bag over 
my head. I was wet to my socks. My boots were full of water…You can smell the 
electricity. Not something you wanna do, not something that I recommend doing. 
And I don't even know that we've done it as we should have 'by the books', approved 
by everybody. I'm just telling you that I had people in the hospital, the power went 
out, we done what we had to do to get power up back and running. (Middle) 
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Approximately 3.5 hours after the backup generator malfunctioned, power was lost 
from the second backup generator. A staff member described the feeling of loss after this 
vital piece of equipment failed: 
Your emergency backup generator is your last life safety piece of equipment…I had 
no emergency lights, exit lights, I had nothing. About five and a half hours in, our 
plant generator catastrophically malfunctioned. So we were dead in the water, we had 
nothing. And basically, I had no ideas. (Middle) 
 
At 4:44pm, the decision was made to divert all ambulance and walk-in emergency 
department patients to other hospitals, and ambulances were called to evacuate current ED 
patients to other hospitals. At 5:08pm, ambulances arrived to transport patients, and by 5:14, 
all patients were out. At 5:23, the doors to the ED were officially closed. For about one hour 
and 37 minutes, the emergency department operated without power, and staff found 
themselves providing care to patients by flashlight and lantern. 
Staff members noted that the loss of power meant the loss of important tools and 
technology for patient care, such as laboratory services, electronic documentation, suctioning 
equipment, and telemetry monitoring.  
‘Everything was in the dark. We didn’t have any lights down in the rooms or 
whatever. And they had a little flashlight, but I mean it was like working in a third 
world country being here. And I could never go through that again. And people can 
downplay it or whatever. When I tell you it was horrible conditions working here, I 
would never in my life, I couldn’t do it again.’ (Frontline) 
 
One participant noted that after the power had been lost, the staff had to deal with a patient 
emergency in the dark: 
‘When the generator went out, we had an emergency situation…The power went out, 
surgery was called in, and there was no lights. They couldn't see, and they needed to 
see in there. People got flashlights to illuminate the room, and in order for the 
surgeon to do what he needed to do, and then be able to have someone transport her 
to another hospital...it was a time when we didn't have lights in the ED, and we were 
using solely flashlights.’ (Middle) 
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Without commercial or generator power, employees were unable to connect with the 
“outside world” by watching the news, charging their phones, or connecting to the internet. 
The loss of their connection to information and families compounded their sense of 
frustration and stress: 
I think that a new level of frustration set in for everybody because prior to the power 
going out, we had outside world still. We were able to connect with the news, with 
family, and we had these diversions when we weren't on shift. So, when the power 
went out, it affected us in a number of ways…in a stressful situation, and now some 
of the simple pleasures are being taken away from you. (Middle) 
 
 Finally, the facilities manager reached out to a friend who had a contact at a local 
Publix grocery store. Through this contact, it was discovered that the grocery store had a 
backup generator they weren’t using. The president of the hospital contacted the store’s 
headquarters in Florida, and leaders there approved the transfer of the generator from the 
grocery store to the hospital. With the help of the National Guard, the generator was brought 
to the hospital. However, while the generator was being transferred, facilities staff were able 
to get the hospital backup generator working again, and power was restored to the hospital 
without using the loaned generator. 
Building Hazards. During the storm, staff lived and worked inside the hospital 
building. Participants discussed their perceptions of the ways in which the design or features 
of the hospital building produced safety hazards. Participants discussed features of the 
building that created concerns about hazardous conditions, such as the lack of windows in the 
ED, the electric sliding doors in the ED, and the unprotected, uncovered generator access. 
Many older hospitals were built to last a long time, not necessarily to provide a safe, effective 
disaster response (Seltenrich, 2018). In other cases, the design of the hospital building 
created conditions or situations that staff perceived as hazardous, or that resulted in potential 
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safety hazards. For example, an automatically-locking stairwell door trapped a staff member 
in the stairwell when power was lost. The ED did not have windows, which meant no fresh 
air could circulate throughout the unit: 
A lot of respiratory distress. That was bad for those patients because we had no air 
conditioning and we don't have windows in the ER to open up and let [in] the breeze. 
It was hot. It was cooler outside than it was inside. That was bad. (Frontline) 
 
The doors to the ED, which were standard electric sliding doors, were being blown open by 
the force of the wind during the storm, and staff were concerned that they would break: 
…the winds were so strong that our doors at times were being blown violently. So we 
had to turn the power off to the doors…So, we basically had to stand there during the 
times that the wind was that violent and pry the door open to make sure people could 
come in. Otherwise, it would've been a hazard with those doors and we didn’t take the 
chance of them being broken or anything like that. (Middle) 
 
Staff members also discussed the amount of water that came into the building during and 
after the storm, coating the floors and walls with water and creating slippery conditions 
throughout the building: 
The water in the building became a big concern. That's something that's out of the 
ordinary because now, it's a safety thing…not only is the building taking in rain and 
water, it's also the walls are sweating and literally falling and spilling out onto the 
floor. So it was a fall hazard everywhere in the facility. (Middle) 
 
The facilities manager described the flat surface of the potentially hazardous construction of 
the hospital roof, as large pools of water formed on the roof during the storm: 
I mean it looked like swimming pools. The roofs weren't designed to handle the 
amount of water we got in the short period of time. We couldn't get it off the building 
fast as we were getting it. (Middle) 
 
Staff described conditions during the storm in which large of amounts of water could 
be seen dripping from the ceiling down the walls and pooling on the floor. After the 
hurricane, renovation crews and industrial hygienists were working throughout the hospital. 
Several employees spoke about the air quality and the possibility of mold in the building: 
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It took them five times before they could get air quality to pass [inspection] on part of 
med-surg…they totally tore out the walls that were on the outside walls and opened 
them up and cleaned them and made sure there was no black mold there. It took them 
five times, they plugged it five times before they could get the air quality test [to] 
come back right. (Frontline) 
 
The Heat. Like the building structure, the temperature inside the building affected the 
living and working conditions of the staff. The hospital chiller, which controlled the air 
conditioning, was connected to commercial power, not the generator power. Thus, when 
commercial power was lost, air conditioning was lost too. The hospital had no air 
conditioning from September 14th through September 19th. Every participant in this study 
spoke about the oppressive heat, and the way it affected their work and daily lives inside the 
hospital. Participants estimated the heat within the hospital to be between 90-100 degrees 
Fahrenheit. At 8:43am on the 14th, HICS notes indicate that temperature readings in the OR 
were in the seventies, with humidity levels nearing 100%: 
It was literally raining inside the building. I couldn't decipher between what was roof 
leaks and what was just sweating. It went from everything being normal, cool, 
comfortable, to when the power bangs out…bringing 100% humidity. It sweats like a 
drink can. (Middle) 
 
The high temperature within the hospital thus became a central character in the story 
of the hospital disaster response. Participants described “wringing water out of [their] shirts”, 
stuffing their clothing with ice or cold washcloths, and running outside into the storm to cool 
off. The heat was more than just uncomfortable to several participants; staff members 
described the heat in terms of their fear for their own health and safety, and that of their 
patients and family members within the building. One staff member stated that the heat had 
caused illness in several of staff members’ children who had been brought into the hospital to 
stay during the storm. 
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Similar conditions have been reported in other studies of hospital disaster response. 
During Hurricane Katrina, temperatures inside some hospitals rose to over 100 degrees 
Fahrenheit after losing power; the intense heat coupled with limited or nonexistent potable 
water supplies lead to multiple patient deaths (Gray & Hebert, 2007). The extended period of 
time staff and patients endured these conditions inside the New Orleans hospitals due to 
prolonged patient evacuations that lasted at least a week. In this study, it took only thirty 
minutes to safely evacuate all patients; however, the decision to keep the emergency 
department open kept staff inside the hot, humid hospital for days at a time. Clinical staff 
discussed the challenges of providing care to patients in the hot, muggy conditions: 
‘There were patients everywhere and I was down there trying to help them catch up in 
triage, and the nurses were walking around with their pants rolled up because it was 
just so hot…I was triaging a patient and just wiping my brow, because sweat was just 
rolling off of me…It was hard.’ (Leadership)  
 
Another nurse described the intense heat as a “dragon”, and spoke about one employee 
walking out into the rain to cool himself: 
…but even breathing was taking too much energy from you and… you just feel heat, 
like a dragon coming out of you. I mean it was ridiculous. The doctor literally left 
here, went outside in the pouring windy rain, came back drenched just so that he can 
keep on working. (Frontline) 
 
Several staff members reflected on their own discomfort as compared to the patients they 
cared for: 
It was a lot on us. I can't imagine how it would be on [the patients], some of these 
older folks with COPD, and heart problems, and stuff. (Frontline) 
 
After days without air conditioning, the facilities staff were able to rent a diesel-
powered heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) unit. They cut a hole in the wall 
of the ED and installed the unit, allowing cool air to finally flow through the area. However, 
staff members suggested the arrival of the HVAC unit was “too little, too late.” 
 106 
Infrastructure Damage. The hospital in this study was built in 1952, and lacked 
some of the modern disaster-resilient features of newer healthcare facilities. As such, the 
building suffered significant damage during the storm, with severe water intrusion from the 
roof and windows, and mold damage from water that had collected for days inside the 
ceiling, walls, and floor. This is a common occurrence in reports of hospital disaster 
responses; after Hurricane Sandy, 83 out of 172 hospitals in the declared disaster areas 
reported difficulties with infrastructure during and after the disaster response (Levinson, 
2014).  
Participants discussed the damage to the building following the hurricane. Water 
found its way into the building through the roof and the windows, and as the storm hovered 
over the town for several days after landfall, water damage became visible to all staff 
members: 
Our building flooded. I mean, not flooded from the floor up, but flooded from the 
roof down. It just was almost like the walls were going to collapse on us, it was just 
bad. (Middle) 
 
The water and the humid air had caused paint to begin peeling from the walls, and floor tiles 
buckled from the water intrusion. One employee who returned to work after the storm 
described the damage as “a big shock.” In particular, the OR seemed to sustain the most 
severe damage. Participants described seeing water inside the lightbulbs in the OR, and large, 
basketball-sized “bubbles” of water under the floor. One staff member became worried about 
the infection control issues associated with stormwater in the OR: 
The hospital sustained damage to every exterior wall. The floor of the main OR…it 
actually looked like a wave in the floor, which meant that there was water under it. 





Organizational culture reflects the values and beliefs that shape the interactions and 
inner workings of an organization (Daft, 2007). Aspects of organizational culture referenced 
by study participants included the ways they worked together as a group (Teamwork), the 
quality, mode, and tone of communication between leadership and staff (Communication), 
issues of fairness that arose during the storm (Justice), and participants’ experiences 
balancing work and rest during the disaster (Work and Rest).  
Teamwork. Participants offered multiple perspectives regarding aspects of the 
hospital’s organizational culture during the hurricane and disaster response. The literature 
lacks detail about how disasters affect the cultures in hospitals that respond to them; 
however, studies have reported on certain aspects of organizational culture during hospital 
disaster response, including teamwork, and offer some insights. Despite challenging 
conditions inside the hospital, participants in this study largely described teamwork during 
the disaster response as positive. This perspective is similar to that reported in other studies 
of hospital response (e.g., Lehmann et al., 2019). Participants in this study praised the staff as 
a whole for “pulling together” or “coming together” to evacuate and treat patients, and 
responding to changing conditions within the hospital: 
…we just work[ed] so closely together during this time. Closer than we do on a day-
to-day basis because we're so wrapped up with our respective departments, so. This 
wasn't like that. Our focus was to keep everybody safe, and [for] everybody at the end 
of the storm [to] get home. (Middle) 
 
One employee described her coworkers as “family”, and felt she couldn’t abandon them 
during the storm by leaving to go home: 
[It would] make me feel like if I was to leave, I'm abandoning my family, that's how I 
feel, but I love it here…We look out for each other… I feel like if I leave here I know 
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I won't have nobody, because I done made close friends, and they're more like family. 
I just can't up and leave. (Frontline) 
 
Because this study relies on post-disaster interviews with employees to understand 
the disaster environment, and because it was impossible to make direct observations of 
behaviors that occurred during the event, it is not possible to assess the actual quality of 
teamwork that was demonstrated during the disaster response. Instead, employees reported 
that they perceived teamwork during the disaster to be satisfactory or better than usual. 
Examples of teamwork given by participants during interviews lend some insight to the 
teamwork conditions during the disaster.   
Participants discussed behaviors such as staff members pitching in and helping each 
other, performing duties that aren’t usually their responsibility to help the group as a whole, 
“getting along” with each other, and focusing on the end goal of evacuating and treating 
patients safely and effectively. Participants described how employees assisted with tasks they 
are not normally responsible for to help other departments, and how duties were shared: 
… it was so busy. Very busy. We had the surgery team down here starting IV's for us, 
running blood draws. I had even, one time, the director of nursing down there, "What 
can I do to help?" I'm like, "Here, take this to the lab for me." They couldn't discharge 
and they couldn't admit, but they were doing everything else. (Frontline) 
 
A leadership staff member described cleaning where they could and helping the dietary staff 
with their responsibilities: 
And then just cleaning up, helping an assistant, another thing I normally don't do is 
cooking. I was kind of giving the dietary staff a reprieve, and that was actually a fun 
thing. Serving meals in the evening and getting to kind of get back in the kitchen and 
get involved with staff. So, that was actually a cool thing that I enjoyed was 
connecting with folks I normally don't connect with, and saying, "Hey, you go, let me 
serve you for a change." (Leadership) 
 
A middle manager also described the “expanded” roles staff took on during the storm: 
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And when you're there, and you've got maybe two or three people from 
Environmental Service on shift at that time…So everybody's role became expanded. 
So, I may be doing security work, EVS work, a little bit of everything at that point in 
time. So we did a lot of things on top of our regular duties. (Middle) 
 
These examples of positive teamwork align with the three types of team processes 
that have been used to characterize successful task-related teamwork: coordination, or using 
knowledge, skills, and behavior to meet goal outcomes; communication (discussed in the 
next section), or sending and receiving messages to inform behaviors, attitudes, and 
outcomes; and cooperation, or the motivations that inspire team members to work together as 
a unit (Mathieu, Goodwin, Heffner, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000; Salas, Shuffler, Thayer, 
Bedwell, & Lazzara, 2015). Participants in this study discussed the ways in which staff and 
leaders worked together during the disaster response, including pulling together to 
accomplish the goal of keeping patients safe and providing the care they could.  
Communication. Participants’ perceptions of hospital communications during 
Hurricane Florence were varied. Like their assessment of teamwork, some participants 
described communication overall as satisfactory. In particular, participants expressed positive 
opinions of communications between staff members, but often gave negative examples of 
communication between management or leadership and staff: 
It's just the lack of consideration for anybody. It was really sad. But the morale was 
low. I mean, and it was a lack of... nobody knew what really was going on because 
you had this command center, but they weren't telling you anything. (Frontline) 
 
Other participants reinforced that communication between staff members and 
departments was positive. One participant, a member of the leadership team, described 
communication as “process-oriented”, and as more than adequate for staff members: 
Communication was good…Process-oriented is kind of how I would describe our 
administration team during disasters and things…So communication was good 
because it all flowed through the command center, we had walkie talkies, and 
 110 
cellphones obviously. So I think we erred on the side of over-communication for 
things throughout the whole storm. Yeah, so I think communication was very good. 
(Leadership) 
 
Likewise, another member of the leadership team described the communication and 
atmosphere within the HICS center:  
Lots of fun. Lots of fun just cutting up, it never got tense. Never got tense. 
(Leadership) 
 
However, other participants felt that managers and leadership were unaware of or did 
not care about their needs, or the working conditions in the ED, and expressed dissatisfaction 
with the quality of communication from leadership: 
By nine o'clock that morning the Director of the Emergency Department contacted us 
and like, "It's slow then, you need to start cleaning. You need to start doing this and 
that." But she was not aware, and nobody in the command center was aware that the 
electricity was out, we were on generator power at that time, because they were over 
there playing cards and watching TV. And a command center should have vital 
weather updates and know what's going on…They didn't know anything, they did not 
update us at the time. (Frontline) 
 
Frontline staff members also felt that some of the communication from leadership was 
inconsiderate of the needs or working conditions of the staff: 
Our manager came down here when the power went out and then her comment to the 
staff was, ‘I had to put my hair up. Does it look okay? I had it down.’ We're drenched 
in sweat and then she comes in worried because her makeup was not on right. I mean 
it's like, ‘Are you serious? I got dressed in the dark.’ (Frontline) 
 
Our clothing would be soaking wet with sweat, like soaked. Then it's like I remember 
at one point the then director was having a conniption about some people not having 
their uniforms on. And I'm like, ‘Look, I'm not putting my uniform back on that I 
have sweated. We are soaking wet when we leave here and get off. I don't have 10 
pairs of uniforms at home.’ (Frontline) 
 
The tone and manner of communication with frontline employees is a critical aspect 
of effective disaster response. If leaders do not communicate with frontline staff in a way that 
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reflects empathy and makes staff feel they are cared about and respected, frontline staff may 
not be as willing to work during future disasters (Powell-Young, et al., 2006).  
The communication of the decision to evacuate patients and remain open was a 
particularly salient example of the “outward” flow of information from leadership to middle 
management to staff. Five employees, all from leadership or middle management levels, 
were informed of the evacuation decision in a meeting with the president of the hospital. 
Three of these employees stated they were part of the decision. Four frontline employees 
heard about the decision from their managers, either in-person or through email or text. Two 
frontline employees and one middle manager stated they heard of the decision by word of 
mouth from other staff members, and two frontline employees heard of the decision from the 
news. One frontline employee stated that no one specifically told her about the evacuation; 
she came back from her day off and found that all the med-surg patients had been discharged 
from the unit.   
A middle manager described sharing news of the evacuation with staff to alleviate the 
rumors and confusion regarding the storm: 
The decision on evacuation, once it came down, then like I said, it just got to the point 
where the staff were wondering, ‘So are we staying? Are we going to be able to go? 
What's kind of plan? Are they going to just shut us down completely until this is over 
with? What's the thought?’ So once we got that information, then I went back to them 
and shared with them what the plan was. (Middle) 
 
Another participant spoke about finding out about the evacuation through the local news, and 
then contacting her department leader to verify, describing this communication as “hit or 
miss”: 
I found out through a third party. I was not contacted directly…never was I contacted 
by anyone…So we found out, actually by the news, that they were being evacuated. 
So that's when I contacted my director, and then it was a hit or miss type thing. 
(Frontline) 
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In contrast, a member of the leadership team stated that they were notified of the evacuation 
soon after the hospital’s president had made the decision: 
So the decision to evacuate, I was notified pretty soon after [president of the 
hospital]…With county leaders and [hospital system] leaders, they made that decision 
and she made communicated that to the rest of the leadership pretty shortly after that 
decision was made. (Leadership) 
 
Another participant received a text message from her department manager to let her 
know that if she felt the hurricane would prevent her from getting to work the following day, 
she would need to report to work that night, and stay overnight. News of the evacuation and 
the housing of employees at the hospital was spread, in part, through employee’s work email. 
However, because employees could not access their work email from home, this participant, 
who had been off for a few days prior to the hurricane, was not aware that staff were required 
to stay overnight: 
But she said seeing as I had not been at work for a few days so I didn't get the email 
so she actually reached out through a text message and was like, "Okay, if you feel 
like you can't get into work tomorrow to work your shift, then you need to come in 
and stay the night." You know, the night before. (Frontline) 
 
Participants also described the quality of communication after the disaster. Here too, 
perceptions were mixed. Some participants believed the hospital leaders made a good attempt 
to connect with employees and show appreciation for their help during the disaster: 
We got emails from [the hospital system CEO], our director, [the president of the 
hospital]. Even the CEO over the whole hospital system came out here during the 
storm to check on us…Like I say, most places you work, people don't reach out to 
their staff like that, but he came to check on us and talk to the staff. Some people that 
have positions like that, they might see you walking the hallway, don't even say hi or 
acknowledge you. But he came and talked to us at the nurses station; make sure 
everything was all right…I really appreciate that. That's what you call working 
together and making a difference. Because you want your employees to see that you 
care for them, not just leave them in the dark. (Frontline) 
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After the storm, staff had questions about the damage to the building, and the safety 
of working inside the building during renovations. Participants described limited 
communications being shared from leadership about the state of the building. Several 
participants indicated some degree of distrust towards leadership regarding the information 
shared with staff about the air quality and mold remediation: 
I mean, if there is mold in the walls, I don't know. There's not a bunch of 
communication. I think they tell us what they want us to know for the most part…it 
just kind of seems weird. I think I would've said something by now, like, ‘This 
doesn't seem legit,’ but it's not my money. I don't know about the air quality. It does 
seem like part of the reason it's taking so long is because when they test it, the air 
quality's not good, so they have to redo things, or test it again. I don't know. 
(Frontline) 
 
…there's at least two girls that work here and every time they come in on a Friday 
they're fine. By the mid-afternoon…I mean their nose is running…and we said, ‘We 
don't feel like the air quality stuff is good here.’ We said that for months. [The 
response we get is] ‘Oh no, we don't have mold, we don't have this.’ Well, then they 
hired this contractor, well guess what? They're like, ‘Oh yeah…we're treating mold 
here.’ And it's like, oh they're telling us one thing, and [then] they're telling us 
something totally different. (Frontline) 
 
Justice. The notion of justice as "fairness”, or the feeling of one group or individual 
receiving a benefit not received by others, was also frequently mentioned by study 
participants. Distributive justice is the perceived fairness of the allocation of resources or 
decisions made by management, in particular rewards and punishments (Cropanzano, 
Bowen, & Gilliland, 2007). In nurses, distributive justice is positively associated with job 
satisfaction (Blegen & Mueller, 1987; Djukic et al., 2014). In a disaster response 
environment, justice can take on an especially significant role in employees’ experience of 
the work environment, as access to basic needs such as hygiene, clothing, comfort, and rest 
may be unequally allocated among working staff. Employees may also judge fairness as the 
work they are performing relative to the conditions they are working in.  
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Participants described a Dickensian scenario of the “haves” and “have-nots” to reflect 
differences between working in the ED, and working in the hospital incident command (HIC) 
center. In the emergency department, the intense heat and humidity caused by the loss of air 
conditioning and the lack of windows forced employees to work drenched in sweat. 
Employees did what they could to cool themselves and their patients down; they rolled up the 
legs of their scrub pants, pressed cool washcloths and ice packs to the necks and foreheads of 
their patients and themselves, and even dashed out the emergency room door just to find 
relief in the coolness of the pouring rain. They drank as much water as they could, and shared 
responsibilities to keep any one person from becoming overwhelmed with work and the 
stress of the situation. When the backup generator failed and power was lost, frontline 
clinical staff provided patient care by flashlight, often holding flashlights for each other if 
“lanterns”—or flashlights with a sturdy base that can be set down on a surface—could not be 
found. Participants working in the emergency department described the stress, anxiety, and 
fear of working in extreme conditions, and managing multiple priorities. Employees were 
concerned for the safety of their patients and families, and some were afraid for their own 
safety due to the intense heat and concerns about the integrity of the 66 year-old building. 
They watched the news and checked their phones frequently for updates on the weather and 
the wellbeing of their loved ones, and waited for situation updates from leadership.  
In HIC, a different scene was described by participants. Participants indicated that 
portable air conditioners and fans were brought to the room housing HIC, and unlike the 
humid, hot conditions in the ED, employees in HIC were cool and dry. Although one 
participant complained about the endless phone calls and situation updates required of 
employees working in HIC, staff members working in HIC described watching movies, 
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laughing, joking, and a generally congenial atmosphere. Shift lengths were also different in 
HIC; participants described HIC shifts as lasting two, four, or eight hours, while employees 
in other areas of the hospital worked twelve-hour shifts to provide care to patients and relieve 
coworkers.  
The stark differences between these two environments—HIC and the ED—were 
noticed and mentioned by participants from all three job levels. Participants working in the 
ED were angry and frustrated by the perceived relative comfort of those working in HIC. 
Participants expressed criticism of the decision to keep air conditioners and fans in HIC 
instead of in the ED, where both staff and patients both were suffering in the heat and 
humidity. Participants described being able to hear laughter and joking from HIC as they 
walked by, or as they clocked in and out of their shifts: 
…the command center, they were unaware that the ceiling was leaking…because they 
were too busy playing cards, they were too busy laughing, because I think it was air 
conditioned. But don't worry because we got smoothies one day that was delivered by 
the [public relations person] of the hospital in her tank top and shorts. Now, we're not 
allowed to wear tank tops and shorts here. But I mean she's cool, but she's in the air 
conditioner also. (Frontline) 
 
…the staff get really frustrated, because they walk by and it looks like everybody in 
incident command is having a party. Because there's talking and laughing, and they're 
out here sweating to death. (Frontline) 
 
In a study of nurses’ needs and concerns during Hurricane Floyd in 1999 (French et 
al., 2002), nurses complained that physicians, administrators, and managers were given 
preferential treatment in the form of on-site housing, while nurses were directed to local 
shelters. The nurses also complained that administrators and managers were not “in the 
trenches”, and came to work dressed in nice clothing, signaling they were unprepared to 
provide patient care or “get their hands dirty” (French et al., 2002). In this study, staff were 
also unhappy with the perceived inequality between those working with patients in the ED, 
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and managers and leaders working in HIC. Instead of “getting their hands dirty” in the hot, 
humid, and chaotic ED, staff saw management and leaders enjoying the cool, pleasant 
environment of HIC. Two participants had also commented that leaders and management 
were vocally worried about their hair and makeup, while nurses were working in sweat-
drenched, uncomfortable scrubs. One or more fans or portable air conditioners had been 
reportedly placed in HIC. Several staff members noted that they believed these air 
conditioning units should have been more appropriately placed in patient care areas: 
‘They had plenty of air conditioning down there. It was like some of the big air 
conditioning things that I felt like should have been down in the ER where the 
patients and staff that were like literally dying from the heat should have been, but 
they utilized those resources. I do feel like a lot of people were upset about that. We 
weren't upset towards each other as far as the staff working, but it was a little 
upsetting that administration was down there in the AC chilling while were all down 
there running around crazy like dying from the heat.’ (Frontline) 
 
Participants also complained about the lack of “hurricane pay” during the disaster. 
Staff felt that they should have been rewarded for their dedication to providing care in the 
heat, humidity, and uncomfortable living conditions of the hospital. During the disaster, 
employees were required to “clock in” and out by reporting to HIC before and after their 
shift, and logging their time worked. These hours were noted on a sheet of paper. Hourly 
employees were paid their usual rate for the time that they were clocked in, but salaried 
employees were not paid overtime. Before the storm began, employees had been instructed 
that they were expected to be present for their shifts; if they believed there would be any 
issue getting to the hospital, they were required to stay overnight. As the hurricane grew in 
intensity and roads became impassible, staff were informed that they would be required to 
shelter overnight at the hospital as no one was allowed on the roads.  
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Participants conveyed that, due to the working conditions and the requirement to stay 
overnight, they should have been compensated above and beyond their normal pay rate. 
Participants noted that during Hurricane Matthew, staff had been given “hurricane pay” and 
were required to stay overnight at the hospital. However, during Florence, no such extra pay 
was given. Several participants commented that the pay structure during Matthew was fair in 
compensating employees for their time during the disaster. Staff members felt that sleeping 
overnight at the hospital without being paid for it was not fair: 
…if you have staff that are willing to come in and work, and especially work when 
there's absolutely not power, heat, this, that, I really feel like they should consider 
compensating…I mean because you're not just doing your regular work…you're 
working under extreme circumstances. (Frontline staff) 
 
…I was very upset and probably angry about the fact that we didn't get the 
compensation for being here, and how hard we had to work, and in the conditions we 
had to work in or whatever…I'm telling you I was hot about that. (Frontline) 
 
A salaried member of the leadership team stated that they had added up the hours of overtime 
they had worked and not been paid for: 
I was really ready to quit my job then. I'm just being honest. Because we worked so 
many hours, I worked, I think I counted it up, 72 hours of overtime. In those 10 days, 
72 hours of overtime, no reimbursement, no time off. That's discouraging. Very 
discouraging. (Leadership) 
 
One frontline staff member indicated that they believed the hospital was using FEMA 
grant money unethically. The staff member stated that they believe hospitals are reimbursed 
by FEMA for sheltering employees overnight during a disaster, but this money was not 
passed on to the employees staying overnight: 
They were eager to make sure that you had your adequate checking out for shelter 
and everything else, because…I mean, it's common knowledge that you're paid for 
that. FEMA and the resources stuff, the government pays [hospitals] for that. So 
you're doing shelter for us, you get paid. But we didn't get paid anything. (Frontline) 
 
A member of the leadership team described the compensation structure this way: 
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If you were there mandatory, if you were hourly you got paid. I can't remember the 
exact methodology, but if you were there, you got paid. Salaried folks are salaried 
folks. They ain't giving me nothing extra for being there for six days. (Leadership) 
 
Work and Rest. Participants expressed varying perceptions of the amount of rest 
they were able to get, and the lengths of their shifts. Some participants felt the workload was 
too heavy, and complained of a lack of rest or downtime: 
It was very uncomfortable because people weren't able ... I wasn't able to rest like I 
would like to even when I wasn't working. But even when you are off shift, it felt like 
you were working because it was so much going on. (Middle) 
 
For others employees, the experience was not characterized by overwork or stress. One staff 
member described feeling as though there was “not much to do”: 
Just from the time it started till the end it was not much to do really. I was cleaning 
baseboards, just finding stuff to do to stay busy. It wasn't actually stressful to me. It 
was my first storm here, it was a lot better than I anticipated. (Frontline) 
 
One nurse noted that the leadership had called in an extra physician to work in the ED 
and take pressure off the medical staff; however, the arrival of the physician meant more 
patients seen and thus more work for the nursing staff. Another staff member commented 
that shifts should have been shortened on account of the working conditions: 
I feel like it should have been five hour increments, four hour increments because you 
didn't have air flow through here. I mean it was horrible and it seems like you would 
break people's time up just for a mental break, but they wouldn't do that. (Frontline) 
 
A middle manager described taking shifts in HIC, which were shorter, but noted they had 
difficulty resting when not on shift: 
We took shifts usually. I think they were two or four hours…Some of them did 
longer…I told them, I said, ‘Every time I try to step away and go work on something, 
it's like I can't get my mind settled on nothing because I feel like I'm constantly 




By contrast, an RN described being satisfied with working her normal shift length, 
rather than having to stay on the clock longer due to the disaster response: 
They gave us time off…we only had to work 12-hour shifts, which was great. I mean 
that's a normal shift. They didn't make me work 20-hour [shifts]. (Frontline) 
 
Comparison of Findings by Job Role and Job Level 
To identify any unique differences or similarities in the disaster response experience 
between participants of differing job levels and job roles, summaries of each participants’ 
overall evaluations of and comments on aspects of the disaster response were compared 
within a matrix. Aspects of the disaster response and birth center closure included teamwork, 
communication, justice, and safety. Interesting findings from this analysis are discussed here.  
Frontline employees, which included staff from nursing, laboratory, allied health, 
dietary, and environmental services, tended to emphasize the compensation structure during 
and after the hurricane as negative. Most middle management and leadership staff did not 
discuss pay at all, and if they did, they expressed neutral views on the subject, with the 
exception of one member of the leadership team, who was dissatisfied with the amount of 
unpaid overtime they had to work. The frontline staff in this study are all likely hourly 
employees, rather than salary, and eight out of the nine are women. Women and hourly 
employees tend to report lower levels of satisfaction with pay, and with the physical safety of 
the workplace (Brenan, 2019). During a disaster, women are less likely to report to work, and 
nurses, as compared to physicians, are less willing to work during disasters. Frontline clinical 
staff, such as nurses, also report higher levels of job stress during a disaster (Nickell et al., 
2004). The frontline status of this group, most of whom were female, may have contributed 
to the dissatisfaction with pay. It is also possible that these participants judged their pay as 
compared to the working conditions, or demands of the job, as unbalanced or unfair.  
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Similarly, five out of nine frontline employees made more negative statements regarding 
their feelings of personal safety during the disaster response, while three made neutral 
comments, and one expressed positive views about their personal safety.  
Out of the ten participants with clinical patient care backgrounds, six individuals 
made statements that were mostly negative regarding patient safety during the disaster 
response. A non-clinical member of the middle management team observed what they 
believed were unsafe patient care conditions, and commented on this observation during the 
interview. One nurse, and the president of the hospital indicated that patient safety was 
“good” or above average during the disaster response.  
Comparison of Findings by Recruitment Method 
In this study, six participants were recruited by the hospital leader point of contact, 
rather than by the researcher or through flyers posted on units advertising the study. These 
participants, as noted in Table 2, were a Certified Nursing Assistant/Unit Clerk, an 
Environmental Services employee, a Registered Nurse, the Finance Director, the Security 
Supervisor, and the Facilities Manager. Every effort was made during the consent process of 
data collection to advise these participants that their participation was voluntary, and not 
connected in any way to their employment. Still, due to the leader’s encouragement of these 
individuals to participate in this study, coercion and data validity were concerns. 
Additionally, these participants may have felt pressured to describe the disaster response 
more positively, or more favorably in regards to leaderships’ actions during the response.   
To determine if differences in descriptions of the disaster and birth center closure 
experiences were present in the data from this group of participants, transcripts from these 
interviews were examined collectively, and then compared to transcripts from participants 
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recruited in other ways. A matrix was used to compare the two groups along factors such as 
teamwork, communication, justice, and safety. Insights from this analysis are described here.  
Although this group of participants tended to describe hospital leaders’ preparation 
for the storm in positive terms, all participants, regardless of type of recruitment, identified 
areas of preparation that leaders could improve upon. Participants in this group felt safe and 
supported by hospital leaders during the storm, but noted that different preparation activities 
and efforts by leaders could have prevented the power loss and water intrusion into the 
building. Similarly, most of the participants in this group stated that they felt safe during the 
storm, but expressed worry about spending long hours in the heat, or the building’s ability to 
withstand hurricane and tornado-force winds. All of the participants in this group felt 
satisfied with the teamwork and communication during the storm, and seemed to appraise 
their treatment by hospital leaders as fair.  However, several participants did note that they 
believed “hurricane pay” would have been appropriate.  
Several participants in this study expressed concern for patient safety during the 
disaster response, and gave examples of unsafe patient care conditions. Participants in this 
group, however, tended not to discuss issues of patient safety during the interviews, or felt 
neutral about the issue. Out of the six participants recruited by the hospital leader point of 
contact, three did not discuss patient safety, two felt neutral, and one felt certain that patient 
safety was adequate during the disaster. Regarding personal safety, two made more positive 
statements, two made more negative statements, and two made more neutral statements.  
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, results from the sixteen semi-structured qualitative interviews were 
presented. Five themes were derived from the data—Preparation, Hurricane Response, 
Aftermath, Facilities, and Organizational Culture. The categories derived from each of these 
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themes were analyzed and discussed, and cross-group comparisons were made to explore 
potential differences in the disaster response experience based on job role and job level, and 
recruitment method. In the next chapter, these results will be discussed within the context of 
theory, research, policy, and practice.  
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION  
Introduction 
The aims of this study were to examine hospital employee experiences during an 
evacuation due to disaster (research question 1), and hospital employee perceptions of the 
work environment during a disaster (research question 2). Using qualitative description, 
sixteen employees of a hospital that evacuated due to a hurricane were interviewed, and data 
from these interviews, as well as documents containing HICS notes, were analyzed using 
conventional content analysis. In this chapter, a summary of salient findings are summarized 
and discussed in context of implications for practice and administration, education, theory 
and research, and policy. Finally, limitations and methodological considerations are 
discussed.  
Summary of Major Findings 
 In this section, the major findings from this study are presented. Although this study 
identified many compelling and useful findings related to aspects of the hospital disaster 
response experience and work environment, the areas discussed below are especially 
important to the overall disaster response experience described by participants. These 
findings (presented in no particular order) include: staff comfort and satisfaction; the 
influence of job role and job level; duty, obligation, and standards of care; stress, burnout, 
and psychological debris; the birth center; building hazards and cascading (or secondary) 
effects; hospital culture; and community networks.  
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Staff Satisfaction 
In this study, preparations for staff comfort that may affect satisfaction may have 
been overlooked by hospital leaders during planning for the disaster response. Participants 
described three important areas of concern: food, work attire required during the hurricane, 
and compensation. First, the food provided to staff by the hospital was not always regarded 
as suitable in the hot, humid work environment, and did not take individual dietary needs into 
consideration. Second, the type of clothing and shoes needed for staff to provide care under 
the working conditions was inappropriate: frontline staff providing clinical care to patients 
worked in wet scrubs drenched in sweat; they were not permitted to change into the dry 
scrubs supplied by the hospital, or more appropriate attire such as the comfortable shorts, t-
shirts, and sandals worn by hospital leaders. Staff also were unable to launder clothing at the 
hospital due to the loss of electricity, so they wore wet, dirty clothing for several days at a 
time while they worked in the hospital.  
Challenges related to providing adequate and appropriate food, water, clothing, and 
hygiene facilities for hospital staff working during disasters have been reported in previous 
literature (French et al., 2002; King et al., 2016; Morris, Ricci, Griffin, Heslin, & Dobalian, 
2016; Nakagawa et al., 2013). Yet, during an extended disaster response, attending to 
employees’ basic needs, including food, water, and shelter, and comfort needs, such as 
familiar and appropriate food, and dry, clean clothing and shoes, are important in shaping 
staff experiences the response, and their evaluations of hospital leaders’ actions during the 
response. Comfort needs in particular may be neglected in standard disaster response 
planning, as these plans generally are limited to protecting the “basic” survival needs of 
employees, such as food and shelter.  
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Third, compensation for employees working during disasters is another aspect of staff 
satisfaction that is often overlooked. The majority of the frontline participants in this study 
described being dissatisfied with the pay structure during the disaster response, especially 
those who worked at the hospital during a prior hurricane, when they received “hurricane 
pay”, or hazard pay, and were compensated for the entire time (on and off-duty) they spent 
sheltering at the hospital. During Hurricane Florence, staff were not paid for the hours they 
were “off the clock” but on-site at the hospital, and no overtime pay was provided for 
salaried employees. Many frontline participants stated that due to the difficult and hazardous 
working conditions, they should have received hazard pay.  
Decisions regarding if, how, and when healthcare staff should be paid during and 
after disasters is a contentious issue. Staff who feel that their lives or wellbeing are at risk at 
work may believe that hazard pay is owed to them (Graham & Shakow, 2010). 
Administrators and policymakers, however, may feel that disaster response is simply part of 
the roles and responsibilities of healthcare workers that requires no additional pay. Clinical 
professionals, particularly physicians and nurses, have long been socialized to believe that 
the care and treatment of patients is a deeply humanitarian and ethical responsibility that 
transcends the transactional nature of work and employment. In times of disasters, clinicians 
are often called upon to volunteer their time, unpaid, as a moral responsibility. Healthcare 
workers may believe, however, that the perceived risk of participating in disaster response 
exceeds the responsibilities of their positions.   
Planning for staff compensation is an important aspect of disaster response 
preparation, and is typically addressed in hospital disaster planning guidelines. Hospital 
leaders should be aware, however, that the decisions they make regarding the compensation 
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structure during disaster response may significantly affect staff satisfaction and motivation to 
participate in a future disaster response. Moreover, as demonstrated during the COVID-19 
pandemic, decisions regarding healthcare worker compensation may positively or negatively 
shape public perceptions of healthcare organizations, policymakers, and the role of 
healthcare workers overall. 
The Influence of Job Role and Job Level 
Participants’ perceptions of and reactions to certain facets of the disaster response 
varied by their job role and job level. Frontline staff, who were mostly women, included 
nurses, dietary assistants, lab technicians, respiratory therapists, and environmental services 
workers. In general, they expressed concerns in two areas: pay during the disaster response, 
and negative opinions about their personal safety during the disaster. This finding aligns with 
studies of employee work attitudes outside of disaster research that have found women and 
hourly workers on the frontline to have lower levels of satisfaction with pay and with the 
physical safety of the workplace than men and salaried workers (Brenan, 2019). Similarly, 
during a disaster, women and nurses are less likely to report to work and less willing to work 
than men and workers in different healthcare roles (Nickell et al., 2004). Frontline staff also 
tend to report higher levels of job stress (Nickell et al., 2004).  Frontline workers represent 
the largest segment of hospital employees, and are critical to carrying out effective disaster 
response. Dissatisfaction with pay and concerns about personal safety expressed by these 
workers may reflect the heightened stress, and limited resources (such as work autonomy, 
financial resources, childcare, and alternative employment options) characterized by these 
job roles.  
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 Frontline staff (including those with and without direct patient care duties) expressed 
patient safety concerns during the disaster. In contrast, middle and leadership staff members 
without direct clinical duties described patient safety during the disaster positively. In 
particular, frontline clinical staff were uncomfortable providing care in the dark, without 
electricity. While the power was out, staff could not utilize certain technologies they were 
accustomed to, such as imaging, electronic health records, suction equipment, and telemetry. 
The discomfort and anxiety expressed by frontline clinical staff regarding providing direct 
patient care when contingency or crisis standards of care are adopted may reflect a failure of 
hospital leadership to adequately prepare for the clinical demands of disaster response or to 
adequately communicate the shift in standards of care. The disparity between the way 
frontline clinical and non-clinical staff discussed patient safety during the disaster 
underscores the lack of communication or situational awareness within the organization in 
regard to patient care.   
Duty, Obligation, and Standards of Care 
 Participants reported feeling a strong sense of duty and obligation to their community, 
their patients, and their organization during the disaster. These feelings have been reported in 
other studies of healthcare workers’ experiences when responding to disasters (Morris et al., 
2016). In this study, these feelings were complicated by the altered standard of care 
participants were able to provide to their patients, particularly when both commercial and 
generator power were lost. When this happened, crisis standards of care were adopted, which 
represents a significant shift from normal operations. Although the shift to crisis standards of 
care (CSC) was informal, and participants may not be familiar with the term CSC or the 
details of those standards, their concerns and reactions to providing CSC are echoed in 
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findings from other studies of hospital disaster response (Berggren, 2005; Couch, 2008; 
Powell-Young, et al., 2006).  
 Providing altered standards of care to patients during a disaster response could bring 
concerns about ethics, morality, legal and professional concerns, as well as the psychological 
aftereffects of healthcare workers who provide care. These concerns were widely publicized 
after a New Orleans physician chose to hasten the death of four hospitalized patients who 
could not be saved during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (Fink, 2013), and as physicians across 
the world have been forced to choose between who does and does not receive invasive 
ventilation during the mechanical ventilator shortages of the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic 
(Hick & Hanfling, 2020). Hospital staff who must make difficult treatment decisions, or 
provide medical care under CSC, often feel anxiety at the workplace and morally or 
professionally compromised (Ammar et al., 2020; Hick & Hanfling, 2020; Leider, Debruin, 
Reynolds, Koch, & Seaberg, 2017). Although it is unknown how the provision of CSC may 
affect clinicians’ motivations to participate in disaster response efforts in the future, past 
responses to events that stress the healthcare system on a small or large scale heighten 
concerns about how shifting care standards affect staff and their expectations about care they 
are asked to deliver.  
 Despite feeling the pull towards patient care during disasters, healthcare workers may 
also feel a “dual loyalty,” or a struggle between personal autonomy and the desire to protect 
the health of the public (Karadag & Hakan, 2012). Some participants in this study discussed 
conflict between feeling the need to protect themselves and their families, and feeling 
compelled as healthcare workers to report to work during the hurricane and engage in patient 
care. This conflict, in the absence of organizational provisions to protect workers and their 
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families, may result in employees choosing to stay home rather than assist with disaster 
response. 
Stress, Burnout, and Psychological Debris 
The combined effects of a host of problems--the heat, the loss of power, the 
discomforts of living and working in the hospital, insufficient or insensitive communication 
from leadership, fear for self and others, and anxiety about providing CSC—resulted in, for 
some, trauma and intense stress. Some participants who described these negative reactions to 
the experience were unsure if they would participate in future disaster response at the 
hospital. Ensuring that an adequate supply of staff will report to work during a disaster is a 
critical piece of disaster planning for healthcare organizations (McHugh, 2010). Thus, it is 
important to understand why hospital staff experience stress during disaster response, what 
the consequences of that stress might be, and how to prevent or mitigate stress to hospital 
workers during and after disasters. Based on this study, failure to learn from staff experiences 
during Hurricane Florence could jeopardize hospitals leaders’ response during future disaster 
events.  
The stress reported by participants in this study, particularly frontline staff, can be 
understood by examining the concept of burnout. Maslach and Jackson (1981) characterized 
burnout as a syndrome of depersonalization, reduced personal accomplishment, and 
emotional exhaustion occurring as a result of working in occupations that require high levels 
of emotional labor. These occupations included health and human services, such as medicine, 
social work, and psychology. Demerouti et al. (2001) later expanded this definition in the Job 
Demands-Resources (JD-R) model, arguing that burnout can develop regardless of 
occupation, in any work setting where job demands are high, and job resources are limited. 
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Job demands are those organizational, physical, or social aspects of a job that require 
sustained mental or physical effort. Job resources refers to aspects of a job that may assist the 
employee in achieving work goals, reduce the physiological or psychological costs of job 
demands, or encourage personal growth and development (Demerouti et al., 2001). The JD-R 
model suggests that burnout is the result of a “constellation” of working conditions. When 
the demands of a job are high, employees experience exhaustion, and when job resources are 
lacking, employees experience increased disengagement. When job demands are high, and 
job resources are limited, burnout syndrome may occur (Demerouti et al., 2001).  
Participants in this study discussed the demands placed upon them in the context of 
the disaster response. Physical demands included withstanding high heat and humidity while 
providing patient care in a busy emergency department, having little or low-quality sleep or 
rest periods, and enduring challenging living conditions in the hospital, such as taking cold 
showers, or navigating slippery hallways and stairwells in the dark. Social demands included 
round-the-clock interactions with coworkers and managers, and interacting with anxious 
patients, families, and community members. Organizational demands included providing safe 
patient care while lacking certain resources they were accustomed to having, clocking in and 
out of their shifts on time, performing job duties they may not normally be responsible for, 
and working professionally with outside agencies and groups, such as EMS and the National 
Guard.  
Participants reported varying levels of job resources, and the levels of job resources 
available to employees varied based on job role and job level. For example, participants in 
middle management and leadership roles discussed being part of decision making during the 
disaster response, while participants on the frontline discussed being given orders and being 
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notified of decisions made by upper-level employees. Participants also differed in their 
assessments of supervisory or management support, and the resources available to them to do 
their jobs. Most frontline participants agreed that “rewards,” or in this case, extra 
compensation in the form of “hurricane pay,” were deserved, but were not given. 
Although the long-term effects of the stress and burnout experienced by this sample 
during the disaster are unknown, short-term effects included psychological symptoms, 
cynicism towards the organization and anger towards its leaders, reluctance to participate in 
future disaster response, and uncertainty about the hospital’s future. Maintaining the mental 
health, wellbeing, and satisfaction of healthcare workers who respond to disasters is essential 
to support an adequate workforce ready to respond to disasters (Kang et al., 2020; Mo et al., 
2020).  
Responding to a disaster at the workplace can also have severe psychological 
consequences for healthcare workers (Kang et al., 2020; Mo et al., 2020; Xiao, Zhang, Kong, 
Li, & Yang, 2020). Some participants in this study expressed feelings of fear, anxiety, and 
depression during and after the disaster response. A few described the experience as 
“traumatic” and wondered if they suffered from PTSD as a result of the disaster. 
Furthermore, participants in this study were either unaware of the psychological services 
available to them after Hurricane Florence, or were unable to access them due to distance. 
The psychological toll of responding to the disaster may affect workers’ productivity, 
commitment to the organization, and future disaster response participation (Brooks et al., 
2018; Davidson et al., 2009; Miller-Burke et al., 1999).  
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The Second Disaster: Loss of the Birth Center  
After Hurricane Florence damaged the hospital’s surgical suite, the hospital 
underwent widespread renovations, and consequently obstetrical services were suspended. 
Obstetrical patients had to be triaged in the hospitals’ emergency department (ED), and sent 
to other facilities for care as needed. After four months of operating this way, it was decided 
by hospital leaders that the obstetrical unit would close permanently. Hospital leadership 
described the process, and the ability of the ED to triage and transfer obstetrical patients 
during and after the storm as a “success.” Despite the success, however, a critical service was 
no longer available in this community. Hospital leaders described the financial struggles of 
the obstetrical services unit prior to the disaster, and felt that the obstetrical unit closure was 
inevitable and needed to ensure the hospital’s survival.  
For staff members and the community, the closure was a devastating loss of a vital 
service. Participants described the community outcry on social media, and lamented the loss 
of the unit for their own pregnancies and deliveries. The unit was described by employees as 
beloved by the community, and as a safe space where women and families could trust the 
care and attention provided by local nurses and physicians. The closure also led to job losses 
and transitions for staff members who worked in the birth center. These employees were 
given only a few days after the announcement of the closure to make a critical career 
decision: transfer to another hospital within the system, work elsewhere in the same hospital, 
or take a severance package and leave the hospital. In a small community with few 
employment options, this career decision also had potential life-changing implications for 
those who worked in the birth center.  
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The closure of the birth center was significant because it was a result of the disaster, 
and because of the widespread effects the closure had on the staff and community. 
Obstetrical unit closures in rural hospitals are not uncommon. Between the years of 2004-
2014, 9% of rural hospitals have discontinued obstetric services (Hung, Henning-Smith, 
Casey, & Kozhimannil, 2017). Common reasons for closing obstetric units include low 
delivery volume, difficulty staffing obstetric units, or serving a disproportionately high 
proportions of Medicaid patients relative to privately insured or self-pay patients, which puts 
the hospital in a financially vulnerable position (Hung, Kozhimannil, Casey, & Moscovice, 
2016). Very little is known, however, about how the closure of a hospital’s obstetrical unit 
affects the staff who works there.  
This study sheds light on two important consequences of this closure. First, some 
staff who formerly worked in the birth center chose to transfer to units within the hospital 
which were substantially different clinical areas such as the intensive care unit (ICU). These 
staff expressed anxiety and discomfort in having to learn a new and very different skill set 
needed to care for a very different patient population. To remain employed and in their 
community, these staff had no other choice. Second, the closure of the birth center meant that 
obstetrical patients presenting to the hospital had to be seen by ED staff, triaged, and either 
treated in the ED or transported to another facility. Responding to obstetrical and neonatal 
emergencies is within the scope of practice for ED clinicians (Bush, 2016; Robinson et al., 
2018). The care typically provided in these cases is limited, of short duration, and 
intermediate until patients can be transferred to an obstetrical unit within the hospital. 
Because the hospital lacked an obstetrical unit, the ED staff in this study reported feeling 
unprepared and uncomfortable providing the level of care needed for complicated or 
 134 
uncomplicated obstetrical patients. The closure of this birth center, therefore, highlights the 
deep tensions that result from the tradeoffs of administrative decision-making, and the 
consequences of those decisions on staff, especially when staff are not integrally involved in 
the decision-making process.   
Building Hazards and Cascading Effects 
The disaster response that was the focus of this study was made difficult by 
engineering and architectural features of the hospital building. The generator was located 
outside the building, in an uncovered area, which meant staff had to stand outside in the 
hurricane to repair and replace it. Generator malfunctions and operational issues are a well-
documented phenomenon in hospital disaster response (Ornstein, 2012). Facilities and 
engineering staff of the study hospital understood the importance of the generator, and even 
acquired a second and third backup generator prior to and during the storm. Despite this, 
generator malfunctions plagued the hospital’s disaster response efforts.  
Other challenges presented by the building structure included: the flat roof, which 
allowed pooling of water; the lack of windows in the emergency department, which increased 
the heat and humidity when the air conditioning was lost; an automatically locking stairwell, 
which led to an employee being “trapped” until discovered by another staff member; and 
electric sliding doors at the external entry to the emergency department, which had to be held 
closed by staff members to prevent outside winds from blowing them open. Each of these 
building problems had to be addressed by staff, adding time, energy, and stress to already 
“stretched” hospital work environment and operations. 
In addition to these engineering and architectural challenges, the loss of power, and 
the subsequent loss of air conditioning, resulted in an uncomfortable and difficult work 
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environment within the hospital. The combination of the extreme heat and humidity, and the 
loss of electricity caused discomfort for staff and patients, and created serious safety risks 
related to the inability to operate imaging, telemetry, and suctioning tools.  
These hazards are commonly referred to as secondary hazards, or cascading effects. 
Using the study site as an example, the initial event—the hurricane—triggered a series of 
secondary hazards that resulted in physical, social, or economic disruption to the hospital, 
staff, and even patients (Pescaroli & Alexander, 2015). Secondary hazards, or cascading 
events, can range in severity from small nuisances that exacerbate disaster conditions, such 
as the emergency department doors repeatedly flying open and crashing shut, to major hazard 
events that can evolve into disasters themselves, such as the loss of power leading to 
potential patient safety events (American Institute of Architects, 2017). Secondary hazards 
have been reported in other studies of hospital disaster response. For example, at one New 
York hospital, the loss of electricity meant that patients had to be physically carried down 
dark, slippery hospital stairwells by staff, rather than transported in an elevator (VanDevanter 
et al., 2014b). Secondary hazards may not be adequately planned for in hospital disaster 
response, but represent a significant threat to the safety of hospital working conditions, as 
well as staff and patients’ safety.  
Hospital Culture 
In this study, facets of the hospital’s culture—including communication, justice, 
teamwork, and organizational learning—affected the disaster preparedness and response 
processes, and the experiences of hospital staff during the disaster. Hospital culture is 
cultivated prior to a disaster, and is further developed by the actions of hospital leaders 
during disaster response (Davidson et al., 2009). Thus, the culture is an essential aspect of an 
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organization both during times of normal and disaster operations, and influences how a 
hospital prepares for, responds to, recovers from, and mitigates the effects of a disaster.  
Some participants in this study described dissatisfaction with the communication 
between staff and leadership. Participants described leadership’s attitude to the working 
environment of frontline staff in the ED as insensitive, and perceived situation updates 
throughout the disaster response as inadequate. Participants who spoke negatively about the 
culture within the hospital during the disaster also tended to describe the entire experience as 
traumatic. These employees were dissatisfied with the behaviors of the leadership team 
toward staff, the standard of care they were able to provide, and were scared for their own 
safety, and the safety of their patients and loved ones. Some staff felt their needs were 
dismissed by leadership and their sacrifices not acknowledged. Employee satisfaction is 
strongly associated with a supportive organizational culture (Das, Chen, Warren, & Hodgson, 
2011; Warren et al., 2007). Participants in this study who were dissatisfied with the 
communication and actions of leadership may be unlikely or reluctant to participate in future 
disaster response activities at the hospital (Davidson et al., 2009).  
Teamwork was also a critical aspect of the disaster response in this study. Participants 
who described the staff as “family”, or as a tightly-knit team, tended to describe the disaster 
response experience more positively. These participants described effective teamwork, 
sharing responsibilities, working together to protect patients and staff, and compassionate 
communication between leadership and staff. Participants expressed appreciation of their 
colleagues who shared responsibilities and “jumped in” to help when there was much to do. 
Participants gave examples of staff members and leaders helping with tasks not normally 
within their realm of responsibility, such as preparing food, providing direct patient care (in 
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the case of managers and leaders with a clinical background), babysitting employees’ 
children, and cleaning the facility.  
Organizational leaders who are able to “self-diagnose” organizational problems can 
foster a culture of learning that can operate safely despite rapid changes and deepening 
complexity in their environments (Thompson, 2012). In this study, hospital leaders reflected 
on their past experiences with disasters, including a previous hurricane that hit the area, 
Hurricane Matthew, and applied the lessons from that disaster to their planning and response 
during Hurricane Florence. Instead of continuing to care for admitted patients, as they did in 
Hurricane Matthew, they discharged all inpatients before the storm began, to free up 
resources and staff for the disaster response. Also, during Hurricane Matthew, families of 
staff were permitted to shelter at the hospital, which put a strain on hospital resources.  
During Hurricane Florence, only single parents were allowed to bring their children to shelter 
at the hospital. Anticipating that commercial power would be lost, hospital staff tested the 
hospital generator, and even ordered a second backup generator just in case the hospital 
generator malfunctioned. These actions demonstrate a culture of organizational learning from 
past errors, which is crucial to safe disaster response within hospitals (Thompson, 2012).  
After disasters, emergencies, or adverse patient safety events, hospitals may engage in 
learning by reviewing after-action reports, conducting debriefings with staff, or conducting 
root cause analyses (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2019; Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration, 2016; Wolf & Hughes, 2008). Reflecting on lessons learned 
during disaster response, investigating the causes of errors or accidents during the response, 
and making changes to future disaster response plans are activities essential to organizational 
learning, and safe healthcare disaster response.  
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Community Networks 
The hospital leaders in this study relied on relationships with community 
organizations to carry out an effective disaster response. Prior to the disaster, hospital leaders 
created a formal “network” with local and state emergency managers, law enforcement, the 
National Guard, and ambulance services. When the disaster struck, the leaders found that this 
network alone was insufficient. The network had to be quickly expanded to include a grocery 
store (for a generator), a food distributor (for snacks and meals), a funeral home (for the 
storage of a corpse), and a prison (for laundry facilities).  
Effective disaster response is directly tied to the resources available in the 
community, and the interactions of the organizations within the community (IOM, 2009). A 
good example of community resource use and networking can be found by looking at an 
industry outside of healthcare: nuclear power. Nuclear power plants are surrounded by 
emergency planning zones, known as EPZs. EPZs are thought of as two concentric circles 
surrounding each nuclear power plant in the US. The inner circle, with a radius of 10 miles, 
is termed the “plume exposure pathway.” That is, in an accident, individuals within this 10-
mile radius would be exposed to radioactive material from the “plume”. The larger circle, 
with a radius of 50 miles, is considered the “ingestion exposure pathway”, and is the longer-
term exposure risk to the surrounding community (United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (U.S. NRC), 2019).  
Within the ten-mile EPZ, a large network is formed to prepare and respond to 
disasters. The networks include, among many others, state departments of environment and 
agriculture, county-level emergency management agencies, and municipal governments that 
include designated radiological officers, municipal volunteers, county health departments, 
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utility companies, hospitals, farms and farmers, nursing homes, daycares, schools, and 
restaurants (Adalja et al., 2015). Training exercises, drills, simulations, educational sessions, 
and public forums are held regularly within the ten-mile EPZ, and all organizations within 
the network are invited to participate. Within an EPZ, disaster preparedness planning is not 
the sole responsibility of the nuclear plant; it is an effort required of all organizations within 
the network.  
Studies of interorganizational networks at the network level (conceptually similar to 
an EPZ), rather than the organizational level (such as an individual hospital), have been 
termed “whole network” research (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003). Whole network research aims to 
explore how networks evolve, how they are governed, and how specific collective outcomes 
might be produced. Within the context of disaster response, whole network research presents 
a unique perspective to understand how groups of organizations within a community or 
region can work together to respond effectively to disasters. Although focusing on how a 
hospital is embedded into its community, and the strength of its relationships with other 
organizations, may be helpful in understanding the how and why of hospital disaster 
response, it may also be useful to examine the whole network and its interactions, rather than 
use the hospital as the central actor.  
Implications 
 There are several implications of this study’s findings that are relevant to practice, 
especially hospital administration and operations, as well as education, theory and research, 
and policy. Each of these implications are discussed below. 
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Implications for Practice  
The two primary implications for practice that arise from this study are specific to 
hospital administration and operations. First, the creation of an organizational culture of 
learning is essential for disaster planning, response, and the mitigation of future events.  
Second, attending to the needs of employees during a disaster is essential, especially in an 
environment where human lives are at stake. These areas are discussed next.   
Organizational Culture. In this study, the actions taken by hospital leaders and staff 
to prepare for Hurricane Florence were informed by their past experiences with hurricanes. 
Hospital leaders who adopt and promote a culture of organizational learning within their 
organizations by encouraging error reporting during normal operations, engaging in after-
action report evaluations when disasters strike, and performing root cause analyses when 
errors occur as a result of disasters can prevent future negative outcomes of disaster response, 
and build staff confidence by thoughtfully taking actions to address problems (OSHA, 2016; 
Wolf & Hughes, 2008). The hospital leaders in this study demonstrated that they had done 
this by considering the needs and challenges during a past disaster, Hurricane Matthew, and 
applying these lessons to the response to Hurricane Florence.  
In addition to learning from past experiences, effective teamwork and communication 
are important components of everyday operations that become magnified during safe disaster 
response (Power, 2018). In general, participants in this study positively described the 
teamwork during and after the disaster response. Although they described effective and 
appropriate communication among staff, some participants described the communication 
between staff and leadership as inadequate, insensitive, and strained. Hospital leaders should 
work to promote cultures of positive teamwork and communication within their 
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organizations as a matter of routine operations. When individuals in an organization are 
accustomed to working in teams and communicating effectively during normal operating 
conditions, a strong foundation is built for safely responding to a disaster by drawing on 
effective teamwork and communication skills (Thompson, 2012).  
Although hospital disaster planning requirements dictate that the means and methods 
of communication are specified, the manner and quality of communication are also 
important. Although many frontline and middle participants in this study positively evaluated 
the communication between colleagues, some participants were dissatisfied with the tone, 
frequency, and quality of communication coming from leaders. Communication to 
employees at all levels of the organization should be timely, complete, accurate, and sensitive 
to the needs of staff. Information technologies that deliver quick mass situation updates can 
keep staff at all levels abreast of changing conditions or plans and may help staff feel they 
are a respected and important part of the disaster response. Managers and leaders also send 
messages to employees through their appearance and manner of dress. During a disaster, 
frontline employees may expect their supervisors to come to work ready to help out, and 
expect them to be dressed appropriately (French et al., 2002). During and after the disaster, it 
is also important that leaders take time to deliver compassionate communications to 
employees in the form of emails, texts, phone calls, or meetings. These communications may 
make employees feel valued, cared for, and reinforce that they are an important part of the 
hospital team.  
Attending to the Needs of the Workforce. Under disaster conditions, hospital 
employees may expect a similar level of working conditions and comforts they are used to 
under normal circumstances. For example, employees may expect satisfactory food, 
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beverages, and living conditions while working under disaster conditions at the hospital. 
Disaster plans should include efforts to provide heating, cooling, and plumbing, and dietary 
rations suitable for many diets, allergies, and special needs. Plant-based disaster response 
diets (DRDs) have been suggested for use in hospital disaster response planning, as these 
diets can include foods that are shelf-stable, and tolerated by a wide range of diets, cultures, 
and religions (Wien & Sabaté, 2015). In hospital planning, leaders should also consider the 
need to provide meals to external agencies that assist with the disaster response, such as EMS 
crews and National Guard. However, if they offer food to these workers, hospital leaders 
should make sure there is also sufficient food for their own employees who are working 
under strained conditions, and avoid putting hospital employees at risk of meal shortages.  
Clothing and shoes for hospital employees may also become a critical need during 
disaster response, especially during extreme weather conditions. Hospital leaders engaged in 
disaster planning should plan to have appropriate clothes on hand for staff under expected 
weather conditions, including extra scrubs, t-shirts, shorts, and shoes. Policies regarding the 
use of hospital scrubs (or scrubs typically found within the surgical department) and wearing 
non-uniform clothing should be communicated clearly before the disaster, and followed by 
staff at all levels of the hospital hierarchy. Hospital disaster response plans should also 
include the laundering clothing and linens during times of extended disaster response. In this 
study, laundry facilities at a local prison were utilized by staff; other laundry locations could 
include laundromats, dormitories, and apartment buildings.  
Participants in this study also discussed the role of their families and pets in their 
disaster preparation plans and their ability to report to work. Allowing employees’ immediate 
family members to shelter at the hospital may improve both staff willingness and ability to 
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work during the disaster, and their satisfaction with the disaster response experience, which 
may increase employees’ willingness to work during future disasters. Hospitals that are able 
to accommodate employees and family on campus should make plans for childcare, and 
sufficient food and water for everyone housed in the building. 
Having clear organizational policies about how healthcare staff will be compensated 
for regular time, overtime, and off-shift time during a disaster and while sheltering at the 
hospital is a hospital leadership imperative. Providing increases in pay during disaster 
response also may increase staff willingness and ability to report to work during a disaster.  
These policies should be clearly communicated to staff, as they convey staff lives and work 
are valued by the organization. Moreover, these steps could help incentivize staff to work 
during a disaster. Leaders in hospital disaster preparedness planning should address plans for 
providing these financial benefits to staff who participate in disaster response.  
Finally, to protect the mental health of staff and support a sufficient supply of staff 
that is willing and able to respond to future disasters, leaders of healthcare organizations 
must address the psychological symptoms staff may experience after disaster response. In 
this study, some participants described feelings of anxiety, fear, and depression during and 
after the disaster response. Although some participants were aware of psychological services 
offered by the hospital to employees, others were not aware of these services, or were unable 
to access them. This finding suggests that on-site or local counseling and psychiatric services 
should be made available to hospital employees after disaster, and these services should be 
widely promoted by hospital leadership.  
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Implications for Education 
In this study, hospital leaders indicated that the decision to close the obstetrical 
services unit of the hospital was partially due to the perceived success of hospital ED staff to 
triage and transfer obstetric patients. However, participants working in the ED expressed 
discomfort caring for obstetrical patients, and suggested that more training was needed to 
care for this population. Rural hospitals in which decisions are made to close obstetrical units 
must rely on the ED staff to triage and care for obstetrical patients and neonates. In these 
situations, in-depth training and education must be developed for ED staff to provide basic 
and advanced knowledge of both routine obstetric care and the care of obstetric emergencies.  
Initial training should be a requirement for ED staff to complete along with refresher courses 
on a recurring basis. ED staff may lack the knowledge and experience to provide high-
quality, safe care for obstetric patients; this presents clear patient safety issues, and 
potentially staff retention or satisfaction issues. Similarly, the county should require EMS 
staff to undergo similar training and education, as these staff will be relied on to care for 
mothers and neonates during initial transport and the transfer of patients to area labor and 
delivery units. This training could be integrated into the disaster response training already 
implemented by many EMS organizations. Interprofessional education, in which EMS and 
hospital ED staff work together to practice triage, discuss and agree on hospital limits and 
capabilities during routine conditions and in a disaster response, and simulate effective 
communication, may improve the efficiency and effectiveness of care provided during 
disasters. 
 145 
Implications for Future Research  
The findings of this qualitative study point to many areas that are ripe for future 
research. One area to explore is the JD-R (Demerouti et al., 2001), mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, which offers several constructs and concepts that could be examined in future 
research – namely, job demands and job resources during a disaster response, and the 
consequences of the interactions among job demands and resources on staff stress, burnout, 
and organizational performance. For example, future investigations of hospital disaster 
response could explore the job resources and job demands placed on staff during disaster 
response, and examine the impact of these factors relative to employees’ job role and 
position within the hospital structure. An exploration of the burnout that might be 
experienced among staff during a hospital disaster could inform improvements in hospital 
disaster preparedness by developing interventions that target specific groups of employees 
with burnout-reducing strategies to improve their disaster response experience, and increase 
the likelihood of employee participation in future disaster responses. 
Another area of potential research is a more focused examination of how disasters 
affect rural hospitals, and particularly closures that are a result of a disaster event. In this 
study conducted in a rural hospital, leaders made the decision to permanently close the 
hospital’s struggling obstetrical unit after the surgical operating suite was damaged by a 
hurricane. It is unknown how weathering a disaster affects the ability of rural hospitals to 
remain open. While many rural hospitals receive funding after disasters to repair 
infrastructure, other factors such as staff turnover or population migration may become 
challenges rural hospital leaders must address after disasters. Future research is needed to 
examine the relationship between full or partial rural hospital closures, and disasters. 
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Understanding how disasters affect the short- and long-term viability of financially 
vulnerable hospitals could inform policy to prepare and protect rural hospitals.    
Implications for Policy 
 Building and Sustaining a Disaster-Ready Workforce. Findings from this study 
suggest that policymakers must intentionally develop policies that focus on the safety, 
satisfaction, and basic needs of employees if they aim to build and sustain a cadre of 
healthcare workers who are willing and prepared to work during a disaster. In times of 
disaster, healthcare workers are often encouraged to participate in the healthcare response, 
often unpaid, as a “moral duty.” Physicians and nurses are reminded of their duties as 
caregivers, and their ethical obligation to “unconditional and unprejudiced servitude” 
(Nagesh & Chakraborty, 2020, p.1). Although many clinical workers do feel morally 
compelled to assist their communities in times of disaster, these workers may still expect—
and are entitled to—an adequate amount of the necessary supplies to complete their jobs 
effectively and safely, resources to protect themselves and their families, provisions for basic 
human needs, and fair compensation for their time and sacrifice. Healthcare workers who 
choose to work during disasters should not be viewed or treated as disposable, as if an 
infinite supply of the number and type of workers are available, or that employees are simply 
going to “do their job”, but as the valuable, skilled professionals they are, and as essential 
workers who are providing a critical service to humanity, perhaps risking their own health 
and safety in doing so.  
 To that end, leaders and policymakers should be prudent in their communication and 
messaging to the healthcare workforce during times of disaster. Barriers to willingness to 
participate in disaster response, such as fears for personal and family safety, desire for 
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“hazard pay” that reflects the risk and sacrifice made by workers, and belief that their efforts 
are not valued by the public or hospital leaders, may be overcome by strong communication 
to the healthcare organizational workforce and the public that those who work during a 
disaster are valued, will be given the supplies needed to stay safe, and will be compensated 
fairly for their time and sacrifice. Although initially, healthcare workers may be enthusiastic 
and willing to participate in and work during a disaster response, this willingness may wane 
if they do not feel that their efforts and sacrifices are valued by the actions and decisions of 
hospital leaders and policymakers.  
Disaster Reporting. Many businesses operate under the assumption that the 
organization will never have a need for its EOP. At the local level, disasters and emergencies 
are conceptualized as “low probability” events, calling into question the frugality of 
channeling funds into expensive preparedness actions that yield no immediate revenue 
(Toner, 2017). It is no surprise, then, that when disasters do strike, healthcare organizations 
are consistently caught off guard (Hogan & Burstein, 2007). The findings from this study 
indicate that hospital leaders were indeed caught off-guard with respect to the type and 
number of supplies needed, and the infrastructure hazards that would affect the hospital.  
Similarly, during the COVID-19 pandemic, hospitals and healthcare facilities all over the US 
and many across the globe faced shortages of staff, space, and supplies (such as N95 masks 
and intensive care beds), despite decades of research suggesting that a pandemic—and 
associated need for these resources—could be imminent (Webby & Webster, 2003).  
The complacency of national leaders and the lack of current and comprehensive data 
regarding the frequency and nature of disasters at the national level may be partially to blame 
for organizational leaders’ reluctance to invest in preparedness. Because hospitals are not 
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required to report disaster response activities to any central agency or database, little is 
known about the frequency of hospital disaster responses, and the “boots on the ground” 
challenges associated with disaster responses in hospitals. Thus, healthcare organizational 
leaders are in the dark regarding potential risks. Moreover, federal disaster planning 
guidelines lack critical information organizational leaders need regarding the issues hospital 
staff will realistically face when carrying out disaster response. Policies aimed at requiring 
hospital leaders to submit after-action reports to a central agency or database could provide a 
more accurate representation of organizational risk, and better inform federal disaster 
planning and response guidelines. With such policies in place, hospital disaster response and 
disaster management could be greatly improved overall.  
Community Networks. Although it has been acknowledged that hospital disaster 
response is most effective when it is a collective effort of the community (IOM, 2009), 
hospital disaster response is still conceptualized as the responsibility of the hospital and its 
leadership alone—in other words, hospital leaders are responsible for delineating the 
community relationships it will utilize during different types of disaster responses. Findings 
from this study suggest that hospital disaster response could be improved by building strong 
relationships and collaborating with the whole community. Drawing in the community as 
invested partners in hospital disaster response would spread the responsibility of disaster 
planning throughout community organizations, rather than being the sole responsibility of the 
hospital (IOM, 2015). 
Policies that specify federal disaster planning requirements are needed to encourage 
hospitals to involve external community organizations in developing disaster plans and 
simulating disaster responses. Reconstructing hospital disaster planning as a “whole 
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network” responsibility—or the responsibility of the entire community—rather than the 
responsibility of the hospital alone, may improve the resilience of both hospitals and 
communities that are struck by disasters. 
Limitations and Methodological Considerations of this Dissertation 
There are several limitations of this study that are important to note. First, although 
attempts were made to recruit study participants using mass emails and the snowball method, 
several participants were “hand selected” by one high-level hospital leader, which introduced 
a potential source of selection bias. Furthermore, this leader made a comment in an email 
communication to the investigator that staff would be informed that they were “expected to 
participate” in the study. Although the researcher cautioned the leader against using this 
approach, it is unknown what actions were actually taken. If the leader did convey this 
sentiment to staff, the potential for participants to feel pressured or even coerced into 
participating was introduced. Because of this concern, prior to each interview, an in-depth 
conversation between the research and each participant was held to discuss informed consent, 
and the voluntary nature of this study. Participants were informed that, although this study 
was being conducted at their workplace, and despite how they were recruited, their 
participation in the study was in no way connected to their employment, and their 
participation was voluntary. Each participant was asked to confirm their understanding of 
this prior to participating in the study. Still, it is difficult to gauge the effect of the leaders’ 
actions on the motivations of employees to participate in the study, fully share information 
about their experiences working at the hospital during the hurricane, and discuss their honest 
perceptions of the hospital work environment. Employees who perceived themselves to be 
“lower” in the hospital hierarchy may have been more vulnerable to feelings of pressure to 
participate in the study and pressure to report only positive evaluations of the disaster 
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response, for fear of losing their employment. For this reason, additional time was spent with 
participants discussing informed consent, the actions being taken to protect their identity, and 
the potential risks of their participation in the study. 
Data collection for this study also took place approximately fourteen months after the 
disaster occurred. Because qualitative data is sensitive to time, the feelings and experiences 
expressed by participants may have been subject to recall bias, and the data they were being 
asked to provide could have been less readily accessed and remembered after a year. 
Although attempts were made by the researcher to enter the hospital five months after the 
event, delays in communication and obtaining organizational approvals prevented an earlier 
start to data collection. However, because the birth center did not close until January of 2019, 
data regarding this event was still “fresh” in the minds of the participants, and its full effects 
on the disaster recovery would have been missed if data collection had begun soon after the 
storm event.  
Finally, document review in this study was limited to the notes taken by members of 
the HICS. Facility planning and preparedness documents were not made available to the 
researcher; thus, it is unknown how the actual disaster response activities were similar or 
differed from the planned activities. Additionally, the HICS document was restricted to 
viewing access only, and the researcher thus relied on notes taken while reading the 
document when conducting document review. Full and unrestricted access to both HICS 
notes and hospital preparedness planning documents would have given this study greater 
context in regards to the processes, procedures, and actions carried out by hospital employees 
during the disaster response.  
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Conclusion 
 The purpose of this study was to examine hospital employees’ perceptions of the 
disaster response experience, and their work environment during the disaster response. Using 
qualitative descriptive methodology with conventional content analysis, sixteen participants 
from one hospital, drawn from different organizational levels of the hospital hierarchy, were 
recruited and interviewed regarding their experiences.  
Participants described experiencing two disasters: first, Hurricane Florence, and then, 
the permanent closure of the hospital’s birth center. Participant experiences of the hospital 
disaster response varied depending on their job role and job level. In general, frontline 
workers expressed more fear for their personal safety and dissatisfaction with pay, and 
frontline employees with clinical duties described patient care safety concerns during the 
disaster. Participants’ experiences of the disaster also were shaped by the culture of 
teamwork, communication, and preparedness that existed in the hospital work environment. 
Hospital leaders indicated that hospital operations relied on a wide network of community 
relationships to carry out an effective disaster response, indicating that the intentional use of 
a whole network approach to disaster preparedness may be a better strategy for planning.  
This study was conducted just a few months prior to the emergence of a global 
pandemic, COVID-19, and the resurgence of civil rights and social justice issues in the US 
and across many countries. As leaders of countries, regions, and healthcare organizations 
around the globe reexamine their existing disaster response plans and evaluate their 
effectiveness during the COVID-19 pandemic, it is likely that many of the “old” structures of 
disaster preparedness and response will be found to be inadequate. Disasters have the power 
to reshape national and local economies, the sociodemographic makeup of nations and 
communities, and the healthcare needs of populations and communities. Disasters can also 
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exacerbate existing systemic inadequacies, inequities, and injustices within nations and 
communities. As organizations and governments move forward, it is critical to invest 
increased funding in disaster preparedness and response activities to protect communities and 
individuals from current and future disasters. This change will not be without resistance; as 
Machiavelli noted, proposals for a new order face impassioned opposition from those who 
benefit from the old order (Fuchs, 2020; Machiavelli, 1532). Nevertheless, the onus is on 
governments, leaders, and policymakers to acknowledge the failures of the existing 
healthcare disaster preparedness systems, and press forward in constructing newer, more 
robust plans.  
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APPENDIX A: RECRUITMENT EMAIL 
Dear employee of [redacted] Hospital, 
 
Did you assist with the evacuation of the hospital during Hurricane Florence? Researchers 
from University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, are conducting a research study about what it 
was like to evacuate the hospital during the hurricane and are looking for your input!  
 
Participation in this study will involve a one-on-one interview with a doctoral student from 
the UNC School of Nursing about your experiences in the workplace during the evacuation. 
Interviews will be audio recorded and will last approximately one hour. All hospital 
employees who assisted during the evacuation are invited to participate. Your participation is 
voluntary and no compensation is offered for your participation. 
 
If you are interested in participating or would like to know more, please contact Meriel 
McCollum at meriel@unc.edu.  
 
This research is being conducted under the direction of Dr. Cheryl Jones, School of Nursing. 
IRB number #19-0405. 
 
Thank you for your consideration, 
 
Meriel McCollum, RN, BSN 
Cheryl B. Jones, PhD, RN, FAAN 
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APPENDIX B: FOLLOW-UP RECRUITMENT EMAIL 
Dear employee of [redacted] Hospital, 
 
We recently invited you to participate in a research study about your experiencing evacuating 
the hospital during Hurricane Florence. We would like to invite you again to participate and 
share your story about what it was like in the workplace during the evacuation.  
 
Participation in this study will involve a one-on-one interview with a doctoral student from 
the UNC School of Nursing about your experiences in the workplace during the evacuation. 
Interviews will be audio recorded and will last approximately one hour. All hospital 
employees who assisted during the evacuation are invited to participate. Your participation is 
voluntary and no compensation is offered for your participation. 
 
If you are interested in participating or would like to know more, please contact Meriel 
McCollum at meriel@unc.edu.  
 
This research is being conducted under the direction of Dr. Cheryl Jones, School of Nursing. 
IRB number #.  
 
Thank you for your consideration, 
 
Meriel McCollum, RN, BSN 
Cheryl B. Jones, PhD, RN, FAAN 
  
 155 
APPENDIX C: FLYER 
 
 
Volunteers wanted for a research study 
 
Hurricane Florence in the Carolinas: Hospital Staff Experiences 
of the Evacuation Work Environment 
 
Did you assist with the evacuation of [redacted] Hospital during Hurricane 
Florence? We are conducting a research study about what it was like to 
evacuate the hospital during the hurricane and are looking for your input!  
 
Participation in this research study will involve a one-on-one interview with a 
doctoral student from the UNC School of Nursing about your experiences in the 
workplace during the evacuation. Interviews will be audio recorded and take 
approximately an hour. All hospital employees who assisted during the 
evacuation are invited to participate. Participation is voluntary, and no 
compensation is offered for your participation.  
 
If you are interested in participating or would like to know more, please contact 




This research is conducted under the direction of Dr. Cheryl Jones, School of Nursing  
 
(IRB number: #19-0405) 
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1. Tell me about your background.   
Potential probes 
• What is your role here at the hospital? 
• How long have you worked here?  
• What is your educational background?  
 
2. Tell me the day that you found out you would be evacuating.   
Potential probes 
• When did you first hear that you would be evacuating? From whom? 
• How did you react to this news? What were your feelings? 
• What were your concerns? Were you concerned about safety? 
• How much time did you have to prepare? Was it enough? 
 
3. Tell me about what it was like to work in the immediate evacuation environment. 
Potential probes 
• What was your role during the evacuation?  
• Did you have enough or adequate supplies and resources? 
• Did you think the layout of the hospital was conducive to evacuation? 
• How did your team work together during the evacuation?  
• Do you think these challenges had any effect on patient or staff? On 
your community? 
 
4. What do you think about your level of preparation?  
Potential probes 
• What came up that was unexpected? Expected? 
• What were you unprepared for? Prepared for? 
• What further training or preparation do you think your hospital needs? 
 
5. What helped you manage your stress during and after the evacuation? 
Potential probes 
• How did the hospital help you manage your stress? 
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